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2021-03-05
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A Warning From Warren Buffett: We’re a Long Way From 1981<blockquote>沃伦·巴菲特的警告：我们距离1981年还有很长的路要走</blockquote>
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Analysts, money managers, journalists, and investors of all stripes tend to read it the weekend it comes out, even if they own no shares.</p><p><blockquote>阅读伯克希尔的信，寻找巴菲特的名言和见解的复活节彩蛋，已经成为金融界许多人的年度传统。分析师、基金经理、记者和各类投资者往往会在报告发布的周末阅读，即使他们不持有股票。</blockquote></p><p>Your editor is one such reader: Though never a shareholder, we’ve been perusing the Buffett letters for nearly 20 years. We also have all of the old letters on file, dating back long before we were born. The best one of all, in our view, is the Buffett Partnership letter covering 1965, available here.</p><p><blockquote>你的编辑就是这样一位读者：虽然从来不是股东，但我们已经仔细阅读巴菲特的信件近20年了。我们也有所有的旧信件存档，可以追溯到我们出生之前很久。在我们看来，最好的一封是涵盖1965年的巴菲特合伙信，可以在这里找到。</blockquote></p><p>The 2021 letter felt somber and restrained compared to past years. This makes sense, given what America and the world had to go through in 2020.</p><p><blockquote>与过去几年相比，2021年的信感觉忧郁而克制。考虑到美国和世界在2020年不得不经历的事情，这是有道理的。</blockquote></p><p>Still, in terms of pessimism and dark warnings — far from the normal fare for Buffett — this passage on the “bleak future” for fixed-income investors stood out:</p><p><blockquote>尽管如此，就悲观和黑暗警告而言——这与巴菲特的正常情况相去甚远——这段关于固定收益投资者“黯淡未来”的文章还是很突出：</blockquote></p><p><i>[B]onds are not the place to be these days. Can you believe that the income recently available from a 10-year U.S. Treasury bond – the yield was 0.93% at year end – had fallen 94% from the 15.8% yield available in September 1981? In certain large and important countries, such as Germany and Japan, investors earn a negative return on trillions of dollars of sovereign debt. Fixed-income investors worldwide – whether pension funds, insurance companies or retirees – face a bleak future.</i></p><p><blockquote><i>现在不是去onds的地方。你能相信最近10年期美国国债的收益（年底收益率为0.93%）比1981年9月的15.8%下降了94%吗？在某些大国和重要国家，如德国和日本，投资者从数万亿美元的主权债务中获得了负回报。全球固定收益投资者——无论是养老基金、保险公司还是退休人员——都面临着黯淡的未来。</i></blockquote></p><p>Per Buffett’s calculation, over the course of almost four decades — from September 1981 to year-end 2020 — the yield on the 10-year note fell by 94%.</p><p><blockquote>根据巴菲特的计算，从1981年9月到2020年底的近四十年时间里，10年期国债的收益率下降了94%。</blockquote></p><p>In regard to falling yields, here is another remarkable stat per Chris Bloomstran, the president and chief investment officer of Semper Augustus: As of Feb. 27, the price of the U.S. 30-year Treasury bond had fallen by more than 16% in three months — a drop that erased 10 full years’ worth of coupon payments. Also per Bloomstran, the 10-year gave up 7 years’ worth of coupons in that time.</p><p><blockquote>关于收益率下降，Semper Augustus总裁兼首席投资官Chris Bloomstran提供了另一个引人注目的统计数据：截至2月27日，美国30年期国债价格在三个月内下跌了16%以上——这一跌幅抹去了整整10年的息票支付。同样根据Bloomstran的说法，10年期债券在此期间放弃了7年的息票。</blockquote></p><p>Imagine clipping coupons on your government bonds for a full decade — then taking a hit on the principal worth all of the payments and then some, over the course of just 12 weeks. Now imagine trying to be a government bond investor moving forward.</p><p><blockquote>想象一下，削减整整十年的政府债券息票，然后在短短12周的时间里，损失了相当于所有付款甚至更多的本金。现在想象一下，努力成为一名政府债券投资者。</blockquote></p><p>For holders of long-dated U.S. Treasuries, the pain is increasing because the U.S. economy is reflating, powered by vaccine optimism, pent-up demand, and a tsunami of fiscal stimulus. Economic growth of the rip-roaring variety is coming, with inflation to follow on the heels of that.</p><p><blockquote>对于长期美国国债持有者来说，痛苦正在增加，因为在疫苗乐观情绪、被压抑的需求和财政刺激海啸的推动下，美国经济正在通货再膨胀。疯狂的经济增长即将到来，随之而来的是通货膨胀。</blockquote></p><p>If you’ll pardon the cheap rhyme, the interest-rate mantra “lower for longer” now looks “wrong and wronger.” Per data from Bespoke Investment Group, the 2021 sell-off in the Merrill Lynch 10+ Year Treasury Index has already produced the third-worst percentage since records began in 1988 — and the year is still young.</p><p><blockquote>如果你原谅这种廉价的押韵，利率“更长时间地降低”的口号现在看起来“越来越错误”。根据Bespoke Investment Group的数据，美林10年期以上国债指数2021年的抛售已经产生了自1988年有记录以来第三差的百分比——而且这一年还很年轻。</blockquote></p><p>Then, too, Buffett’s harkening back to 1981, and a 94% decline in yields over nearly 40 years, is a sobering reminder of how far the pendulum has swung. The chart below, via FRED, shows the four-decade journey of the 10-year yield from 1980 to today.</p><p><blockquote>然后，巴菲特回顾1981年，近40年来收益率下降了94%，这也清醒地提醒人们钟摆已经摆了多远。下图来自FRED，显示了10年期国债收益率从1980年到今天的40年历程。</blockquote></p><p>It is hard to beat the 10-year yield for a vivid illustration of what Ray Dalio calls “the long-term debt cycle.”</p><p><blockquote>很难比10年期国债收益率更能生动地说明雷·达里奥·评级的“长期债务周期”。</blockquote></p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/36263398704c16a502896748461035c5\" tg-width=\"808\" tg-height=\"566\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">The Long-Term Debt Cycle is the cyclical pattern by which interest rates and inflation pressures tend to fall, even as debt and leverage levels rise, for decades at a time.</p><p><blockquote>长期债务周期是一种周期性模式，即使债务和杠杆水平上升，利率和通胀压力也往往会下降，持续数十年。</blockquote></p><p>At the beginning of the long-term debt cycle — which had its genesis in 1981 — inflation was sky-high, while debt and leverage levels were low.</p><p><blockquote>在1981年开始的长期债务周期之初，通货膨胀率极高，而债务和杠杆水平却很低。</blockquote></p><p>Interest rates peaked in 1981 because that was the year Paul Volcker, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, finally “broke the back of inflation” in a way investors could acknowledge.</p><p><blockquote>利率在1981年达到顶峰，因为那一年美联储主席保罗·沃尔克最终以投资者可以承认的方式“打破了通胀的后盾”。</blockquote></p><p>Volcker’s efforts to kill off inflation, through a multi-year period of painfully high interest rates, were part of what cleaned out the debt and the leverage. The United States went through not one, but two recessions in the early 1980s, spaced about 14 months apart, as the price of borrowing went through the roof.</p><p><blockquote>沃尔克通过多年痛苦的高利率消除通货膨胀的努力是清理债务和杠杆的一部分。20世纪80年代初，美国经历了不止一次，而是两次衰退，相隔约14个月，因为借贷价格飙升。</blockquote></p><p>But Volker’s successful anti-inflation campaign, coupled with low debt-and-leverage levels, was the very thing that allowed a new long-term debt cycle to kick off.</p><p><blockquote>但沃尔克成功的反通胀运动，加上低债务和杠杆水平，正是让新的长期债务周期开始的原因。</blockquote></p><p>The build-up of debt to GDP from 1980 onward, as shown in the FRED chart below, is a sort of inverted image of the falling 10-year yield. That is because, in a standard long-term debt cycle, debt levels go up as inflation and borrowing costs go down.<img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/078f1f48bf80854f84c01fc648e7b5f4\" tg-width=\"809\" tg-height=\"563\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">The “bleak future” that Buffett warned of for fixed income investors relates to what happens when the long-term debt cycle reaches its farthest point.</p><p><blockquote>如下图所示，1980年以来债务与GDP之比的增加是10年期国债收益率下降的倒影。这是因为，在标准的长期债务周期中，债务水平会随着通货膨胀和借贷成本的下降而上升。巴菲特警告固定收益投资者的“黯淡未来”与长期债务周期达到最远点时会发生什么有关。</blockquote></p><p></p><p>Think of a giant, slow-moving pendulum that swings in the same direction over a 40-plus-year period. Over that entire window of time, bond yields and inflation pressures are falling, even as debt and leverage levels rise.</p><p><blockquote>想象一个巨大的、缓慢移动的钟摆，在40多年的时间里朝着同一个方向摆动。在整个时间窗口内，债券收益率和通胀压力都在下降，尽管债务和杠杆水平在上升。</blockquote></p><p>Once the pendulum starts to swing the other way, a multi-decade trend in the opposite direction occurs. Instead of falling for decades on end, yields go into a pattern of rising for decades on end (which means bond prices fall); and instead of debt and leverage building up to ever-higher levels as a percentage of output over time, there is a far less pleasant multi-decade period where debt and leverage levels are cut back (or inflated away) to a lesser percentage of output over time, rolling back the previous extreme.</p><p><blockquote>一旦钟摆开始向另一个方向摆动，就会出现几十年相反方向的趋势。收益率不是连续几十年下降，而是连续几十年上升（这意味着债券价格下跌）；随着时间的推移，债务和杠杆率占产出的百分比并没有上升到越来越高的水平，而是有一个远不那么令人愉快的几十年时期，债务和杠杆水平在产出中的百分比随着时间的推移被削减（或膨胀），回落到之前的极端水平。</blockquote></p><p>Then, once the pendulum has swung all the way back, it swings forward yet again, a kind of permanent oscillation between high interest rates versus low, coupled with low debt levels versus high. And because a nation’s economy is immortal — assuming the nation continues to exist — these generational patterns of build-up and roll-back can repeat ad infinitum.</p><p><blockquote>然后，一旦钟摆一直摆回来，它就会再次向前摆动，这是一种高利率与低利率、低债务水平与高债务水平之间的永久振荡。因为一个国家的经济是不朽的——假设这个国家继续存在——这些建立和倒退的代际模式可以无限重复。</blockquote></p><p>What a majority of investors haven’t yet realized is that their entire personal experience in markets — going all the way back to 1981 — is geared toward the pleasant half of the long-term debt cycle.</p><p><blockquote>大多数投资者尚未意识到的是，他们在市场上的整个个人经历——可以追溯到1981年——都是为了长期债务周期中令人愉快的一半。</blockquote></p><p>All that they know on a gut-feel basis — unless they were active market participants in the 1970s — is that left-to-right pendulum swing where interest rates fall, as debt and leverage rise and rise.</p><p><blockquote>他们凭直觉所知道的——除非他们是20世纪70年代的活跃市场参与者——就是利率从左到右的钟摆摆动，债务和杠杆不断上升。</blockquote></p><p>Buffett’s warning to fixed-income investors is a reminder we are headed for the less-pleasant half of the long-term debt cycle — the multi-decade period where interest rates rise and rise, and then rise some more, as governments, corporations, and consumers either actively reduce their debt loads or see the value of those debts inflated away.</p><p><blockquote>巴菲特对固定收益投资者的警告提醒我们，我们正走向长期债务周期中不太愉快的一半——在这一时期，利率不断上升，然后进一步上升，因为政府、企业和消费者要么积极减少债务负担，要么看到这些债务的价值膨胀。</blockquote></p><p>Then, too, inflation is a part of the process because the debt adjustment almost always happens more via inflation than hardcore belt-tightening: It is just easier to reduce the debt load via printing press, which reduces the percentage ratio of debt-to-output over time. That tendency also explains why inflation will likely roar higher again — with interest rates rising up with it — over the next decade or two (or three, or four).</p><p><blockquote>此外，通货膨胀也是这一过程的一部分，因为债务调整几乎总是更多地通过通货膨胀而不是严格的勒紧裤腰带进行：通过印刷机减轻债务负担更容易，印刷机降低了债务与债务的百分比-随着时间的推移产出。这种趋势也解释了为什么在未来一二十年（或三年或四年）内，通胀可能会再次飙升，利率也会随之上升。</blockquote></p><p>Just for fun, we took the 10-year yield chart and flipped the image horizontally (below), to create a visual picture of how the next 40 years might look if the long-term debt cycle retraced its steps perfectly. It’s never that simple, of course, but as a mental exercise, it’s worthwhile trying to imagine interest rates following a path like the one below.<img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/e31778f96af4d69be42e3fed9c5d32a1\" tg-width=\"809\" tg-height=\"564\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">The bottom line is that very few investors are ready for the world that is coming.</p><p><blockquote>只是为了好玩，我们拿了10年期收益率图表并水平翻转图像（下图），以创建一个视觉画面，如果长期债务周期完美回撤，未来40年可能会是什么样子。当然，事情从来没有那么简单，但作为一种心理练习，尝试想象利率遵循如下所示的路径是值得的。底线是，很少有投资者为即将到来的世界做好准备。</blockquote></p><p>With “lower for longer” becoming “wrong and wronger” as the U.S. prepares for emerging-market-like levels of growth in the year ahead — and the Federal Reserve signaling it is fine with a jump in long-term yields, at least for now — dislocations in vulnerable areas of the stock market are likely just beginning.</p><p><blockquote>随着美国为未来一年类似新兴市场的增长水平做准备，“长期走低”变得“越来越错误”——美联储表示，至少就目前而言，长期收益率的上升是可以接受的——股市脆弱领域的混乱可能才刚刚开始。</blockquote></p><p><i>Originally by Beverly Becker for TradeSmith.com</i>.</p><p><blockquote><i>最初由Beverly Becker为TradeSmith.com撰写</i>.</blockquote></p><p>The views and opinions expressed herein are the views and opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Nasdaq, Inc.</p><p><blockquote>本文表达的观点和意见是作者的观点和意见，不一定反映纳斯达克公司的观点和意见。</blockquote></p><p></p>","source":"lsy1603171495471","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; 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color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nA Warning From Warren Buffett: We’re a Long Way From 1981<blockquote>沃伦·巴菲特的警告：我们距离1981年还有很长的路要走</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n<p class=\"head\">\n<strong class=\"h-name small\">Nasdaq</strong><span class=\"h-time small\">2021-03-05 10:37</span>\n</p>\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n<p>The Berkshire Hathaway annual letter — penned, as always, by CEO Warren Buffett, now 90 years old — came out this past weekend. </p><p><blockquote>伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的年度信函一如既往地由现年90岁的首席执行官沃伦·巴菲特撰写，于上周末发布。</blockquote></p><p>Reading the Berkshire letter, and hunting for easter eggs of Buffett bon mots and insights, has become a kind of annual tradition for much of the financial world. Analysts, money managers, journalists, and investors of all stripes tend to read it the weekend it comes out, even if they own no shares.</p><p><blockquote>阅读伯克希尔的信，寻找巴菲特的名言和见解的复活节彩蛋，已经成为金融界许多人的年度传统。分析师、基金经理、记者和各类投资者往往会在报告发布的周末阅读，即使他们不持有股票。</blockquote></p><p>Your editor is one such reader: Though never a shareholder, we’ve been perusing the Buffett letters for nearly 20 years. We also have all of the old letters on file, dating back long before we were born. The best one of all, in our view, is the Buffett Partnership letter covering 1965, available here.</p><p><blockquote>你的编辑就是这样一位读者：虽然从来不是股东，但我们已经仔细阅读巴菲特的信件近20年了。我们也有所有的旧信件存档，可以追溯到我们出生之前很久。在我们看来，最好的一封是涵盖1965年的巴菲特合伙信，可以在这里找到。</blockquote></p><p>The 2021 letter felt somber and restrained compared to past years. This makes sense, given what America and the world had to go through in 2020.</p><p><blockquote>与过去几年相比，2021年的信感觉忧郁而克制。考虑到美国和世界在2020年不得不经历的事情，这是有道理的。</blockquote></p><p>Still, in terms of pessimism and dark warnings — far from the normal fare for Buffett — this passage on the “bleak future” for fixed-income investors stood out:</p><p><blockquote>尽管如此，就悲观和黑暗警告而言——这与巴菲特的正常情况相去甚远——这段关于固定收益投资者“黯淡未来”的文章还是很突出：</blockquote></p><p><i>[B]onds are not the place to be these days. Can you believe that the income recently available from a 10-year U.S. Treasury bond – the yield was 0.93% at year end – had fallen 94% from the 15.8% yield available in September 1981? In certain large and important countries, such as Germany and Japan, investors earn a negative return on trillions of dollars of sovereign debt. Fixed-income investors worldwide – whether pension funds, insurance companies or retirees – face a bleak future.</i></p><p><blockquote><i>现在不是去onds的地方。你能相信最近10年期美国国债的收益（年底收益率为0.93%）比1981年9月的15.8%下降了94%吗？在某些大国和重要国家，如德国和日本，投资者从数万亿美元的主权债务中获得了负回报。全球固定收益投资者——无论是养老基金、保险公司还是退休人员——都面临着黯淡的未来。</i></blockquote></p><p>Per Buffett’s calculation, over the course of almost four decades — from September 1981 to year-end 2020 — the yield on the 10-year note fell by 94%.</p><p><blockquote>根据巴菲特的计算，从1981年9月到2020年底的近四十年时间里，10年期国债的收益率下降了94%。</blockquote></p><p>In regard to falling yields, here is another remarkable stat per Chris Bloomstran, the president and chief investment officer of Semper Augustus: As of Feb. 27, the price of the U.S. 30-year Treasury bond had fallen by more than 16% in three months — a drop that erased 10 full years’ worth of coupon payments. Also per Bloomstran, the 10-year gave up 7 years’ worth of coupons in that time.</p><p><blockquote>关于收益率下降，Semper Augustus总裁兼首席投资官Chris Bloomstran提供了另一个引人注目的统计数据：截至2月27日，美国30年期国债价格在三个月内下跌了16%以上——这一跌幅抹去了整整10年的息票支付。同样根据Bloomstran的说法，10年期债券在此期间放弃了7年的息票。</blockquote></p><p>Imagine clipping coupons on your government bonds for a full decade — then taking a hit on the principal worth all of the payments and then some, over the course of just 12 weeks. Now imagine trying to be a government bond investor moving forward.</p><p><blockquote>想象一下，削减整整十年的政府债券息票，然后在短短12周的时间里，损失了相当于所有付款甚至更多的本金。现在想象一下，努力成为一名政府债券投资者。</blockquote></p><p>For holders of long-dated U.S. Treasuries, the pain is increasing because the U.S. economy is reflating, powered by vaccine optimism, pent-up demand, and a tsunami of fiscal stimulus. Economic growth of the rip-roaring variety is coming, with inflation to follow on the heels of that.</p><p><blockquote>对于长期美国国债持有者来说，痛苦正在增加，因为在疫苗乐观情绪、被压抑的需求和财政刺激海啸的推动下，美国经济正在通货再膨胀。疯狂的经济增长即将到来，随之而来的是通货膨胀。</blockquote></p><p>If you’ll pardon the cheap rhyme, the interest-rate mantra “lower for longer” now looks “wrong and wronger.” Per data from Bespoke Investment Group, the 2021 sell-off in the Merrill Lynch 10+ Year Treasury Index has already produced the third-worst percentage since records began in 1988 — and the year is still young.</p><p><blockquote>如果你原谅这种廉价的押韵，利率“更长时间地降低”的口号现在看起来“越来越错误”。根据Bespoke Investment Group的数据，美林10年期以上国债指数2021年的抛售已经产生了自1988年有记录以来第三差的百分比——而且这一年还很年轻。</blockquote></p><p>Then, too, Buffett’s harkening back to 1981, and a 94% decline in yields over nearly 40 years, is a sobering reminder of how far the pendulum has swung. The chart below, via FRED, shows the four-decade journey of the 10-year yield from 1980 to today.</p><p><blockquote>然后，巴菲特回顾1981年，近40年来收益率下降了94%，这也清醒地提醒人们钟摆已经摆了多远。下图来自FRED，显示了10年期国债收益率从1980年到今天的40年历程。</blockquote></p><p>It is hard to beat the 10-year yield for a vivid illustration of what Ray Dalio calls “the long-term debt cycle.”</p><p><blockquote>很难比10年期国债收益率更能生动地说明雷·达里奥·评级的“长期债务周期”。</blockquote></p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/36263398704c16a502896748461035c5\" tg-width=\"808\" tg-height=\"566\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">The Long-Term Debt Cycle is the cyclical pattern by which interest rates and inflation pressures tend to fall, even as debt and leverage levels rise, for decades at a time.</p><p><blockquote>长期债务周期是一种周期性模式，即使债务和杠杆水平上升，利率和通胀压力也往往会下降，持续数十年。</blockquote></p><p>At the beginning of the long-term debt cycle — which had its genesis in 1981 — inflation was sky-high, while debt and leverage levels were low.</p><p><blockquote>在1981年开始的长期债务周期之初，通货膨胀率极高，而债务和杠杆水平却很低。</blockquote></p><p>Interest rates peaked in 1981 because that was the year Paul Volcker, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, finally “broke the back of inflation” in a way investors could acknowledge.</p><p><blockquote>利率在1981年达到顶峰，因为那一年美联储主席保罗·沃尔克最终以投资者可以承认的方式“打破了通胀的后盾”。</blockquote></p><p>Volcker’s efforts to kill off inflation, through a multi-year period of painfully high interest rates, were part of what cleaned out the debt and the leverage. The United States went through not one, but two recessions in the early 1980s, spaced about 14 months apart, as the price of borrowing went through the roof.</p><p><blockquote>沃尔克通过多年痛苦的高利率消除通货膨胀的努力是清理债务和杠杆的一部分。20世纪80年代初，美国经历了不止一次，而是两次衰退，相隔约14个月，因为借贷价格飙升。</blockquote></p><p>But Volker’s successful anti-inflation campaign, coupled with low debt-and-leverage levels, was the very thing that allowed a new long-term debt cycle to kick off.</p><p><blockquote>但沃尔克成功的反通胀运动，加上低债务和杠杆水平，正是让新的长期债务周期开始的原因。</blockquote></p><p>The build-up of debt to GDP from 1980 onward, as shown in the FRED chart below, is a sort of inverted image of the falling 10-year yield. That is because, in a standard long-term debt cycle, debt levels go up as inflation and borrowing costs go down.<img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/078f1f48bf80854f84c01fc648e7b5f4\" tg-width=\"809\" tg-height=\"563\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">The “bleak future” that Buffett warned of for fixed income investors relates to what happens when the long-term debt cycle reaches its farthest point.</p><p><blockquote>如下图所示，1980年以来债务与GDP之比的增加是10年期国债收益率下降的倒影。这是因为，在标准的长期债务周期中，债务水平会随着通货膨胀和借贷成本的下降而上升。巴菲特警告固定收益投资者的“黯淡未来”与长期债务周期达到最远点时会发生什么有关。</blockquote></p><p></p><p>Think of a giant, slow-moving pendulum that swings in the same direction over a 40-plus-year period. Over that entire window of time, bond yields and inflation pressures are falling, even as debt and leverage levels rise.</p><p><blockquote>想象一个巨大的、缓慢移动的钟摆，在40多年的时间里朝着同一个方向摆动。在整个时间窗口内，债券收益率和通胀压力都在下降，尽管债务和杠杆水平在上升。</blockquote></p><p>Once the pendulum starts to swing the other way, a multi-decade trend in the opposite direction occurs. Instead of falling for decades on end, yields go into a pattern of rising for decades on end (which means bond prices fall); and instead of debt and leverage building up to ever-higher levels as a percentage of output over time, there is a far less pleasant multi-decade period where debt and leverage levels are cut back (or inflated away) to a lesser percentage of output over time, rolling back the previous extreme.</p><p><blockquote>一旦钟摆开始向另一个方向摆动，就会出现几十年相反方向的趋势。收益率不是连续几十年下降，而是连续几十年上升（这意味着债券价格下跌）；随着时间的推移，债务和杠杆率占产出的百分比并没有上升到越来越高的水平，而是有一个远不那么令人愉快的几十年时期，债务和杠杆水平在产出中的百分比随着时间的推移被削减（或膨胀），回落到之前的极端水平。</blockquote></p><p>Then, once the pendulum has swung all the way back, it swings forward yet again, a kind of permanent oscillation between high interest rates versus low, coupled with low debt levels versus high. And because a nation’s economy is immortal — assuming the nation continues to exist — these generational patterns of build-up and roll-back can repeat ad infinitum.</p><p><blockquote>然后，一旦钟摆一直摆回来，它就会再次向前摆动，这是一种高利率与低利率、低债务水平与高债务水平之间的永久振荡。因为一个国家的经济是不朽的——假设这个国家继续存在——这些建立和倒退的代际模式可以无限重复。</blockquote></p><p>What a majority of investors haven’t yet realized is that their entire personal experience in markets — going all the way back to 1981 — is geared toward the pleasant half of the long-term debt cycle.</p><p><blockquote>大多数投资者尚未意识到的是，他们在市场上的整个个人经历——可以追溯到1981年——都是为了长期债务周期中令人愉快的一半。</blockquote></p><p>All that they know on a gut-feel basis — unless they were active market participants in the 1970s — is that left-to-right pendulum swing where interest rates fall, as debt and leverage rise and rise.</p><p><blockquote>他们凭直觉所知道的——除非他们是20世纪70年代的活跃市场参与者——就是利率从左到右的钟摆摆动，债务和杠杆不断上升。</blockquote></p><p>Buffett’s warning to fixed-income investors is a reminder we are headed for the less-pleasant half of the long-term debt cycle — the multi-decade period where interest rates rise and rise, and then rise some more, as governments, corporations, and consumers either actively reduce their debt loads or see the value of those debts inflated away.</p><p><blockquote>巴菲特对固定收益投资者的警告提醒我们，我们正走向长期债务周期中不太愉快的一半——在这一时期，利率不断上升，然后进一步上升，因为政府、企业和消费者要么积极减少债务负担，要么看到这些债务的价值膨胀。</blockquote></p><p>Then, too, inflation is a part of the process because the debt adjustment almost always happens more via inflation than hardcore belt-tightening: It is just easier to reduce the debt load via printing press, which reduces the percentage ratio of debt-to-output over time. That tendency also explains why inflation will likely roar higher again — with interest rates rising up with it — over the next decade or two (or three, or four).</p><p><blockquote>此外，通货膨胀也是这一过程的一部分，因为债务调整几乎总是更多地通过通货膨胀而不是严格的勒紧裤腰带进行：通过印刷机减轻债务负担更容易，印刷机降低了债务与债务的百分比-随着时间的推移产出。这种趋势也解释了为什么在未来一二十年（或三年或四年）内，通胀可能会再次飙升，利率也会随之上升。</blockquote></p><p>Just for fun, we took the 10-year yield chart and flipped the image horizontally (below), to create a visual picture of how the next 40 years might look if the long-term debt cycle retraced its steps perfectly. It’s never that simple, of course, but as a mental exercise, it’s worthwhile trying to imagine interest rates following a path like the one below.<img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/e31778f96af4d69be42e3fed9c5d32a1\" tg-width=\"809\" tg-height=\"564\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">The bottom line is that very few investors are ready for the world that is coming.</p><p><blockquote>只是为了好玩，我们拿了10年期收益率图表并水平翻转图像（下图），以创建一个视觉画面，如果长期债务周期完美回撤，未来40年可能会是什么样子。当然，事情从来没有那么简单，但作为一种心理练习，尝试想象利率遵循如下所示的路径是值得的。底线是，很少有投资者为即将到来的世界做好准备。</blockquote></p><p>With “lower for longer” becoming “wrong and wronger” as the U.S. prepares for emerging-market-like levels of growth in the year ahead — and the Federal Reserve signaling it is fine with a jump in long-term yields, at least for now — dislocations in vulnerable areas of the stock market are likely just beginning.</p><p><blockquote>随着美国为未来一年类似新兴市场的增长水平做准备，“长期走低”变得“越来越错误”——美联储表示，至少就目前而言，长期收益率的上升是可以接受的——股市脆弱领域的混乱可能才刚刚开始。</blockquote></p><p><i>Originally by Beverly Becker for TradeSmith.com</i>.</p><p><blockquote><i>最初由Beverly Becker为TradeSmith.com撰写</i>.</blockquote></p><p>The views and opinions expressed herein are the views and opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Nasdaq, Inc.</p><p><blockquote>本文表达的观点和意见是作者的观点和意见，不一定反映纳斯达克公司的观点和意见。</blockquote></p><p></p>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n<p> 来源：<a href=\"https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/a-warning-from-warren-buffett%3A-were-a-long-way-from-1981-2021-03-04\">Nasdaq</a></p>\n<p>为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化</p>\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{},"source_url":"https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/a-warning-from-warren-buffett%3A-were-a-long-way-from-1981-2021-03-04","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1112359794","content_text":"The Berkshire Hathaway annual letter — penned, as always, by CEO Warren Buffett, now 90 years old — came out this past weekend. Reading the Berkshire letter, and hunting for easter eggs of Buffett bon mots and insights, has become a kind of annual tradition for much of the financial world. Analysts, money managers, journalists, and investors of all stripes tend to read it the weekend it comes out, even if they own no shares.Your editor is one such reader: Though never a shareholder, we’ve been perusing the Buffett letters for nearly 20 years. We also have all of the old letters on file, dating back long before we were born. The best one of all, in our view, is the Buffett Partnership letter covering 1965, available here.The 2021 letter felt somber and restrained compared to past years. This makes sense, given what America and the world had to go through in 2020.Still, in terms of pessimism and dark warnings — far from the normal fare for Buffett — this passage on the “bleak future” for fixed-income investors stood out:[B]onds are not the place to be these days. Can you believe that the income recently available from a 10-year U.S. Treasury bond – the yield was 0.93% at year end – had fallen 94% from the 15.8% yield available in September 1981? In certain large and important countries, such as Germany and Japan, investors earn a negative return on trillions of dollars of sovereign debt. Fixed-income investors worldwide – whether pension funds, insurance companies or retirees – face a bleak future.Per Buffett’s calculation, over the course of almost four decades — from September 1981 to year-end 2020 — the yield on the 10-year note fell by 94%.In regard to falling yields, here is another remarkable stat per Chris Bloomstran, the president and chief investment officer of Semper Augustus: As of Feb. 27, the price of the U.S. 30-year Treasury bond had fallen by more than 16% in three months — a drop that erased 10 full years’ worth of coupon payments. Also per Bloomstran, the 10-year gave up 7 years’ worth of coupons in that time.Imagine clipping coupons on your government bonds for a full decade — then taking a hit on the principal worth all of the payments and then some, over the course of just 12 weeks. Now imagine trying to be a government bond investor moving forward.For holders of long-dated U.S. Treasuries, the pain is increasing because the U.S. economy is reflating, powered by vaccine optimism, pent-up demand, and a tsunami of fiscal stimulus. Economic growth of the rip-roaring variety is coming, with inflation to follow on the heels of that.If you’ll pardon the cheap rhyme, the interest-rate mantra “lower for longer” now looks “wrong and wronger.” Per data from Bespoke Investment Group, the 2021 sell-off in the Merrill Lynch 10+ Year Treasury Index has already produced the third-worst percentage since records began in 1988 — and the year is still young.Then, too, Buffett’s harkening back to 1981, and a 94% decline in yields over nearly 40 years, is a sobering reminder of how far the pendulum has swung. The chart below, via FRED, shows the four-decade journey of the 10-year yield from 1980 to today.It is hard to beat the 10-year yield for a vivid illustration of what Ray Dalio calls “the long-term debt cycle.”The Long-Term Debt Cycle is the cyclical pattern by which interest rates and inflation pressures tend to fall, even as debt and leverage levels rise, for decades at a time.At the beginning of the long-term debt cycle — which had its genesis in 1981 — inflation was sky-high, while debt and leverage levels were low.Interest rates peaked in 1981 because that was the year Paul Volcker, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, finally “broke the back of inflation” in a way investors could acknowledge.Volcker’s efforts to kill off inflation, through a multi-year period of painfully high interest rates, were part of what cleaned out the debt and the leverage. The United States went through not one, but two recessions in the early 1980s, spaced about 14 months apart, as the price of borrowing went through the roof.But Volker’s successful anti-inflation campaign, coupled with low debt-and-leverage levels, was the very thing that allowed a new long-term debt cycle to kick off.The build-up of debt to GDP from 1980 onward, as shown in the FRED chart below, is a sort of inverted image of the falling 10-year yield. That is because, in a standard long-term debt cycle, debt levels go up as inflation and borrowing costs go down.The “bleak future” that Buffett warned of for fixed income investors relates to what happens when the long-term debt cycle reaches its farthest point.Think of a giant, slow-moving pendulum that swings in the same direction over a 40-plus-year period. Over that entire window of time, bond yields and inflation pressures are falling, even as debt and leverage levels rise.Once the pendulum starts to swing the other way, a multi-decade trend in the opposite direction occurs. Instead of falling for decades on end, yields go into a pattern of rising for decades on end (which means bond prices fall); and instead of debt and leverage building up to ever-higher levels as a percentage of output over time, there is a far less pleasant multi-decade period where debt and leverage levels are cut back (or inflated away) to a lesser percentage of output over time, rolling back the previous extreme.Then, once the pendulum has swung all the way back, it swings forward yet again, a kind of permanent oscillation between high interest rates versus low, coupled with low debt levels versus high. And because a nation’s economy is immortal — assuming the nation continues to exist — these generational patterns of build-up and roll-back can repeat ad infinitum.What a majority of investors haven’t yet realized is that their entire personal experience in markets — going all the way back to 1981 — is geared toward the pleasant half of the long-term debt cycle.All that they know on a gut-feel basis — unless they were active market participants in the 1970s — is that left-to-right pendulum swing where interest rates fall, as debt and leverage rise and rise.Buffett’s warning to fixed-income investors is a reminder we are headed for the less-pleasant half of the long-term debt cycle — the multi-decade period where interest rates rise and rise, and then rise some more, as governments, corporations, and consumers either actively reduce their debt loads or see the value of those debts inflated away.Then, too, inflation is a part of the process because the debt adjustment almost always happens more via inflation than hardcore belt-tightening: It is just easier to reduce the debt load via printing press, which reduces the percentage ratio of debt-to-output over time. That tendency also explains why inflation will likely roar higher again — with interest rates rising up with it — over the next decade or two (or three, or four).Just for fun, we took the 10-year yield chart and flipped the image horizontally (below), to create a visual picture of how the next 40 years might look if the long-term debt cycle retraced its steps perfectly. It’s never that simple, of course, but as a mental exercise, it’s worthwhile trying to imagine interest rates following a path like the one below.The bottom line is that very few investors are ready for the world that is coming.With “lower for longer” becoming “wrong and wronger” as the U.S. prepares for emerging-market-like levels of growth in the year ahead — and the Federal Reserve signaling it is fine with a jump in long-term yields, at least for now — dislocations in vulnerable areas of the stock market are likely just beginning.Originally by Beverly Becker for TradeSmith.com.The views and opinions expressed herein are the views and opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Nasdaq, Inc.","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{}},"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":881,"commentLimit":10,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"symbols":[],"verified":2,"subType":0,"readableState":1,"langContent":"CN","currentLanguage":"CN","warmUpFlag":false,"orderFlag":false,"shareable":true,"causeOfNotShareable":"","featuresForAnalytics":[],"commentAndTweetFlag":false,"andRepostAutoSelectedFlag":false,"upFlag":false,"length":21,"xxTargetLangEnum":"ZH_CN"},"commentList":[],"isCommentEnd":true,"isTiger":false,"isWeiXinMini":false,"url":"/m/post/367135803"}
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