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2021-11-15

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Stocks are money makers now but be aware that some investors still haven’t recovered from the 2000 internet bubble<blockquote>股票现在可以赚钱，但请注意，一些投资者仍未从2000年的互联网泡沫中恢复过来</blockquote>

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{"i18n":{"language":"zh_CN"},"detailType":1,"isChannel":false,"data":{"magic":2,"id":873401067,"tweetId":"873401067","gmtCreate":1636970080819,"gmtModify":1636970080872,"author":{"id":3575056939798485,"idStr":"3575056939798485","authorId":3575056939798485,"authorIdStr":"3575056939798485","name":"Joby","avatar":"https://static.laohu8.com/default-avatar.jpg","vip":1,"userType":1,"introduction":"","boolIsFan":false,"boolIsHead":false,"crmLevel":12,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[],"fanSize":4,"starInvestorFlag":false},"themes":[],"images":[],"coverImages":[],"extraTitle":"","html":"<html><head></head><body>👍🏻</body></html>","htmlText":"<html><head></head><body>👍🏻</body></html>","text":"👍🏻","highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":0,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"favoriteSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/873401067","repostId":1131535069,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1131535069","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1636959277,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1131535069?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-11-15 14:54","market":"us","language":"en","title":"Stocks are money makers now but be aware that some investors still haven’t recovered from the 2000 internet bubble<blockquote>股票现在可以赚钱，但请注意，一些投资者仍未从2000年的互联网泡沫中恢复过来</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1131535069","media":"Marketwatch","summary":"How many years of lagging stock portfolio returns would you tolerate in order to avoid the bursting ","content":"How many years of lagging stock portfolio returns would you tolerate in order to avoid the bursting of a stock market bubble?<blockquote>为了避免股市泡沫破裂，您会容忍多少年的股票投资组合回报滞后？</blockquote> That in effect is what Wall Street’s “permabears” are asking. They’ve been bearish on U.S. stocks for a number of years now, and therefore they (and their clients) have missed out on one of the most powerful bull markets in U.S. history.<blockquote>这实际上就是华尔街“永久空头”所要求的。他们多年来一直看跌美国股市，因此他们（和他们的客户）错过了美国历史上最强大的牛市之一。</blockquote> Jeremy Grantham is one of the most prominent permabear; he is co-founder of Grantham, Mayo, &amp; van Otterloo, a Boston-based asset management firm that is commonly known by the acronym GMO. Grantham has a number of impressive market calls to his credit, including largely sidestepping the bursting of both the internet bubble and the Great Recession. But he is not always bearish. In March 2009, the month in which the Great Financial Crisis-induced bear market came to an end, Grantham surprised many on Wall Street by penning a letter imploring managers to develop a plan for getting back into stocks.<blockquote>杰里米·格兰瑟姆是最著名的永久熊之一；他是格兰瑟姆、梅奥和范奥特卢的联合创始人，这是一家总部位于波士顿的资产管理公司，通常缩写为GMO。格兰瑟姆拥有许多令人印象深刻的市场评级，包括在很大程度上避免了互联网泡沫和大衰退的破裂。但他并不总是看跌。2009年3月，也就是金融危机引发的熊市结束的那个月，格兰瑟姆写了一封信，恳求经理们制定重返股市的计划，这让华尔街的许多人感到惊讶。</blockquote> Yet in most financial circles, in which a “what have you done for me lately” attitude prevails, Grantham is known for failing to anticipate the past decade’s bull market. Back in 2010, barely a year after the U.S. bull market began in March 2009, GMO projected that U.S. large-cap stocks would barely outperform inflation over the subsequent seven years.<blockquote>然而，在大多数金融界，“你最近为我做了什么”的态度盛行，格兰瑟姆以未能预测过去十年的牛市而闻名。早在2010年，即2009年3月美国牛市开始仅一年后，GMO就预测美国大盘股在随后的七年中的表现将勉强跑赢通胀。</blockquote> As we now know, of course, U.S. stocks in recent years have been beating inflation by historic margins. Since 2010, the S&amp;P 500’s SPX, +0.72% inflation-adjusted total return has been 12.5% annualized.<blockquote>当然，正如我们现在所知，美国股市近年来一直以历史性的幅度跑赢通胀。自2010年以来，标普500 SPX，+0.72%经通胀调整后的年化总回报率为12.5%。</blockquote> GMO’s response, in effect, is that caution could be vindicated and it would get the last laugh. In a recent analysis entitled “Wounds That Never Heal,” GMO argues that all it would take would be something similar to the bursting of the internet bubble in March 2000 or the bear market that accompanied the stagflation era of the 1970s.<blockquote>实际上，转基因生物的回应是，谨慎是正确的，它会笑到最后。在最近一份题为“永不愈合的伤口”的分析中，GMO认为，所需要的只是类似于2000年3月互联网泡沫破裂或伴随20世纪70年代滞胀时代的熊市。</blockquote> Since this response is self-serving on GMO’s part, I decided to independently measure the long-term impact of living through the bursting of a bubble. What I found is sobering indeed. There have been occasions in U.S. stock market history—not as infrequent as we would like — when unlucky investors lost so much that it took a generation or more to recover.<blockquote>由于转基因生物的这种反应是自私的，我决定独立衡量经历泡沫破裂的长期影响。我的发现确实发人深省。美国股市历史上曾出现过这样的情况——并不像我们希望的那样罕见——倒霉的投资者损失惨重，需要一代人或更长时间才能恢复。</blockquote> If Grantham is right that the current stock market is forming a bubble that is about to burst, he’s also right that “for the majority of investors today, this could very well be the most important event of your investing lives.”<blockquote>如果格兰瑟姆认为当前股市正在形成一个即将破裂的泡沫是正确的，那么他也是正确的，“对于当今的大多数投资者来说，这很可能是你投资生涯中最重要的事件。”</blockquote> The 6% solution<blockquote>6%溶液</blockquote> One way of measuring the lingering effect of a bubble bursting is to calculate how long it takes for the stock market to make it back to its long-term trend line. Since 1793, according to research from Edward McQuarrie, an emeritus professor at Santa Clara University’s Leavey School of Business, the U.S. stock market has produced an inflation-adjusted total return of 6.05% annualized. For illustration purposes, I’ll round that to six percent.<blockquote>衡量泡沫破裂的持续影响的一种方法是计算股市需要多长时间才能回到长期趋势线。根据圣克拉拉大学利维商学院名誉教授爱德华·麦夸里的研究，自1793年以来，美国股市经通胀调整后的年化总回报率为6.05%。为了说明起见，我将把它四舍五入到百分之六。</blockquote> Imagine an investor in December 1968 to construct a portfolio that would financially support his retirement. His financial planner almost certainly would have turned to history to calculate this portfolio’s expected return, and so would have projected that — year-to-year volatility aside — the equity portion of his portfolio would produce a 6% annualized real total return over the subsequent decades.<blockquote>想象一下，1968年12月，一位投资者构建了一个投资组合，为他的退休提供经济支持。他的财务规划师几乎肯定会参考历史来计算该投资组合的预期回报，因此会预测——抛开逐年波动——他投资组合的股票部分将在随后的几十年里产生6%的年化实际总回报。</blockquote> I picked December 1968 to illustrate my point, as that marked a generational high. The chart below plots this investor’s annualized inflation-adjusted total return from that month forward. You can see the devastation wrought by the 1973-74 bear market, as well as the high-inflation years of the 1970s and early 1980s. But, most of all, notice that it’s not until mid-1997 that this investor’s long-term return would make it back to 6% annualized. That’s almost 30 years.<blockquote>我选择1968年12月来说明我的观点，因为那标志着一代人的高点。下图显示了该投资者从当月开始的经通胀调整后的年化总回报。你可以看到1973-74年熊市造成的破坏，以及20世纪70年代和80年代初的高通胀年份。但是，最重要的是，请注意，直到1997年中期，该投资者的长期回报率才会回到6%的年化水平。差不多30年了。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/ed06d3d3275e628f5e13ae8c13c71c47\" tg-width=\"700\" tg-height=\"471\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\" width=\"100%\" height=\"auto\">You might wonder why I didn’t focus on the bursting of the internet bubble in March 2000. The answer is that an investor unlucky enough to put a lump sum into the market at that time still hasn’t sufficiently recovered from losses so as to make it back to the 6% trendline. That investor’s real total-return since that date is 5.1% annualized. So 21 years have not been enough to vindicate the investor in March 2000 who based his financial future on extrapolating the long-term past.<blockquote>你可能想知道为什么我没有关注2000年3月互联网泡沫的破裂。答案是，当时不幸向市场一次性投入资金的投资者仍然没有从损失中充分恢复过来，无法回到6%的趋势线。自该日期以来，该投资者的实际年化总回报率为5.1%。因此，21年的时间不足以证明2000年3月的投资者是正确的，他将自己的财务未来建立在对长期过去的推断之上。</blockquote> Who believes in 6% anymore?<blockquote>谁还相信6%？</blockquote> You also could object to the sobering message of my analysis on the grounds that no one expects the stock market to produce a long-term real total return of 6% annualized. In the low-interest-rate low-growth world in which we now live, you could argue, it’s unrealistic to expect the stock market’s future return to be as impressive as in the past.<blockquote>你也可以反对我分析中发人深省的信息，理由是没有人期望股市产生6%的长期实际年化总回报率。你可能会说，在我们现在生活的低利率、低增长的世界里，期望股市未来的回报像过去一样令人印象深刻是不现实的。</blockquote> Old beliefs die hard, however. You’d be surprised to learn that many financial planners continue to construct financial plans for their clients on the assumption (implicit if not explicit) that the future is like the past. It’s also the implicit assumption behind the glide paths followed by many of the target-date retirement funds that are so popular for 401(k) investors and retirees.<blockquote>然而，旧的信念很难改变。你会惊讶地发现，许多财务规划师继续为他们的客户构建财务计划，假设（如果不是明确的，则是隐含的）未来就像过去一样。这也是许多深受401(k)投资者和退休人员欢迎的目标日期退休基金所遵循的下滑路径背后的隐含假设。</blockquote> Nevertheless, your objection is not unfair. So it’s also worth focusing on how long investors need to merely break even following the bursting of a bubble.<blockquote>尽管如此，你的反对并非不公平。因此，也值得关注投资者在泡沫破裂后需要多长时间才能实现收支平衡。</blockquote> Fortunately, the heavy lifting of such calculations has been conducted by McQuarrie. For the period dating back to 1793, he calculated the longest stretch in which the stock market’s inflation-adjusted total return was less than 1% annualized. The longest was the period beginning with the 1929 crash: From then until 1949, the stock market produced an inflation-adjusted total return of 0.75% annualized — 20 years, in other words.<blockquote>幸运的是，麦夸里已经完成了此类计算的繁重工作。从1793年开始，他计算了股市经通胀调整后的年化总回报率低于1%的最长时期。最长的时期是从1929年崩盘开始的时期：从那时到1949年，股市产生了0.75%的年化通胀调整总回报率——换句话说，是20年。</blockquote> That’s better than the nearly 30 years it took after an unlucky investor in December 1968 to make it back to the 6% trendline, but not by much.<blockquote>这比1968年12月一位不幸的投资者花了近30年的时间才回到6%的趋势线要好，但也好不了多少。</blockquote> Bubble trouble?<blockquote>泡沫麻烦？</blockquote> None of this sheds light on whether we are in a bubble, of course. All this discussion does is show that being cautious for a decade is not automatic grounds for concluding that the adviser has failed his clients.<blockquote>当然，这些都不能说明我们是否处于泡沫之中。所有这些讨论都表明，十年来的谨慎并不是得出顾问辜负了客户的结论的自动理由。</blockquote> The arguments for why the stock market is extremely overvalued, if not in a bubble, are familiar, and I won’t repeat them here. But given Grantham’s record at detecting prior bubbles, and given the long-term damage a bubble bursting would have on our portfolios, I would be nervous dismissing his caution out of hand.<blockquote>为什么股市被极度高估，如果不是在泡沫中，这些论点很熟悉，我在这里不再重复。但鉴于格兰瑟姆在发现之前泡沫方面的记录，以及泡沫破裂将对我们的投资组合造成的长期损害，我会紧张地立即忽视他的谨慎。</blockquote>","source":"market_watch","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>Stocks are money makers now but be aware that some investors still haven’t recovered from the 2000 internet bubble<blockquote>股票现在可以赚钱，但请注意，一些投资者仍未从2000年的互联网泡沫中恢复过来</blockquote></title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nStocks are money makers now but be aware that some investors still haven’t recovered from the 2000 internet bubble<blockquote>股票现在可以赚钱，但请注意，一些投资者仍未从2000年的互联网泡沫中恢复过来</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n\nMarketwatch2021-11-15 14:54\n\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\nHow many years of lagging stock portfolio returns would you tolerate in order to avoid the bursting of a stock market bubble?<blockquote>为了避免股市泡沫破裂，您会容忍多少年的股票投资组合回报滞后？</blockquote> That in effect is what Wall Street’s “permabears” are asking. They’ve been bearish on U.S. stocks for a number of years now, and therefore they (and their clients) have missed out on one of the most powerful bull markets in U.S. history.<blockquote>这实际上就是华尔街“永久空头”所要求的。他们多年来一直看跌美国股市，因此他们（和他们的客户）错过了美国历史上最强大的牛市之一。</blockquote> Jeremy Grantham is one of the most prominent permabear; he is co-founder of Grantham, Mayo, &amp; van Otterloo, a Boston-based asset management firm that is commonly known by the acronym GMO. Grantham has a number of impressive market calls to his credit, including largely sidestepping the bursting of both the internet bubble and the Great Recession. But he is not always bearish. In March 2009, the month in which the Great Financial Crisis-induced bear market came to an end, Grantham surprised many on Wall Street by penning a letter imploring managers to develop a plan for getting back into stocks.<blockquote>杰里米·格兰瑟姆是最著名的永久熊之一；他是格兰瑟姆、梅奥和范奥特卢的联合创始人，这是一家总部位于波士顿的资产管理公司，通常缩写为GMO。格兰瑟姆拥有许多令人印象深刻的市场评级，包括在很大程度上避免了互联网泡沫和大衰退的破裂。但他并不总是看跌。2009年3月，也就是金融危机引发的熊市结束的那个月，格兰瑟姆写了一封信，恳求经理们制定重返股市的计划，这让华尔街的许多人感到惊讶。</blockquote> Yet in most financial circles, in which a “what have you done for me lately” attitude prevails, Grantham is known for failing to anticipate the past decade’s bull market. Back in 2010, barely a year after the U.S. bull market began in March 2009, GMO projected that U.S. large-cap stocks would barely outperform inflation over the subsequent seven years.<blockquote>然而，在大多数金融界，“你最近为我做了什么”的态度盛行，格兰瑟姆以未能预测过去十年的牛市而闻名。早在2010年，即2009年3月美国牛市开始仅一年后，GMO就预测美国大盘股在随后的七年中的表现将勉强跑赢通胀。</blockquote> As we now know, of course, U.S. stocks in recent years have been beating inflation by historic margins. Since 2010, the S&amp;P 500’s SPX, +0.72% inflation-adjusted total return has been 12.5% annualized.<blockquote>当然，正如我们现在所知，美国股市近年来一直以历史性的幅度跑赢通胀。自2010年以来，标普500 SPX，+0.72%经通胀调整后的年化总回报率为12.5%。</blockquote> GMO’s response, in effect, is that caution could be vindicated and it would get the last laugh. In a recent analysis entitled “Wounds That Never Heal,” GMO argues that all it would take would be something similar to the bursting of the internet bubble in March 2000 or the bear market that accompanied the stagflation era of the 1970s.<blockquote>实际上，转基因生物的回应是，谨慎是正确的，它会笑到最后。在最近一份题为“永不愈合的伤口”的分析中，GMO认为，所需要的只是类似于2000年3月互联网泡沫破裂或伴随20世纪70年代滞胀时代的熊市。</blockquote> Since this response is self-serving on GMO’s part, I decided to independently measure the long-term impact of living through the bursting of a bubble. What I found is sobering indeed. There have been occasions in U.S. stock market history—not as infrequent as we would like — when unlucky investors lost so much that it took a generation or more to recover.<blockquote>由于转基因生物的这种反应是自私的，我决定独立衡量经历泡沫破裂的长期影响。我的发现确实发人深省。美国股市历史上曾出现过这样的情况——并不像我们希望的那样罕见——倒霉的投资者损失惨重，需要一代人或更长时间才能恢复。</blockquote> If Grantham is right that the current stock market is forming a bubble that is about to burst, he’s also right that “for the majority of investors today, this could very well be the most important event of your investing lives.”<blockquote>如果格兰瑟姆认为当前股市正在形成一个即将破裂的泡沫是正确的，那么他也是正确的，“对于当今的大多数投资者来说，这很可能是你投资生涯中最重要的事件。”</blockquote> The 6% solution<blockquote>6%溶液</blockquote> One way of measuring the lingering effect of a bubble bursting is to calculate how long it takes for the stock market to make it back to its long-term trend line. Since 1793, according to research from Edward McQuarrie, an emeritus professor at Santa Clara University’s Leavey School of Business, the U.S. stock market has produced an inflation-adjusted total return of 6.05% annualized. For illustration purposes, I’ll round that to six percent.<blockquote>衡量泡沫破裂的持续影响的一种方法是计算股市需要多长时间才能回到长期趋势线。根据圣克拉拉大学利维商学院名誉教授爱德华·麦夸里的研究，自1793年以来，美国股市经通胀调整后的年化总回报率为6.05%。为了说明起见，我将把它四舍五入到百分之六。</blockquote> Imagine an investor in December 1968 to construct a portfolio that would financially support his retirement. His financial planner almost certainly would have turned to history to calculate this portfolio’s expected return, and so would have projected that — year-to-year volatility aside — the equity portion of his portfolio would produce a 6% annualized real total return over the subsequent decades.<blockquote>想象一下，1968年12月，一位投资者构建了一个投资组合，为他的退休提供经济支持。他的财务规划师几乎肯定会参考历史来计算该投资组合的预期回报，因此会预测——抛开逐年波动——他投资组合的股票部分将在随后的几十年里产生6%的年化实际总回报。</blockquote> I picked December 1968 to illustrate my point, as that marked a generational high. The chart below plots this investor’s annualized inflation-adjusted total return from that month forward. You can see the devastation wrought by the 1973-74 bear market, as well as the high-inflation years of the 1970s and early 1980s. But, most of all, notice that it’s not until mid-1997 that this investor’s long-term return would make it back to 6% annualized. That’s almost 30 years.<blockquote>我选择1968年12月来说明我的观点，因为那标志着一代人的高点。下图显示了该投资者从当月开始的经通胀调整后的年化总回报。你可以看到1973-74年熊市造成的破坏，以及20世纪70年代和80年代初的高通胀年份。但是，最重要的是，请注意，直到1997年中期，该投资者的长期回报率才会回到6%的年化水平。差不多30年了。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/ed06d3d3275e628f5e13ae8c13c71c47\" tg-width=\"700\" tg-height=\"471\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\" width=\"100%\" height=\"auto\">You might wonder why I didn’t focus on the bursting of the internet bubble in March 2000. The answer is that an investor unlucky enough to put a lump sum into the market at that time still hasn’t sufficiently recovered from losses so as to make it back to the 6% trendline. That investor’s real total-return since that date is 5.1% annualized. So 21 years have not been enough to vindicate the investor in March 2000 who based his financial future on extrapolating the long-term past.<blockquote>你可能想知道为什么我没有关注2000年3月互联网泡沫的破裂。答案是，当时不幸向市场一次性投入资金的投资者仍然没有从损失中充分恢复过来，无法回到6%的趋势线。自该日期以来，该投资者的实际年化总回报率为5.1%。因此，21年的时间不足以证明2000年3月的投资者是正确的，他将自己的财务未来建立在对长期过去的推断之上。</blockquote> Who believes in 6% anymore?<blockquote>谁还相信6%？</blockquote> You also could object to the sobering message of my analysis on the grounds that no one expects the stock market to produce a long-term real total return of 6% annualized. In the low-interest-rate low-growth world in which we now live, you could argue, it’s unrealistic to expect the stock market’s future return to be as impressive as in the past.<blockquote>你也可以反对我分析中发人深省的信息，理由是没有人期望股市产生6%的长期实际年化总回报率。你可能会说，在我们现在生活的低利率、低增长的世界里，期望股市未来的回报像过去一样令人印象深刻是不现实的。</blockquote> Old beliefs die hard, however. You’d be surprised to learn that many financial planners continue to construct financial plans for their clients on the assumption (implicit if not explicit) that the future is like the past. It’s also the implicit assumption behind the glide paths followed by many of the target-date retirement funds that are so popular for 401(k) investors and retirees.<blockquote>然而，旧的信念很难改变。你会惊讶地发现，许多财务规划师继续为他们的客户构建财务计划，假设（如果不是明确的，则是隐含的）未来就像过去一样。这也是许多深受401(k)投资者和退休人员欢迎的目标日期退休基金所遵循的下滑路径背后的隐含假设。</blockquote> Nevertheless, your objection is not unfair. So it’s also worth focusing on how long investors need to merely break even following the bursting of a bubble.<blockquote>尽管如此，你的反对并非不公平。因此，也值得关注投资者在泡沫破裂后需要多长时间才能实现收支平衡。</blockquote> Fortunately, the heavy lifting of such calculations has been conducted by McQuarrie. For the period dating back to 1793, he calculated the longest stretch in which the stock market’s inflation-adjusted total return was less than 1% annualized. The longest was the period beginning with the 1929 crash: From then until 1949, the stock market produced an inflation-adjusted total return of 0.75% annualized — 20 years, in other words.<blockquote>幸运的是，麦夸里已经完成了此类计算的繁重工作。从1793年开始，他计算了股市经通胀调整后的年化总回报率低于1%的最长时期。最长的时期是从1929年崩盘开始的时期：从那时到1949年，股市产生了0.75%的年化通胀调整总回报率——换句话说，是20年。</blockquote> That’s better than the nearly 30 years it took after an unlucky investor in December 1968 to make it back to the 6% trendline, but not by much.<blockquote>这比1968年12月一位不幸的投资者花了近30年的时间才回到6%的趋势线要好，但也好不了多少。</blockquote> Bubble trouble?<blockquote>泡沫麻烦？</blockquote> None of this sheds light on whether we are in a bubble, of course. All this discussion does is show that being cautious for a decade is not automatic grounds for concluding that the adviser has failed his clients.<blockquote>当然，这些都不能说明我们是否处于泡沫之中。所有这些讨论都表明，十年来的谨慎并不是得出顾问辜负了客户的结论的自动理由。</blockquote> The arguments for why the stock market is extremely overvalued, if not in a bubble, are familiar, and I won’t repeat them here. But given Grantham’s record at detecting prior bubbles, and given the long-term damage a bubble bursting would have on our portfolios, I would be nervous dismissing his caution out of hand.<blockquote>为什么股市被极度高估，如果不是在泡沫中，这些论点很熟悉，我在这里不再重复。但鉴于格兰瑟姆在发现之前泡沫方面的记录，以及泡沫破裂将对我们的投资组合造成的长期损害，我会紧张地立即忽视他的谨慎。</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/stocks-are-money-makers-now-but-be-aware-that-some-investors-still-havent-recovered-from-the-2000-internet-bubble-11636673985?mod=home-page\">Marketwatch</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{".SPX":"S&P 500 Index"},"source_url":"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/stocks-are-money-makers-now-but-be-aware-that-some-investors-still-havent-recovered-from-the-2000-internet-bubble-11636673985?mod=home-page","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/599a65733b8245fcf7868668ef9ad712","article_id":"1131535069","content_text":"How many years of lagging stock portfolio returns would you tolerate in order to avoid the bursting of a stock market bubble?\nThat in effect is what Wall Street’s “permabears” are asking. They’ve been bearish on U.S. stocks for a number of years now, and therefore they (and their clients) have missed out on one of the most powerful bull markets in U.S. history.\nJeremy Grantham is one of the most prominent permabear; he is co-founder of Grantham, Mayo, & van Otterloo, a Boston-based asset management firm that is commonly known by the acronym GMO. Grantham has a number of impressive market calls to his credit, including largely sidestepping the bursting of both the internet bubble and the Great Recession. But he is not always bearish. In March 2009, the month in which the Great Financial Crisis-induced bear market came to an end, Grantham surprised many on Wall Street by penning a letter imploring managers to develop a plan for getting back into stocks.\nYet in most financial circles, in which a “what have you done for me lately” attitude prevails, Grantham is known for failing to anticipate the past decade’s bull market. Back in 2010, barely a year after the U.S. bull market began in March 2009, GMO projected that U.S. large-cap stocks would barely outperform inflation over the subsequent seven years.\nAs we now know, of course, U.S. stocks in recent years have been beating inflation by historic margins. Since 2010, the S&P 500’s SPX, +0.72% inflation-adjusted total return has been 12.5% annualized.\nGMO’s response, in effect, is that caution could be vindicated and it would get the last laugh. In a recent analysis entitled “Wounds That Never Heal,” GMO argues that all it would take would be something similar to the bursting of the internet bubble in March 2000 or the bear market that accompanied the stagflation era of the 1970s.\nSince this response is self-serving on GMO’s part, I decided to independently measure the long-term impact of living through the bursting of a bubble. What I found is sobering indeed. There have been occasions in U.S. stock market history—not as infrequent as we would like — when unlucky investors lost so much that it took a generation or more to recover.\nIf Grantham is right that the current stock market is forming a bubble that is about to burst, he’s also right that “for the majority of investors today, this could very well be the most important event of your investing lives.”\nThe 6% solution\nOne way of measuring the lingering effect of a bubble bursting is to calculate how long it takes for the stock market to make it back to its long-term trend line. Since 1793, according to research from Edward McQuarrie, an emeritus professor at Santa Clara University’s Leavey School of Business, the U.S. stock market has produced an inflation-adjusted total return of 6.05% annualized. For illustration purposes, I’ll round that to six percent.\nImagine an investor in December 1968 to construct a portfolio that would financially support his retirement. His financial planner almost certainly would have turned to history to calculate this portfolio’s expected return, and so would have projected that — year-to-year volatility aside — the equity portion of his portfolio would produce a 6% annualized real total return over the subsequent decades.\nI picked December 1968 to illustrate my point, as that marked a generational high. The chart below plots this investor’s annualized inflation-adjusted total return from that month forward. You can see the devastation wrought by the 1973-74 bear market, as well as the high-inflation years of the 1970s and early 1980s. But, most of all, notice that it’s not until mid-1997 that this investor’s long-term return would make it back to 6% annualized. That’s almost 30 years.\nYou might wonder why I didn’t focus on the bursting of the internet bubble in March 2000. The answer is that an investor unlucky enough to put a lump sum into the market at that time still hasn’t sufficiently recovered from losses so as to make it back to the 6% trendline. That investor’s real total-return since that date is 5.1% annualized. So 21 years have not been enough to vindicate the investor in March 2000 who based his financial future on extrapolating the long-term past.\nWho believes in 6% anymore?\nYou also could object to the sobering message of my analysis on the grounds that no one expects the stock market to produce a long-term real total return of 6% annualized. In the low-interest-rate low-growth world in which we now live, you could argue, it’s unrealistic to expect the stock market’s future return to be as impressive as in the past.\nOld beliefs die hard, however. You’d be surprised to learn that many financial planners continue to construct financial plans for their clients on the assumption (implicit if not explicit) that the future is like the past. It’s also the implicit assumption behind the glide paths followed by many of the target-date retirement funds that are so popular for 401(k) investors and retirees.\nNevertheless, your objection is not unfair. So it’s also worth focusing on how long investors need to merely break even following the bursting of a bubble.\nFortunately, the heavy lifting of such calculations has been conducted by McQuarrie. For the period dating back to 1793, he calculated the longest stretch in which the stock market’s inflation-adjusted total return was less than 1% annualized. The longest was the period beginning with the 1929 crash: From then until 1949, the stock market produced an inflation-adjusted total return of 0.75% annualized — 20 years, in other words.\nThat’s better than the nearly 30 years it took after an unlucky investor in December 1968 to make it back to the 6% trendline, but not by much.\nBubble trouble?\nNone of this sheds light on whether we are in a bubble, of course. All this discussion does is show that being cautious for a decade is not automatic grounds for concluding that the adviser has failed his clients.\nThe arguments for why the stock market is extremely overvalued, if not in a bubble, are familiar, and I won’t repeat them here. But given Grantham’s record at detecting prior bubbles, and given the long-term damage a bubble bursting would have on our portfolios, I would be nervous dismissing his caution out of hand.","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".SPX":0.9}},"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":418,"commentLimit":10,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"symbols":[],"verified":2,"subType":0,"readableState":1,"langContent":"CN","currentLanguage":"CN","warmUpFlag":false,"orderFlag":false,"shareable":true,"causeOfNotShareable":"","featuresForAnalytics":[],"commentAndTweetFlag":false,"andRepostAutoSelectedFlag":false,"upFlag":false,"length":4,"xxTargetLangEnum":"ZH_CN"},"commentList":[],"isCommentEnd":true,"isTiger":false,"isWeiXinMini":false,"url":"/m/post/873401067"}