They maybe over exaggerating w_老虎社区_美港股上老虎

2021-09-07

They maybe over exaggerating when talking about gains

Investors love to boast about their great stock picks, but beware of those who use fancy math to calculate their gains<blockquote>投资者喜欢吹嘘他们出色的股票选择，但要小心那些使用花哨的数学来计算收益的人</blockquote>

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{"i18n":{"language":"zh_CN"},"detailType":1,"isChannel":false,"data":{"magic":2,"id":817520695,"tweetId":"817520695","gmtCreate":1630976125917,"gmtModify":1631887249734,"author":{"id":3576020103442242,"idStr":"3576020103442242","authorId":3576020103442242,"authorIdStr":"3576020103442242","name":"hoa","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0fde20263e39879236fafd316b76c363","vip":1,"userType":1,"introduction":"","boolIsFan":false,"boolIsHead":false,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[],"fanSize":37,"starInvestorFlag":false},"themes":[],"images":[],"coverImages":[],"extraTitle":"","html":"<html><head></head><body>They maybe over exaggerating when talking about gains</body></html>","htmlText":"<html><head></head><body>They maybe over exaggerating when talking about gains</body></html>","text":"They maybe over exaggerating when talking about gains","highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":9,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"favoriteSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/817520695","repostId":2165809018,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"2165809018","kind":"highlight","pubTimestamp":1630975805,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/2165809018?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-09-07 08:50","market":"us","language":"en","title":"Investors love to boast about their great stock picks, but beware of those who use fancy math to calculate their gains<blockquote>投资者喜欢吹嘘他们出色的股票选择，但要小心那些使用花哨的数学来计算收益的人</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=2165809018","media":"MarketWatch","summary":"Even pros rarely beat the stock market\nGetty Images\nBeating the market is so difficult that you'd be","content":"Even pros rarely beat the stock market<blockquote>即使是专业人士也很少跑赢股市</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/c518e42fc389c9a262ce1a76a11d484e\" tg-width=\"700\" tg-height=\"466\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Getty Images<blockquote>盖蒂图片</blockquote> Beating the market is so difficult that you'd be excused for giving up.<blockquote>战胜市场是如此困难，你放弃是情有可原的。</blockquote> But unlike what happens when you give up elsewhere in life, in the investment arena it's actually a shrewd strategy for winning.<blockquote>但与你在生活中其他地方放弃时会发生的情况不同，在投资领域，这实际上是一种精明的获胜策略。</blockquote> After more than 40 years of rigorously auditing the performance of investment advisers, I have learned that over the long term, buying and holding an index fund that tracks the S&amp;P 500 or other broad index nearly always comes out ahead of all other attempts to do better, such as market timing or picking particular stocks, ETFs and mutual funds.<blockquote>经过40多年对投资顾问业绩的严格审计，我了解到，从长远来看，购买并持有跟踪标普500或其他广泛指数的指数基金几乎总是领先于所有其他做得更好的尝试，例如市场时机或选择特定股票、ETF和共同基金。</blockquote> It's amazing when you think about it: What other pursuit in life is there in which you can come close to winning every race by simply sitting on your hands and doing nothing?<blockquote>当你想到这一点时，你会感到惊讶：生活中还有什么其他的追求，你可以通过简单地袖手旁观，无所事事来接近赢得每一场比赛？</blockquote> I'm not saying it's impossible to beat the market. What I am saying is that it's very difficult and rare. And it's even rarer for an adviser who beats the market in one period to do so in the successive period as well.<blockquote>我并不是说不可能战胜市场。我想说的是这非常困难和罕见。在一个时期跑赢市场的顾问在下一个时期也跑赢市场的情况就更罕见了。</blockquote> I am not the first person to point this out. But what I can contribute to the debate is my extensive performance database that contains real-world returns back to 1980. It compellingly shows how impossibly low your odds are of winning when trying to beat the market.<blockquote>我不是第一个指出这一点的人。但我能为这场辩论做出贡献的是我广泛的绩效数据库，其中包含了1980年以来的真实世界回报。它令人信服地表明，当你试图击败市场时，你的胜算是多么低。</blockquote> My first step in drawing investment lessons from my huge database was to construct a list of investment newsletter portfolios that at any point since 1980 were in the top 10% for performance in a given calendar year. Given how many newsletters my Hulbert Financial Digest has monitored over the years, this list of top decile performers was sizable, containing more than 1,500 portfolios. By construction, the percentiles of their performance rank all fell between 90 and 100, and averaged 95.<blockquote>我从庞大的数据库中汲取投资经验的第一步是构建一个投资通讯投资组合列表，这些投资组合自1980年以来在给定日历年的任何时候都处于业绩前10%的位置。考虑到《我的赫伯特金融文摘》多年来监测的时事通讯数量，这份表现最好的十分之一的名单相当大，包含超过1,500个投资组合。从结构上看，他们的表现排名都在90到100之间，平均为95。</blockquote> What I wanted to measure was how these newsletter portfolios performed in the immediately succeeding year. If performance were a matter of pure skill, then we'd expect that they would have been in the top decile for performance in that second year as well--with an average percentile rank that also was 95.<blockquote>我想衡量的是这些时事通讯组合在接下来的一年中的表现。如果表现是一个纯粹的技能问题，那么我们预计他们在第二年的表现也会排在前十分位——平均百分位排名也是95。</blockquote> That's not what I found, however--not by a long shot. These newsletters' average percentile rank in that second year was just 51.5. That is statistically similar to the 50.0 it would have been if performance were a matter of pure luck.<blockquote>然而，这不是我发现的——一点也不。这些时事通讯在第二年的平均百分位排名仅为51.5。从统计数据来看，这与如果表现纯粹是运气问题，则为50.0相似。</blockquote> I next repeated this analysis for each of the other nine deciles for initial-year performance rank. As you can see from this chart, their expected ranks in the successive years were very close to the 50 percentile, regardless of their performance in the initial year.<blockquote>接下来，我对第一年绩效排名的其他九个十分位数重复了这一分析。从这张图表中可以看出，无论他们第一年的表现如何，他们在随后几年的预期排名都非常接近50%。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/ebfad8a8d9638e4b57cf085b425e5742\" tg-width=\"700\" tg-height=\"569\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> The only exception came for newsletters in the bottom 10% for first-year return. The average second-year percentile ranking was 38.8--significantly below what you'd expect if performance were a matter of pure luck. In other words, it's a decent bet that one year's worst adviser will have a below-average performance in the subsequent year too.<blockquote>唯一的例外是第一年回报率垫底10%的时事通讯。第二年的平均百分位排名为38.8——如果表现纯粹是运气问题，这远远低于你的预期。换句话说，一年最差的顾问在下一年的表现也将低于平均水平，这是一个不错的赌注。</blockquote> What these results mean: While investment advisory performance is not a matter of pure randomness, the deviations from randomness primarily occur among the worst performers--not the best. Unfortunately that doesn't help us to beat the market.<blockquote>这些结果意味着什么：虽然投资咨询的表现不是纯粹的随机性问题，但与随机性的偏差主要发生在表现最差的人身上，而不是表现最好的人。不幸的是，这并不能帮助我们战胜市场。</blockquote> By the way, don't think that you can wriggle out from these conclusions by arguing that other kinds of advisers are better than newsletter editors. At least in regards to the persistence (or lack thereof) between past and future performance, newsletter editors are no different than managers of mutual funds, ETFs, hedge funds and private-equity funds.<blockquote>顺便说一句，不要认为你可以通过争论其他类型的顾问比时事通讯编辑更好来摆脱这些结论。至少就过去和未来表现之间的持久性（或缺乏持久性）而言，时事通讯编辑与共同基金、ETF、对冲基金和私募股权基金的经理没有什么不同。</blockquote> Beware of arrogance<blockquote>谨防傲慢</blockquote> While I believe the data are conclusive, I'm not holding my breath that it will persuade many of you to throw in the towel and go with an index fund. That's because the typical investor all too often believes that the poor odds of beating the market apply to everyone else but not to him individually.<blockquote>虽然我相信这些数据是确凿的，但我并不认为它会说服你们中的许多人认输并选择指数基金。这是因为典型的投资者往往认为，战胜市场的可能性很小，适用于其他人，但不适用于他个人。</blockquote> It reminds me of the famous study in which almost all of us indicate we're better-than-average drivers.<blockquote>这让我想起了一项著名的研究，在这项研究中，几乎所有人都表示我们是比平均水平更好的司机。</blockquote> This arrogance has obviously dangerous consequences on our roads and highways. But it's dangerous in the investment arena as well because it leads investors into incurring greater and greater risks.<blockquote>这种傲慢显然对我们的道路和高速公路产生了危险的后果。但这在投资领域也是危险的，因为它会导致投资者承担越来越大的风险。</blockquote> That creates a downward spiral: When the arrogant investor starts losing to the market, which inevitably happens sooner or later, he pursues an even riskier strategy to make up for his prior loss. That in turn invariably leads him to suffer even greater losses. And the cycle repeats.<blockquote>这就造成了一个螺旋式下降：当傲慢的投资者开始输给市场时（这迟早不可避免地会发生），他会采取风险更大的策略来弥补之前的损失。这反过来又不可避免地导致他遭受更大的损失。循环重复。</blockquote> The temptation of arrogance is particularly evident when it comes to social media. Psychologists have found that younger investors are far more inclined to pursue risky strategies when they are being watched than when operating alone. This helps to explain the bravado that so frequently is exhibited on investment-focused social media platforms.<blockquote>当涉及到社交媒体时，傲慢的诱惑尤其明显。心理学家发现，年轻投资者在被监视时远比独自操作时更倾向于追求高风险策略。这有助于解释以投资为重点的社交媒体平台上经常表现出的虚张声势。</blockquote> Buying and holding an index fund is boring. Adherents are rarely drawn to social media in the first place, and even if they are, they rarely post that they are continuing to hold the same investment they've had for years.<blockquote>购买并持有指数基金很无聊。追随者很少首先被社交媒体吸引，即使他们被吸引，他们也很少发布他们继续持有多年来的相同投资。</blockquote> Beware of this trick, too<blockquote>也要小心这招</blockquote> A similar dynamic leads those who frequent social media to brag about their spectacular winners while ignoring their losers. One frequent way they do it is to annualize their returns from a short-term trade and then boast about that figure. Imagine a stock that goes from $10 to $11 in a week's time. In itself, that doesn't seem particularly remarkable. On an annualized basis, however, that is equivalent to a gain of more than 14,000%.<blockquote>类似的动态导致那些经常使用社交媒体的人吹嘘他们壮观的赢家，而忽视他们的输家。他们经常这样做的一种方式是将短期交易的回报按年计算，然后吹嘘这个数字。想象一下，一只股票在一周内从10美元涨到11美元。就其本身而言，这似乎并不特别引人注目。然而，按年化计算，这相当于超过14,000%的收益。</blockquote> Readers of these social media boasts initially must believe they are the only ones with a mixture of both winning and losing trades. Only later do they discover the unspoken rules of social media platforms: it's bad form to ask fellow investors about their losers, just like it's poor etiquette after a round of golf to ask the boastful golfer whether he actually beat par.<blockquote>这些社交媒体吹嘘的读者最初必须相信他们是唯一一个既有输赢交易的人。直到后来，他们才发现社交媒体平台的潜规则：向其他投资者询问他们的输家是一种糟糕的形式，就像在一轮高尔夫球后询问自吹自擂的高尔夫球手是否真的打出了标准杆是一种糟糕的礼仪一样。</blockquote> Humility is a virtue in the investment area. We would do well to remember Socrates' famous line: \"I am the wisest man alive, for I know one thing, and that is that I know nothing.\"<blockquote>谦逊是投资领域的一种美德。我们最好记住苏格拉底的名言：“我是世上最聪明的人，因为我知道一件事，那就是我什么都不知道。”</blockquote>","source":"lsy1603348471595","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>Investors love to boast about their great stock picks, but beware of those who use fancy math to calculate their gains<blockquote>投资者喜欢吹嘘他们出色的股票选择，但要小心那些使用花哨的数学来计算收益的人</blockquote></title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nInvestors love to boast about their great stock picks, but beware of those who use fancy math to calculate their gains<blockquote>投资者喜欢吹嘘他们出色的股票选择，但要小心那些使用花哨的数学来计算收益的人</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n\nMarketWatch2021-09-07 08:50\n\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\nEven pros rarely beat the stock market<blockquote>即使是专业人士也很少跑赢股市</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/c518e42fc389c9a262ce1a76a11d484e\" tg-width=\"700\" tg-height=\"466\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Getty Images<blockquote>盖蒂图片</blockquote> Beating the market is so difficult that you'd be excused for giving up.<blockquote>战胜市场是如此困难，你放弃是情有可原的。</blockquote> But unlike what happens when you give up elsewhere in life, in the investment arena it's actually a shrewd strategy for winning.<blockquote>但与你在生活中其他地方放弃时会发生的情况不同，在投资领域，这实际上是一种精明的获胜策略。</blockquote> After more than 40 years of rigorously auditing the performance of investment advisers, I have learned that over the long term, buying and holding an index fund that tracks the S&amp;P 500 or other broad index nearly always comes out ahead of all other attempts to do better, such as market timing or picking particular stocks, ETFs and mutual funds.<blockquote>经过40多年对投资顾问业绩的严格审计，我了解到，从长远来看，购买并持有跟踪标普500或其他广泛指数的指数基金几乎总是领先于所有其他做得更好的尝试，例如市场时机或选择特定股票、ETF和共同基金。</blockquote> It's amazing when you think about it: What other pursuit in life is there in which you can come close to winning every race by simply sitting on your hands and doing nothing?<blockquote>当你想到这一点时，你会感到惊讶：生活中还有什么其他的追求，你可以通过简单地袖手旁观，无所事事来接近赢得每一场比赛？</blockquote> I'm not saying it's impossible to beat the market. What I am saying is that it's very difficult and rare. And it's even rarer for an adviser who beats the market in one period to do so in the successive period as well.<blockquote>我并不是说不可能战胜市场。我想说的是这非常困难和罕见。在一个时期跑赢市场的顾问在下一个时期也跑赢市场的情况就更罕见了。</blockquote> I am not the first person to point this out. But what I can contribute to the debate is my extensive performance database that contains real-world returns back to 1980. It compellingly shows how impossibly low your odds are of winning when trying to beat the market.<blockquote>我不是第一个指出这一点的人。但我能为这场辩论做出贡献的是我广泛的绩效数据库，其中包含了1980年以来的真实世界回报。它令人信服地表明，当你试图击败市场时，你的胜算是多么低。</blockquote> My first step in drawing investment lessons from my huge database was to construct a list of investment newsletter portfolios that at any point since 1980 were in the top 10% for performance in a given calendar year. Given how many newsletters my Hulbert Financial Digest has monitored over the years, this list of top decile performers was sizable, containing more than 1,500 portfolios. By construction, the percentiles of their performance rank all fell between 90 and 100, and averaged 95.<blockquote>我从庞大的数据库中汲取投资经验的第一步是构建一个投资通讯投资组合列表，这些投资组合自1980年以来在给定日历年的任何时候都处于业绩前10%的位置。考虑到《我的赫伯特金融文摘》多年来监测的时事通讯数量，这份表现最好的十分之一的名单相当大，包含超过1,500个投资组合。从结构上看，他们的表现排名都在90到100之间，平均为95。</blockquote> What I wanted to measure was how these newsletter portfolios performed in the immediately succeeding year. If performance were a matter of pure skill, then we'd expect that they would have been in the top decile for performance in that second year as well--with an average percentile rank that also was 95.<blockquote>我想衡量的是这些时事通讯组合在接下来的一年中的表现。如果表现是一个纯粹的技能问题，那么我们预计他们在第二年的表现也会排在前十分位——平均百分位排名也是95。</blockquote> That's not what I found, however--not by a long shot. These newsletters' average percentile rank in that second year was just 51.5. That is statistically similar to the 50.0 it would have been if performance were a matter of pure luck.<blockquote>然而，这不是我发现的——一点也不。这些时事通讯在第二年的平均百分位排名仅为51.5。从统计数据来看，这与如果表现纯粹是运气问题，则为50.0相似。</blockquote> I next repeated this analysis for each of the other nine deciles for initial-year performance rank. As you can see from this chart, their expected ranks in the successive years were very close to the 50 percentile, regardless of their performance in the initial year.<blockquote>接下来，我对第一年绩效排名的其他九个十分位数重复了这一分析。从这张图表中可以看出，无论他们第一年的表现如何，他们在随后几年的预期排名都非常接近50%。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/ebfad8a8d9638e4b57cf085b425e5742\" tg-width=\"700\" tg-height=\"569\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> The only exception came for newsletters in the bottom 10% for first-year return. The average second-year percentile ranking was 38.8--significantly below what you'd expect if performance were a matter of pure luck. In other words, it's a decent bet that one year's worst adviser will have a below-average performance in the subsequent year too.<blockquote>唯一的例外是第一年回报率垫底10%的时事通讯。第二年的平均百分位排名为38.8——如果表现纯粹是运气问题，这远远低于你的预期。换句话说，一年最差的顾问在下一年的表现也将低于平均水平，这是一个不错的赌注。</blockquote> What these results mean: While investment advisory performance is not a matter of pure randomness, the deviations from randomness primarily occur among the worst performers--not the best. Unfortunately that doesn't help us to beat the market.<blockquote>这些结果意味着什么：虽然投资咨询的表现不是纯粹的随机性问题，但与随机性的偏差主要发生在表现最差的人身上，而不是表现最好的人。不幸的是，这并不能帮助我们战胜市场。</blockquote> By the way, don't think that you can wriggle out from these conclusions by arguing that other kinds of advisers are better than newsletter editors. At least in regards to the persistence (or lack thereof) between past and future performance, newsletter editors are no different than managers of mutual funds, ETFs, hedge funds and private-equity funds.<blockquote>顺便说一句，不要认为你可以通过争论其他类型的顾问比时事通讯编辑更好来摆脱这些结论。至少就过去和未来表现之间的持久性（或缺乏持久性）而言，时事通讯编辑与共同基金、ETF、对冲基金和私募股权基金的经理没有什么不同。</blockquote> Beware of arrogance<blockquote>谨防傲慢</blockquote> While I believe the data are conclusive, I'm not holding my breath that it will persuade many of you to throw in the towel and go with an index fund. That's because the typical investor all too often believes that the poor odds of beating the market apply to everyone else but not to him individually.<blockquote>虽然我相信这些数据是确凿的，但我并不认为它会说服你们中的许多人认输并选择指数基金。这是因为典型的投资者往往认为，战胜市场的可能性很小，适用于其他人，但不适用于他个人。</blockquote> It reminds me of the famous study in which almost all of us indicate we're better-than-average drivers.<blockquote>这让我想起了一项著名的研究，在这项研究中，几乎所有人都表示我们是比平均水平更好的司机。</blockquote> This arrogance has obviously dangerous consequences on our roads and highways. But it's dangerous in the investment arena as well because it leads investors into incurring greater and greater risks.<blockquote>这种傲慢显然对我们的道路和高速公路产生了危险的后果。但这在投资领域也是危险的，因为它会导致投资者承担越来越大的风险。</blockquote> That creates a downward spiral: When the arrogant investor starts losing to the market, which inevitably happens sooner or later, he pursues an even riskier strategy to make up for his prior loss. That in turn invariably leads him to suffer even greater losses. And the cycle repeats.<blockquote>这就造成了一个螺旋式下降：当傲慢的投资者开始输给市场时（这迟早不可避免地会发生），他会采取风险更大的策略来弥补之前的损失。这反过来又不可避免地导致他遭受更大的损失。循环重复。</blockquote> The temptation of arrogance is particularly evident when it comes to social media. Psychologists have found that younger investors are far more inclined to pursue risky strategies when they are being watched than when operating alone. This helps to explain the bravado that so frequently is exhibited on investment-focused social media platforms.<blockquote>当涉及到社交媒体时，傲慢的诱惑尤其明显。心理学家发现，年轻投资者在被监视时远比独自操作时更倾向于追求高风险策略。这有助于解释以投资为重点的社交媒体平台上经常表现出的虚张声势。</blockquote> Buying and holding an index fund is boring. Adherents are rarely drawn to social media in the first place, and even if they are, they rarely post that they are continuing to hold the same investment they've had for years.<blockquote>购买并持有指数基金很无聊。追随者很少首先被社交媒体吸引，即使他们被吸引，他们也很少发布他们继续持有多年来的相同投资。</blockquote> Beware of this trick, too<blockquote>也要小心这招</blockquote> A similar dynamic leads those who frequent social media to brag about their spectacular winners while ignoring their losers. One frequent way they do it is to annualize their returns from a short-term trade and then boast about that figure. Imagine a stock that goes from $10 to $11 in a week's time. In itself, that doesn't seem particularly remarkable. On an annualized basis, however, that is equivalent to a gain of more than 14,000%.<blockquote>类似的动态导致那些经常使用社交媒体的人吹嘘他们壮观的赢家，而忽视他们的输家。他们经常这样做的一种方式是将短期交易的回报按年计算，然后吹嘘这个数字。想象一下，一只股票在一周内从10美元涨到11美元。就其本身而言，这似乎并不特别引人注目。然而，按年化计算，这相当于超过14,000%的收益。</blockquote> Readers of these social media boasts initially must believe they are the only ones with a mixture of both winning and losing trades. Only later do they discover the unspoken rules of social media platforms: it's bad form to ask fellow investors about their losers, just like it's poor etiquette after a round of golf to ask the boastful golfer whether he actually beat par.<blockquote>这些社交媒体吹嘘的读者最初必须相信他们是唯一一个既有输赢交易的人。直到后来，他们才发现社交媒体平台的潜规则：向其他投资者询问他们的输家是一种糟糕的形式，就像在一轮高尔夫球后询问自吹自擂的高尔夫球手是否真的打出了标准杆是一种糟糕的礼仪一样。</blockquote> Humility is a virtue in the investment area. We would do well to remember Socrates' famous line: \"I am the wisest man alive, for I know one thing, and that is that I know nothing.\"<blockquote>谦逊是投资领域的一种美德。我们最好记住苏格拉底的名言：“我是世上最聪明的人，因为我知道一件事，那就是我什么都不知道。”</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/investors-love-to-boast-about-their-great-stock-picks-but-beware-of-those-who-use-fancy-math-to-calculate-their-gains-11630784143?mod=home-page\">MarketWatch</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".DJI":"道琼斯"},"source_url":"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/investors-love-to-boast-about-their-great-stock-picks-but-beware-of-those-who-use-fancy-math-to-calculate-their-gains-11630784143?mod=home-page","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"2165809018","content_text":"Even pros rarely beat the stock market\nGetty Images\nBeating the market is so difficult that you'd be excused for giving up.\nBut unlike what happens when you give up elsewhere in life, in the investment arena it's actually a shrewd strategy for winning.\nAfter more than 40 years of rigorously auditing the performance of investment advisers, I have learned that over the long term, buying and holding an index fund that tracks the S&P 500 or other broad index nearly always comes out ahead of all other attempts to do better, such as market timing or picking particular stocks, ETFs and mutual funds.\nIt's amazing when you think about it: What other pursuit in life is there in which you can come close to winning every race by simply sitting on your hands and doing nothing?\nI'm not saying it's impossible to beat the market. What I am saying is that it's very difficult and rare. And it's even rarer for an adviser who beats the market in one period to do so in the successive period as well.\nI am not the first person to point this out. But what I can contribute to the debate is my extensive performance database that contains real-world returns back to 1980. It compellingly shows how impossibly low your odds are of winning when trying to beat the market.\nMy first step in drawing investment lessons from my huge database was to construct a list of investment newsletter portfolios that at any point since 1980 were in the top 10% for performance in a given calendar year. Given how many newsletters my Hulbert Financial Digest has monitored over the years, this list of top decile performers was sizable, containing more than 1,500 portfolios. By construction, the percentiles of their performance rank all fell between 90 and 100, and averaged 95.\nWhat I wanted to measure was how these newsletter portfolios performed in the immediately succeeding year. If performance were a matter of pure skill, then we'd expect that they would have been in the top decile for performance in that second year as well--with an average percentile rank that also was 95.\nThat's not what I found, however--not by a long shot. These newsletters' average percentile rank in that second year was just 51.5. That is statistically similar to the 50.0 it would have been if performance were a matter of pure luck.\nI next repeated this analysis for each of the other nine deciles for initial-year performance rank. As you can see from this chart, their expected ranks in the successive years were very close to the 50 percentile, regardless of their performance in the initial year.\n\nThe only exception came for newsletters in the bottom 10% for first-year return. The average second-year percentile ranking was 38.8--significantly below what you'd expect if performance were a matter of pure luck. In other words, it's a decent bet that one year's worst adviser will have a below-average performance in the subsequent year too.\nWhat these results mean: While investment advisory performance is not a matter of pure randomness, the deviations from randomness primarily occur among the worst performers--not the best. Unfortunately that doesn't help us to beat the market.\nBy the way, don't think that you can wriggle out from these conclusions by arguing that other kinds of advisers are better than newsletter editors. At least in regards to the persistence (or lack thereof) between past and future performance, newsletter editors are no different than managers of mutual funds, ETFs, hedge funds and private-equity funds.\nBeware of arrogance\nWhile I believe the data are conclusive, I'm not holding my breath that it will persuade many of you to throw in the towel and go with an index fund. That's because the typical investor all too often believes that the poor odds of beating the market apply to everyone else but not to him individually.\nIt reminds me of the famous study in which almost all of us indicate we're better-than-average drivers.\nThis arrogance has obviously dangerous consequences on our roads and highways. But it's dangerous in the investment arena as well because it leads investors into incurring greater and greater risks.\nThat creates a downward spiral: When the arrogant investor starts losing to the market, which inevitably happens sooner or later, he pursues an even riskier strategy to make up for his prior loss. That in turn invariably leads him to suffer even greater losses. And the cycle repeats.\nThe temptation of arrogance is particularly evident when it comes to social media. Psychologists have found that younger investors are far more inclined to pursue risky strategies when they are being watched than when operating alone. This helps to explain the bravado that so frequently is exhibited on investment-focused social media platforms.\nBuying and holding an index fund is boring. Adherents are rarely drawn to social media in the first place, and even if they are, they rarely post that they are continuing to hold the same investment they've had for years.\nBeware of this trick, too\nA similar dynamic leads those who frequent social media to brag about their spectacular winners while ignoring their losers. One frequent way they do it is to annualize their returns from a short-term trade and then boast about that figure. Imagine a stock that goes from $10 to $11 in a week's time. In itself, that doesn't seem particularly remarkable. On an annualized basis, however, that is equivalent to a gain of more than 14,000%.\nReaders of these social media boasts initially must believe they are the only ones with a mixture of both winning and losing trades. Only later do they discover the unspoken rules of social media platforms: it's bad form to ask fellow investors about their losers, just like it's poor etiquette after a round of golf to ask the boastful golfer whether he actually beat par.\nHumility is a virtue in the investment area. We would do well to remember Socrates' famous line: \"I am the wisest man alive, for I know one thing, and that is that I know nothing.\"","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".SPX":0.9,".IXIC":0.9,".DJI":0.9}},"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":451,"commentLimit":10,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"symbols":[],"verified":2,"subType":0,"readableState":1,"langContent":"EN","currentLanguage":"EN","warmUpFlag":false,"orderFlag":false,"shareable":true,"causeOfNotShareable":"","featuresForAnalytics":[],"commentAndTweetFlag":false,"andRepostAutoSelectedFlag":false,"upFlag":false,"length":46,"xxTargetLangEnum":"ORIG"},"commentList":[],"isCommentEnd":true,"isTiger":false,"isWeiXinMini":false,"url":"/m/post/817520695"}