Philip67
2021-11-23
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Rivian: 2021's Pets.com<blockquote>Rivian:2021年的Pets.com</blockquote>
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Santiago/Getty Images News</span></p><p><blockquote><ul><li>Rivian的首次公开募股取得了巨大成功,之后市值达到了 1090 亿美元。</li><li>然而,该公司受到了一系列负面报道的打击,包括福特退出与其的合作伙伴关系。</li><li>由于其高估值,Rivian开始看起来像Pets.com——2000年互联网崩溃的典型代表。</li><li>在本文中,我将阐述一个看跌Rivian的论点,认为其目前的价格水平仍然过高。</li></ul><p class=\"t-img-caption\"><span>迈克尔·M·圣地亚哥/盖蒂图片社新闻</span></p></blockquote></p><p> <b>Rivian</b>(RIVN) shareholders got some bad news last week, when <b>Ford</b>(F) announced that it had scrapped its plans to launch a joint venture with the company. The news came shortly after a report claimed that Rivian’s electric vans built for <b>Amazon</b>(AMZN) had less range than advertised.</p><p><blockquote><b>Rivian</b>(RIVN) 股东上周收到了一些坏消息,当时<b>福特</b>(F) 宣布已取消与该公司成立合资企业的计划。这一消息发布前不久,有报道称Rivian的电动货车是为<b>亚马逊</b>(AMZN) 的航程比广告宣传的要短。</blockquote></p><p> Following the announcement, Ford kept its 12% ownership stake in RIVN. But its actions cast doubt on any future collaboration. From this point on, Ford will simply be a company that owns RIVN stock. There will be no profitable collaboration going forward.</p><p><blockquote>公告发布后,福特保留了 RIVN 12% 的股权。但它的行动让人对未来的任何合作产生了怀疑。从现在起,福特将只是一家拥有 RIVN 股票的公司。今后不会有有利可图的合作。</blockquote></p><p> With last week’s news, Amazon and Ford -- Rivian’s two biggest investors -- dealt the company a double whammy. Even before the Ford news dropped, investors were already selling Rivian. After a post-IPO rally, RIVN fell by 25%, going from $172 to $128.60. Reports that the company had no revenue may have contributed to the selloff, which hit a couple days after it was listed.</p><p><blockquote>随着上周的消息传出,亚马逊和福特--Rivian最大的两大投资者--给了该公司双重打击。甚至在福特消息传出之前,投资者就已经在抛售Rivian了。在IPO后上涨后,RIVN下跌25%,从172美元跌至128.60美元。有关该公司没有收入的报道可能是导致该公司上市几天后出现抛售的原因之一。</blockquote></p><p> In many ways, Rivian has become the poster child of what some are calling a “new tech bubble.” With NASDAQ stocks reaching new highs seemingly daily, we’re beginning to see price action reminiscent of early 2000, when the NASDAQ reached a 175 P/E ratio. When that bubble finally burst, tech stocks fell 80%. It took the NASDAQ 15 years to recover.</p><p><blockquote>在许多方面,Rivian已经成为一些人所说的 “新科技泡沫 ”的典型代表。随着纳斯达克股票似乎每天都在创出新高,我们开始看到价格走势让人想起 2000 年初,当时纳斯达克的市盈率达到了 175。当泡沫最终破裂时,科技股下跌了 80%。纳斯达克花了15年时间才恢复。</blockquote></p><p> The most notorious of all the 2000-era bubble stocks was Pets.com. Like Rivian, it attracted investment from large tech players like Amazon. IPET’s 1998 IPO raised $82.5 million, its stock debuting at $11. At the height of its power, it had a balloon fly in the Macy’s Day Parade. But thanks to an unprofitable business model, the company lost money at a rapid pace. It eventually went bankrupt and, by late 2000, was trading for $0.06 per share.</p><p><blockquote>2000 年代所有泡沫股票中最臭名昭著的是 Pets.com。与Rivian一样,它吸引了亚马逊等大型科技公司的投资。IPET 1998 年的首次公开募股筹集了 8250 万美元,其股票首发价格为 11 美元。在其鼎盛时期,它曾在梅西百货日游行中放飞气球。但由于商业模式无利可图,公司亏损速度很快。该公司最终破产,到 2000 年底,交易价格为每股 0.06 美元。</blockquote></p><p> While the NASDAQ is nowhere near 2000 levels of overvaluation, some individual stocks are getting there. We can find semi stocks,social media stocks, and even blue chip SaaS stocks above 20 times sales. EVs are the most inflated of them all, with even the most mature player in the space sporting a 23.5 price/sales ratio. There are some pricey names in this market, and some don’t even have sales -- let alone earnings!</p><p><blockquote>虽然纳斯达克远未接近 2000 高估水平,但一些个股正在达到这一水平。我们可以找到销售额超过 20 倍的半股票、社交媒体股票,甚至蓝筹股 SaaS 股票。电动汽车是其中最膨胀的,即使是该领域最成熟的参与者,其市销率也高达 23.5。这个市场上有一些昂贵的名字,有些甚至没有销售额,更不用说盈利了!</blockquote></p><p> Rivian is a perfect case-in-point. Much like Pets.com, it has a lot of market cap but no profit. The company claimed in its prospectus that it had 48,390 pre-orders and had collected $1,000 on each one. If that’s the case then it brought in has $48.3 million in cash from those orders. The company won’t be able to recognize any of this as revenue until the vehicles are delivered. If we take the $48.3 million in cash as a kind of “sale” then Rivian has an astonishing 2,270 price/sales ratio. That’s mighty high, but these aren’t considered “sales” under U.S. GAAP. Instead, they represent a liability until the vehicles start being delivered. That is, until the revenue is “earned.”</p><p><blockquote>Rivian就是一个完美的例子。就像Pets.com一样,它有很大的市值,但没有利润。该公司在招股说明书中声称,它有 48,390 份预订单,每份订单收取了 1,000 美元。如果是这样的话,那么它就能从这些订单中获得 4830 万美元现金。在车辆交付之前,公司无法将这些收入确认为收入。如果我们把 4830 万美元的现金看作是一种 “销售 ”,那么Rivian的市销率高达 2270。这很高,但根据美国通用会计准则,这些并不被视为 “销售额”。相反,在车辆开始交付之前,它们代表着一种责任。也就是说,直到 “赚取”收入为止。</blockquote></p><p> Put simply: Rivian has a stratospheric valuation, even if we’re being generous with it. Like Pets.com before it, it trades at a valuation not based on real world performance. Hype, comparisons to <b>Telsa</b>(TSLA) and general optimism toward EVs have driven the price -- not fundamentals. All the telltale signs of a bubble are there. Given this, it would be wise for investors to tread carefully with the stock, as it is beginning to look like the NASDAQ Bubble stocks that rose in the late 90s only to crash painfully in 2000.</p><p><blockquote>简而言之: Rivian的估值高得离谱,即使我们对它很慷慨。与之前的 Pets.com 一样,它的交易估值并非基于现实世界的表现。炒作,与<b>特尔萨</b>(TSLA)和对电动汽车的普遍乐观情绪推动了价格,而不是基本面。泡沫的所有迹象都在那里。有鉴于此,投资者谨慎对待该股是明智的,因为它开始看起来像 90 年代末上涨但在 2000 年痛苦崩溃的纳斯达克泡沫股票。</blockquote></p><p> <b>Pets.com: Anatomy of a Bubble</b></p><p><blockquote><b>Pets.com:泡沫剖析</b></blockquote></p><p> It’s impossible to talk about the 2000 crash without mentioning Pets.com. The most infamous of the stocks that crashed in the dotcom bust, it was in many ways a microcosm of the NASDAQ in that period.</p><p><blockquote>谈到 2000 年的车祸,就不能不提到 Pets.com。作为互联网泡沫破裂中最臭名昭著的股票,它在许多方面都是那个时期纳斯达克的缩影。</blockquote></p><p> Early on, things looked bright for Pets.com. Amazon bought a large stake in the company in its first venture funding around. Later, a consortium of investors injected $10.5 million. The company ran a $1.2 million super bowl ad. Eventually, it became a household name. In February 2000, it went public for $11 per share, raising $82.5 million.</p><p><blockquote>早期,Pets.com 的情况看起来很光明。亚马逊在第一次风险投资中购买了该公司的大量股份。后来,一个投资者财团注资1050万美元。该公司投放了120万美元的超级碗广告。最终,它成为一个家喻户晓的名字。2000年2月,它以每股11美元的价格上市,筹集了8250万美元。</blockquote></p><p> Things were going well.</p><p><blockquote>事情进展顺利。</blockquote></p><p></p><p> But people started asking hard questions about IPET’s business model. It had trouble generating positive gross margins mailing out large bags of dog food. It sold below cost, attempting to gain market share. It spent $400 to acquire each new customer. Finally, it faced stiff competition from a number of companies, all of them offering the same basic thing. In November 2000, it went bankrupt and was delisted.</p><p><blockquote>但人们开始对 IPET 的商业模式提出尖锐的问题。它在邮寄大袋狗粮方面很难产生正毛利率。它以低于成本的价格出售,试图获得市场份额。它花费了400美元来获得每个新客户。最后,它面临着来自许多公司的激烈竞争,所有这些公司都提供相同的基本产品。2000年11月破产退市。</blockquote></p><p> IPET’s final annual report contained the following metrics:</p><p><blockquote>IPET 的最终年度报告包含以下指标:</blockquote></p><p> <ul> <li>Cash: $4.6 million, down 52% from the prior year.</p><p><blockquote><ul><li>现金:460万美元,比上年下降52%。</li></ul></blockquote></p><p></li> <li>Total assets: $4.7 million, down 62%</p><p><blockquote><li>总资产:470万美元,下降62%</li></blockquote></p><p></li> <li>Total liabilities: $4.18 million, down 56%.</p><p><blockquote><li>总负债:418万美元,下降56%。</li></blockquote></p><p></li> <li>Cash raised in liquidation: $438,000.</p><p><blockquote><li>清算筹集的现金:438,000美元。</li></blockquote></p><p></li> <li>Cash spent in liquidation: $6.3 million.</p><p><blockquote><li>清算花费的现金:630万美元。</li></blockquote></p><p></li> </ul> No revenue or earnings were reported, because the company was not doing business by the time the report was released. Instead, it was a liquidation company, focused on paying off investors.</p><p><blockquote>没有报告收入或盈利,因为报告发布时公司尚未开展业务。相反,它是一家清算公司,专注于偿还投资者。</blockquote></p><p> It’s hard not to see the similarities to Rivian here. We’ve got the early investment by Amazon, the sensational IPO, the lack of profits, and the post-IPO selloff. One factor that’s missing in Rivian’s case is a truly broken business model. There doesn’t appear to be anything RIVN is doing that will make profits impossible. But the company has a long road to drive before it has any real value. In the meantime, investors are left reading vague tea leaves about pre-orders and van range.</p><p><blockquote>很难不看到这里与Rivian的相似之处。亚马逊的早期投资、轰动一时的 IPO、利润不足以及 IPO 后的抛售。Rivian的案例中缺少的一个因素是真正破碎的商业模式。RIVN 所做的任何事情似乎都不会让盈利变得不可能。但该公司在获得任何真正价值之前还有很长的路要走。与此同时,投资者只能阅读有关预购和货车系列的模糊茶叶。</blockquote></p><p> <b>Competitive Landscape</b></p><p><blockquote><b>竞争格局</b></blockquote></p><p> One way to approach Rivian’s value is to look at the marketplace it’s operating in. The electric vehicle industry is a competitive one with a clear market leader:</p><p><blockquote>了解Rivian价值的一个方法是看看它所处的市场。电动汽车行业竞争激烈,市场领导者明确:</blockquote></p><p> <i>Tesla.</i></p><p><blockquote><i>特斯拉.</i></blockquote></p><p> TSLA dominates the EV industry on both market cap and revenue, although its market cap dominance is much stronger than its sales lead. Other companies are catching up to Tesla on deliveries. One of those is <b>Volkswagen</b>(OTCPK:VWAGY). In the third quarter, it delivered 122,100 all-electric vehicles. According to Statista, it has a 12.5% market share in EVs globally -- right behind Tesla. It’s a steep drop-off after Volkswagen, though. And there’s more than a dozen players in the space.</p><p><blockquote>特斯拉在市值和收入方面都主导着电动汽车行业,尽管其市值主导地位比其销售领先地位强得多。其他公司在交付方面正在赶上特斯拉。其中之一是<b>大众汽车</b>(OTCPK:VWAGY)。第三季度,全电动汽车交付12.21万辆。根据 Statista 的数据,它在全球电动汽车市场份额为 12.5%,仅次于特斯拉。不过,这在大众汽车之后是一个急剧下降。这个领域有十几个玩家。</blockquote></p><p> Rivian’s market share in EVs is impossible to calculate because we don’t know how many vehicles it will sell. If the 48,000 pre-orders plus the 100,000 cars ordered by Amazon eventually materialize, then that’s 148,000 future deliveries. However, these deliveries can’t be counted to a specific quarter or year. The Amazon vans are going to be delivered over four years and the pre-orders may fall through. So we can’t compare Rivian’s 148,000 in potential sales to Tesla’s 237,000 in Q3, or Volkswagen’s 122,000. The timeframes don’t line up.</p><p><blockquote>Rivian在电动汽车领域的市场份额无法计算,因为我们不知道它将售出多少辆汽车。如果亚马逊订购的 4.8 万辆预购车和 10 万辆汽车最终实现,那么未来将交付 14.8 万辆汽车。但是,这些交付不能计入特定的季度或年份。亚马逊货车将在四年内交付,预购可能会失败。因此,我们无法将Rivian 14.8 万辆的潜在销量与特斯拉第三季度的 23.7 万辆或大众汽车的 12.2 万辆相提并论。时间框架不一致。</blockquote></p><p> Nevertheless, we know that Rivian’s share is likely to be fairly small. If the Amazon deal runs to the end of 2024 then that’s 25,000 deliveries per year, or 6,250 per quarter. That’s assuming deliveries begin in 2021, which TechCrunch says is the case. The 48,000 pre-orders will presumably be delivered over the course of a single year, since most car buyers order the current year’s model. So let’s say 25,000 per year to Amazon and some year -- perhaps 2022 -- when 48,000 get sent out to customers within 12 months. That gets us to 73,000 in a year, or 24,333 per quarter. Nowhere near where Tesla and VW are. And we don’t even know whether the 48,000 pre-orders will come through!</p><p><blockquote>不过,我们知道Rivian的份额可能相当小。如果亚马逊的交易持续到 2024 年底,那么每年将有 25,000 次送货,即每季度 6,250 次送货。这是假设2021年开始交付,TechCrunch称情况确实如此。由于大多数购车者订购的是当年的车型,因此 48,000 辆预购订单大概将在一年内交付。假设每年给亚马逊 25,000 件,有一年--也许是 2022 年--会在 12 个月内向客户发送 48,000 件。这使得我们一年内达到 73,000 人,即每季度 24,333 人。远不及特斯拉和大众。我们甚至不知道 48,000 份预购订单能否完成!</blockquote></p><p> <b>Valuation</b></p><p><blockquote><b>估值</b></blockquote></p><p> Another set of items we can look at to gauge Rivian’s value is its multiples. Broadly, it doesn’t have any. But we can come up with a kind of hypothetical price/sales ratio based on a future scenario.</p><p><blockquote>衡量Rivian价值的另一组因素是它的倍数。总的来说,它没有任何。但是我们可以根据未来的场景提出一种假设的价格/销售比。</blockquote></p><p> If you treat Rivian’s $1,000 pre-order deposits as “sales” then you get to about $48 million in sales. That would produce a price/sales ratio of 2,270, although these deposits aren’t considered revenue based on U.S. GAAP. We could also throw in some indeterminate amount there for the Amazon order, but there is no confirmation that has begun generating revenue.</p><p><blockquote>如果将Rivian的 1000 美元预购定金视为 “销售额 ”,那么销售额约为 4800 万美元。这将产生 2270 的市销率,尽管根据美国通用会计准则,这些存款不被视为收入。我们也可以为亚马逊订单投入一些不确定的金额,但没有确认已经开始产生收入。</blockquote></p><p> Perhaps a better multiple would be using future revenue. Rivian trucks start at $69,000. We know there are 48,000 consumer pre-orders, and 100,000 Amazon orders over four years (25,000 per year on average). That could give us a future year with 73,000 sales. If they average to $69,000 per vehicle, then we get to $5.037 billion in revenue. That, with Friday’s market cap of $109 billion, gives us a 22 forward price/sales ratio. That’s not completely insane, but keep in mind we have assumed here that:</p><p><blockquote>也许更好的倍数是使用未来的收入。Rivian卡车起价 69,000 美元。我们知道四年内有48,000份消费者预购订单和100,000份亚马逊订单(平均每年25,000份)。这可能会让我们明年的销售额达到 73,000 美元。如果平均每辆车售价为 69,000 美元,那么我们的收入将达到 50.37 亿美元。加上周五的市值为 1090 亿美元,我们的远期市销率为 22。这并不完全疯狂,但请记住,我们在这里的假设是这样的:</blockquote></p><p> <ul> <li>The 48,000 pre-orders will come through.</p><p><blockquote><ul><li>48,000份预购将会到来。</li></ul></blockquote></p><p></li> <li>They’ll all be delivered in 2022.</p><p><blockquote><li>它们都将于 2022 年交付。</li></blockquote></p><p></li> <li>Amazon won’t back out of its order even after the scandalous range report.</p><p><blockquote><li>即使在丑闻系列报告之后,亚马逊也不会出尔反尔。</li></blockquote></p><p></p><p></li> </ul> That’s a lot of assumptions to make. Quite likely, at least one of the moving pieces in this puzzle won’t fit. So what we have got here is a “best case scenario” price/sales ratio where all of the sales Rivian has announced, actually close. And in 2022 no less! I’m attempting to be as charitable with my projection as possible, yet the multiple still ends up being very high.</p><p><blockquote>这需要做出很多假设。很有可能,这个拼图中至少有一块活动的碎片不适合。因此,我们得到的是一个 “最佳情况 ”的市销率,即Rivian宣布的所有销售额实际上都很接近。2022年也一样!我试图在投影时尽可能慷慨,但倍数最终还是很高。</blockquote></p><p> <b>The Bottom Line</b></p><p><blockquote><b>底线</b></blockquote></p><p> The bottom line on Rivian is this:</p><p><blockquote>Rivian的底线是:</blockquote></p><p> If any company in 2021 could be another Pets.com, Rivian is it.</p><p><blockquote>如果说 2021 年有哪家公司可以成为另一家 Pets.com,那就是Rivian。</blockquote></p><p> It has no GAAP-recognizable sales. Its IPO went bust after reaching an unbelievable valuation. It is surrounded by hype but has little to back it up.</p><p><blockquote>它没有 GAAP 认可的销售额。其IPO在达到令人难以置信的估值后破产。它被炒作所包围,但几乎没有什么支持。</blockquote></p><p> Put simply, it is a product of its time, a hyped up stock in an era where hype has become the norm.</p><p><blockquote>简而言之,它是那个时代的产物,是在炒作已成为常态的时代被炒作的股票。</blockquote></p><p> Does that mean that Rivian stock is guaranteed to go down? Hardly. Just like there are risks to RIVN longs, there are risks to its shorts as well. Continued social media hype, an unexpected jump in deliveries, or Amazon coming through with its order, are all scenarios that make RIVN a very risky play for shorts.</p><p><blockquote>这是否意味着Rivian股票一定会下跌?几乎不。正如 RIVN 多头存在风险一样,其空头也存在风险。持续的社交媒体炒作、交付量意外激增,或者亚马逊完成订单,所有这些情况都使 RIVN 成为空头的一个非常冒险的选择。</blockquote></p><p> But just like Pets.com before it, RIVN looks unlikely to live up to the promise of its IPO. For that reason, I will pass on the stock.</p><p><blockquote>但就像之前的 Pets.com 一样,RIVN 似乎不太可能兑现其 IPO 的承诺。因此,我将转让股票。</blockquote></p><p></p>","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>Rivian: 2021's Pets.com<blockquote>Rivian:2021年的Pets.com</blockquote></title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nRivian: 2021's Pets.com<blockquote>Rivian:2021年的Pets.com</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n<p class=\"head\">\n<strong class=\"h-name small\">Seeking Alpha</strong><span class=\"h-time small\">2021-11-23 11:11</span>\n</p>\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n<p><b>Summary</b></p><p><blockquote><b>总结</b></blockquote></p><p> <ul> <li>Rivian had a wildly successful IPO, after which it reached a $109 billion market cap.</li> <li>However, the company has been hit by a string of bad reports, including Ford backing out of a partnership with it.</li> <li>Thanks to its high valuation, Rivian is beginning to look like Pets.com - the poster child for the 2000 dotcom crash.</li> <li>In this article, I will develop a bearish thesis on Rivian, arguing that its current price level is still excessive.</li> </ul> <p class=\"t-img-caption\"><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/4d065787049af8b17ea35806fbb51971\" tg-width=\"1536\" tg-height=\"1024\" width=\"100%\" height=\"auto\"><span>Michael M. Santiago/Getty Images News</span></p><p><blockquote><ul><li>Rivian的首次公开募股取得了巨大成功,之后市值达到了 1090 亿美元。</li><li>然而,该公司受到了一系列负面报道的打击,包括福特退出与其的合作伙伴关系。</li><li>由于其高估值,Rivian开始看起来像Pets.com——2000年互联网崩溃的典型代表。</li><li>在本文中,我将阐述一个看跌Rivian的论点,认为其目前的价格水平仍然过高。</li></ul><p class=\"t-img-caption\"><span>迈克尔·M·圣地亚哥/盖蒂图片社新闻</span></p></blockquote></p><p> <b>Rivian</b>(RIVN) shareholders got some bad news last week, when <b>Ford</b>(F) announced that it had scrapped its plans to launch a joint venture with the company. The news came shortly after a report claimed that Rivian’s electric vans built for <b>Amazon</b>(AMZN) had less range than advertised.</p><p><blockquote><b>Rivian</b>(RIVN) 股东上周收到了一些坏消息,当时<b>福特</b>(F) 宣布已取消与该公司成立合资企业的计划。这一消息发布前不久,有报道称Rivian的电动货车是为<b>亚马逊</b>(AMZN) 的航程比广告宣传的要短。</blockquote></p><p> Following the announcement, Ford kept its 12% ownership stake in RIVN. But its actions cast doubt on any future collaboration. From this point on, Ford will simply be a company that owns RIVN stock. There will be no profitable collaboration going forward.</p><p><blockquote>公告发布后,福特保留了 RIVN 12% 的股权。但它的行动让人对未来的任何合作产生了怀疑。从现在起,福特将只是一家拥有 RIVN 股票的公司。今后不会有有利可图的合作。</blockquote></p><p> With last week’s news, Amazon and Ford -- Rivian’s two biggest investors -- dealt the company a double whammy. Even before the Ford news dropped, investors were already selling Rivian. After a post-IPO rally, RIVN fell by 25%, going from $172 to $128.60. Reports that the company had no revenue may have contributed to the selloff, which hit a couple days after it was listed.</p><p><blockquote>随着上周的消息传出,亚马逊和福特--Rivian最大的两大投资者--给了该公司双重打击。甚至在福特消息传出之前,投资者就已经在抛售Rivian了。在IPO后上涨后,RIVN下跌25%,从172美元跌至128.60美元。有关该公司没有收入的报道可能是导致该公司上市几天后出现抛售的原因之一。</blockquote></p><p> In many ways, Rivian has become the poster child of what some are calling a “new tech bubble.” With NASDAQ stocks reaching new highs seemingly daily, we’re beginning to see price action reminiscent of early 2000, when the NASDAQ reached a 175 P/E ratio. When that bubble finally burst, tech stocks fell 80%. It took the NASDAQ 15 years to recover.</p><p><blockquote>在许多方面,Rivian已经成为一些人所说的 “新科技泡沫 ”的典型代表。随着纳斯达克股票似乎每天都在创出新高,我们开始看到价格走势让人想起 2000 年初,当时纳斯达克的市盈率达到了 175。当泡沫最终破裂时,科技股下跌了 80%。纳斯达克花了15年时间才恢复。</blockquote></p><p> The most notorious of all the 2000-era bubble stocks was Pets.com. Like Rivian, it attracted investment from large tech players like Amazon. IPET’s 1998 IPO raised $82.5 million, its stock debuting at $11. At the height of its power, it had a balloon fly in the Macy’s Day Parade. But thanks to an unprofitable business model, the company lost money at a rapid pace. It eventually went bankrupt and, by late 2000, was trading for $0.06 per share.</p><p><blockquote>2000 年代所有泡沫股票中最臭名昭著的是 Pets.com。与Rivian一样,它吸引了亚马逊等大型科技公司的投资。IPET 1998 年的首次公开募股筹集了 8250 万美元,其股票首发价格为 11 美元。在其鼎盛时期,它曾在梅西百货日游行中放飞气球。但由于商业模式无利可图,公司亏损速度很快。该公司最终破产,到 2000 年底,交易价格为每股 0.06 美元。</blockquote></p><p> While the NASDAQ is nowhere near 2000 levels of overvaluation, some individual stocks are getting there. We can find semi stocks,social media stocks, and even blue chip SaaS stocks above 20 times sales. EVs are the most inflated of them all, with even the most mature player in the space sporting a 23.5 price/sales ratio. There are some pricey names in this market, and some don’t even have sales -- let alone earnings!</p><p><blockquote>虽然纳斯达克远未接近 2000 高估水平,但一些个股正在达到这一水平。我们可以找到销售额超过 20 倍的半股票、社交媒体股票,甚至蓝筹股 SaaS 股票。电动汽车是其中最膨胀的,即使是该领域最成熟的参与者,其市销率也高达 23.5。这个市场上有一些昂贵的名字,有些甚至没有销售额,更不用说盈利了!</blockquote></p><p> Rivian is a perfect case-in-point. Much like Pets.com, it has a lot of market cap but no profit. The company claimed in its prospectus that it had 48,390 pre-orders and had collected $1,000 on each one. If that’s the case then it brought in has $48.3 million in cash from those orders. The company won’t be able to recognize any of this as revenue until the vehicles are delivered. If we take the $48.3 million in cash as a kind of “sale” then Rivian has an astonishing 2,270 price/sales ratio. That’s mighty high, but these aren’t considered “sales” under U.S. GAAP. Instead, they represent a liability until the vehicles start being delivered. That is, until the revenue is “earned.”</p><p><blockquote>Rivian就是一个完美的例子。就像Pets.com一样,它有很大的市值,但没有利润。该公司在招股说明书中声称,它有 48,390 份预订单,每份订单收取了 1,000 美元。如果是这样的话,那么它就能从这些订单中获得 4830 万美元现金。在车辆交付之前,公司无法将这些收入确认为收入。如果我们把 4830 万美元的现金看作是一种 “销售 ”,那么Rivian的市销率高达 2270。这很高,但根据美国通用会计准则,这些并不被视为 “销售额”。相反,在车辆开始交付之前,它们代表着一种责任。也就是说,直到 “赚取”收入为止。</blockquote></p><p> Put simply: Rivian has a stratospheric valuation, even if we’re being generous with it. Like Pets.com before it, it trades at a valuation not based on real world performance. Hype, comparisons to <b>Telsa</b>(TSLA) and general optimism toward EVs have driven the price -- not fundamentals. All the telltale signs of a bubble are there. Given this, it would be wise for investors to tread carefully with the stock, as it is beginning to look like the NASDAQ Bubble stocks that rose in the late 90s only to crash painfully in 2000.</p><p><blockquote>简而言之: Rivian的估值高得离谱,即使我们对它很慷慨。与之前的 Pets.com 一样,它的交易估值并非基于现实世界的表现。炒作,与<b>特尔萨</b>(TSLA)和对电动汽车的普遍乐观情绪推动了价格,而不是基本面。泡沫的所有迹象都在那里。有鉴于此,投资者谨慎对待该股是明智的,因为它开始看起来像 90 年代末上涨但在 2000 年痛苦崩溃的纳斯达克泡沫股票。</blockquote></p><p> <b>Pets.com: Anatomy of a Bubble</b></p><p><blockquote><b>Pets.com:泡沫剖析</b></blockquote></p><p> It’s impossible to talk about the 2000 crash without mentioning Pets.com. The most infamous of the stocks that crashed in the dotcom bust, it was in many ways a microcosm of the NASDAQ in that period.</p><p><blockquote>谈到 2000 年的车祸,就不能不提到 Pets.com。作为互联网泡沫破裂中最臭名昭著的股票,它在许多方面都是那个时期纳斯达克的缩影。</blockquote></p><p> Early on, things looked bright for Pets.com. Amazon bought a large stake in the company in its first venture funding around. Later, a consortium of investors injected $10.5 million. The company ran a $1.2 million super bowl ad. Eventually, it became a household name. In February 2000, it went public for $11 per share, raising $82.5 million.</p><p><blockquote>早期,Pets.com 的情况看起来很光明。亚马逊在第一次风险投资中购买了该公司的大量股份。后来,一个投资者财团注资1050万美元。该公司投放了120万美元的超级碗广告。最终,它成为一个家喻户晓的名字。2000年2月,它以每股11美元的价格上市,筹集了8250万美元。</blockquote></p><p> Things were going well.</p><p><blockquote>事情进展顺利。</blockquote></p><p></p><p> But people started asking hard questions about IPET’s business model. It had trouble generating positive gross margins mailing out large bags of dog food. It sold below cost, attempting to gain market share. It spent $400 to acquire each new customer. Finally, it faced stiff competition from a number of companies, all of them offering the same basic thing. In November 2000, it went bankrupt and was delisted.</p><p><blockquote>但人们开始对 IPET 的商业模式提出尖锐的问题。它在邮寄大袋狗粮方面很难产生正毛利率。它以低于成本的价格出售,试图获得市场份额。它花费了400美元来获得每个新客户。最后,它面临着来自许多公司的激烈竞争,所有这些公司都提供相同的基本产品。2000年11月破产退市。</blockquote></p><p> IPET’s final annual report contained the following metrics:</p><p><blockquote>IPET 的最终年度报告包含以下指标:</blockquote></p><p> <ul> <li>Cash: $4.6 million, down 52% from the prior year.</p><p><blockquote><ul><li>现金:460万美元,比上年下降52%。</li></ul></blockquote></p><p></li> <li>Total assets: $4.7 million, down 62%</p><p><blockquote><li>总资产:470万美元,下降62%</li></blockquote></p><p></li> <li>Total liabilities: $4.18 million, down 56%.</p><p><blockquote><li>总负债:418万美元,下降56%。</li></blockquote></p><p></li> <li>Cash raised in liquidation: $438,000.</p><p><blockquote><li>清算筹集的现金:438,000美元。</li></blockquote></p><p></li> <li>Cash spent in liquidation: $6.3 million.</p><p><blockquote><li>清算花费的现金:630万美元。</li></blockquote></p><p></li> </ul> No revenue or earnings were reported, because the company was not doing business by the time the report was released. Instead, it was a liquidation company, focused on paying off investors.</p><p><blockquote>没有报告收入或盈利,因为报告发布时公司尚未开展业务。相反,它是一家清算公司,专注于偿还投资者。</blockquote></p><p> It’s hard not to see the similarities to Rivian here. We’ve got the early investment by Amazon, the sensational IPO, the lack of profits, and the post-IPO selloff. One factor that’s missing in Rivian’s case is a truly broken business model. There doesn’t appear to be anything RIVN is doing that will make profits impossible. But the company has a long road to drive before it has any real value. In the meantime, investors are left reading vague tea leaves about pre-orders and van range.</p><p><blockquote>很难不看到这里与Rivian的相似之处。亚马逊的早期投资、轰动一时的 IPO、利润不足以及 IPO 后的抛售。Rivian的案例中缺少的一个因素是真正破碎的商业模式。RIVN 所做的任何事情似乎都不会让盈利变得不可能。但该公司在获得任何真正价值之前还有很长的路要走。与此同时,投资者只能阅读有关预购和货车系列的模糊茶叶。</blockquote></p><p> <b>Competitive Landscape</b></p><p><blockquote><b>竞争格局</b></blockquote></p><p> One way to approach Rivian’s value is to look at the marketplace it’s operating in. The electric vehicle industry is a competitive one with a clear market leader:</p><p><blockquote>了解Rivian价值的一个方法是看看它所处的市场。电动汽车行业竞争激烈,市场领导者明确:</blockquote></p><p> <i>Tesla.</i></p><p><blockquote><i>特斯拉.</i></blockquote></p><p> TSLA dominates the EV industry on both market cap and revenue, although its market cap dominance is much stronger than its sales lead. Other companies are catching up to Tesla on deliveries. One of those is <b>Volkswagen</b>(OTCPK:VWAGY). In the third quarter, it delivered 122,100 all-electric vehicles. According to Statista, it has a 12.5% market share in EVs globally -- right behind Tesla. It’s a steep drop-off after Volkswagen, though. And there’s more than a dozen players in the space.</p><p><blockquote>特斯拉在市值和收入方面都主导着电动汽车行业,尽管其市值主导地位比其销售领先地位强得多。其他公司在交付方面正在赶上特斯拉。其中之一是<b>大众汽车</b>(OTCPK:VWAGY)。第三季度,全电动汽车交付12.21万辆。根据 Statista 的数据,它在全球电动汽车市场份额为 12.5%,仅次于特斯拉。不过,这在大众汽车之后是一个急剧下降。这个领域有十几个玩家。</blockquote></p><p> Rivian’s market share in EVs is impossible to calculate because we don’t know how many vehicles it will sell. If the 48,000 pre-orders plus the 100,000 cars ordered by Amazon eventually materialize, then that’s 148,000 future deliveries. However, these deliveries can’t be counted to a specific quarter or year. The Amazon vans are going to be delivered over four years and the pre-orders may fall through. So we can’t compare Rivian’s 148,000 in potential sales to Tesla’s 237,000 in Q3, or Volkswagen’s 122,000. The timeframes don’t line up.</p><p><blockquote>Rivian在电动汽车领域的市场份额无法计算,因为我们不知道它将售出多少辆汽车。如果亚马逊订购的 4.8 万辆预购车和 10 万辆汽车最终实现,那么未来将交付 14.8 万辆汽车。但是,这些交付不能计入特定的季度或年份。亚马逊货车将在四年内交付,预购可能会失败。因此,我们无法将Rivian 14.8 万辆的潜在销量与特斯拉第三季度的 23.7 万辆或大众汽车的 12.2 万辆相提并论。时间框架不一致。</blockquote></p><p> Nevertheless, we know that Rivian’s share is likely to be fairly small. If the Amazon deal runs to the end of 2024 then that’s 25,000 deliveries per year, or 6,250 per quarter. That’s assuming deliveries begin in 2021, which TechCrunch says is the case. The 48,000 pre-orders will presumably be delivered over the course of a single year, since most car buyers order the current year’s model. So let’s say 25,000 per year to Amazon and some year -- perhaps 2022 -- when 48,000 get sent out to customers within 12 months. That gets us to 73,000 in a year, or 24,333 per quarter. Nowhere near where Tesla and VW are. And we don’t even know whether the 48,000 pre-orders will come through!</p><p><blockquote>不过,我们知道Rivian的份额可能相当小。如果亚马逊的交易持续到 2024 年底,那么每年将有 25,000 次送货,即每季度 6,250 次送货。这是假设2021年开始交付,TechCrunch称情况确实如此。由于大多数购车者订购的是当年的车型,因此 48,000 辆预购订单大概将在一年内交付。假设每年给亚马逊 25,000 件,有一年--也许是 2022 年--会在 12 个月内向客户发送 48,000 件。这使得我们一年内达到 73,000 人,即每季度 24,333 人。远不及特斯拉和大众。我们甚至不知道 48,000 份预购订单能否完成!</blockquote></p><p> <b>Valuation</b></p><p><blockquote><b>估值</b></blockquote></p><p> Another set of items we can look at to gauge Rivian’s value is its multiples. Broadly, it doesn’t have any. But we can come up with a kind of hypothetical price/sales ratio based on a future scenario.</p><p><blockquote>衡量Rivian价值的另一组因素是它的倍数。总的来说,它没有任何。但是我们可以根据未来的场景提出一种假设的价格/销售比。</blockquote></p><p> If you treat Rivian’s $1,000 pre-order deposits as “sales” then you get to about $48 million in sales. That would produce a price/sales ratio of 2,270, although these deposits aren’t considered revenue based on U.S. GAAP. We could also throw in some indeterminate amount there for the Amazon order, but there is no confirmation that has begun generating revenue.</p><p><blockquote>如果将Rivian的 1000 美元预购定金视为 “销售额 ”,那么销售额约为 4800 万美元。这将产生 2270 的市销率,尽管根据美国通用会计准则,这些存款不被视为收入。我们也可以为亚马逊订单投入一些不确定的金额,但没有确认已经开始产生收入。</blockquote></p><p> Perhaps a better multiple would be using future revenue. Rivian trucks start at $69,000. We know there are 48,000 consumer pre-orders, and 100,000 Amazon orders over four years (25,000 per year on average). That could give us a future year with 73,000 sales. If they average to $69,000 per vehicle, then we get to $5.037 billion in revenue. That, with Friday’s market cap of $109 billion, gives us a 22 forward price/sales ratio. That’s not completely insane, but keep in mind we have assumed here that:</p><p><blockquote>也许更好的倍数是使用未来的收入。Rivian卡车起价 69,000 美元。我们知道四年内有48,000份消费者预购订单和100,000份亚马逊订单(平均每年25,000份)。这可能会让我们明年的销售额达到 73,000 美元。如果平均每辆车售价为 69,000 美元,那么我们的收入将达到 50.37 亿美元。加上周五的市值为 1090 亿美元,我们的远期市销率为 22。这并不完全疯狂,但请记住,我们在这里的假设是这样的:</blockquote></p><p> <ul> <li>The 48,000 pre-orders will come through.</p><p><blockquote><ul><li>48,000份预购将会到来。</li></ul></blockquote></p><p></li> <li>They’ll all be delivered in 2022.</p><p><blockquote><li>它们都将于 2022 年交付。</li></blockquote></p><p></li> <li>Amazon won’t back out of its order even after the scandalous range report.</p><p><blockquote><li>即使在丑闻系列报告之后,亚马逊也不会出尔反尔。</li></blockquote></p><p></p><p></li> </ul> That’s a lot of assumptions to make. Quite likely, at least one of the moving pieces in this puzzle won’t fit. So what we have got here is a “best case scenario” price/sales ratio where all of the sales Rivian has announced, actually close. And in 2022 no less! I’m attempting to be as charitable with my projection as possible, yet the multiple still ends up being very high.</p><p><blockquote>这需要做出很多假设。很有可能,这个拼图中至少有一块活动的碎片不适合。因此,我们得到的是一个 “最佳情况 ”的市销率,即Rivian宣布的所有销售额实际上都很接近。2022年也一样!我试图在投影时尽可能慷慨,但倍数最终还是很高。</blockquote></p><p> <b>The Bottom Line</b></p><p><blockquote><b>底线</b></blockquote></p><p> The bottom line on Rivian is this:</p><p><blockquote>Rivian的底线是:</blockquote></p><p> If any company in 2021 could be another Pets.com, Rivian is it.</p><p><blockquote>如果说 2021 年有哪家公司可以成为另一家 Pets.com,那就是Rivian。</blockquote></p><p> It has no GAAP-recognizable sales. Its IPO went bust after reaching an unbelievable valuation. It is surrounded by hype but has little to back it up.</p><p><blockquote>它没有 GAAP 认可的销售额。其IPO在达到令人难以置信的估值后破产。它被炒作所包围,但几乎没有什么支持。</blockquote></p><p> Put simply, it is a product of its time, a hyped up stock in an era where hype has become the norm.</p><p><blockquote>简而言之,它是那个时代的产物,是在炒作已成为常态的时代被炒作的股票。</blockquote></p><p> Does that mean that Rivian stock is guaranteed to go down? Hardly. Just like there are risks to RIVN longs, there are risks to its shorts as well. Continued social media hype, an unexpected jump in deliveries, or Amazon coming through with its order, are all scenarios that make RIVN a very risky play for shorts.</p><p><blockquote>这是否意味着Rivian股票一定会下跌?几乎不。正如 RIVN 多头存在风险一样,其空头也存在风险。持续的社交媒体炒作、交付量意外激增,或者亚马逊完成订单,所有这些情况都使 RIVN 成为空头的一个非常冒险的选择。</blockquote></p><p> But just like Pets.com before it, RIVN looks unlikely to live up to the promise of its IPO. For that reason, I will pass on the stock.</p><p><blockquote>但就像之前的 Pets.com 一样,RIVN 似乎不太可能兑现其 IPO 的承诺。因此,我将转让股票。</blockquote></p><p></p>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n<p> 来源:<a href=\"https://seekingalpha.com/article/4471317-rivian-2021-petscom\">Seeking Alpha</a></p>\n<p>为提升您的阅读体验,我们对本页面进行了排版优化</p>\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{"RIVN":"Rivian Automotive, Inc."},"source_url":"https://seekingalpha.com/article/4471317-rivian-2021-petscom","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1144695405","content_text":"Summary\n\nRivian had a wildly successful IPO, after which it reached a $109 billion market cap.\nHowever, the company has been hit by a string of bad reports, including Ford backing out of a partnership with it.\nThanks to its high valuation, Rivian is beginning to look like Pets.com - the poster child for the 2000 dotcom crash.\nIn this article, I will develop a bearish thesis on Rivian, arguing that its current price level is still excessive.\n\nMichael M. Santiago/Getty Images News\nRivian(RIVN) shareholders got some bad news last week, when Ford(F) announced that it had scrapped its plans to launch a joint venture with the company. The news came shortly after a report claimed that Rivian’s electric vans built for Amazon(AMZN) had less range than advertised.\nFollowing the announcement, Ford kept its 12% ownership stake in RIVN. But its actions cast doubt on any future collaboration. From this point on, Ford will simply be a company that owns RIVN stock. There will be no profitable collaboration going forward.\nWith last week’s news, Amazon and Ford -- Rivian’s two biggest investors -- dealt the company a double whammy. Even before the Ford news dropped, investors were already selling Rivian. After a post-IPO rally, RIVN fell by 25%, going from $172 to $128.60. Reports that the company had no revenue may have contributed to the selloff, which hit a couple days after it was listed.\nIn many ways, Rivian has become the poster child of what some are calling a “new tech bubble.” With NASDAQ stocks reaching new highs seemingly daily, we’re beginning to see price action reminiscent of early 2000, when the NASDAQ reached a 175 P/E ratio. When that bubble finally burst, tech stocks fell 80%. It took the NASDAQ 15 years to recover.\nThe most notorious of all the 2000-era bubble stocks was Pets.com. Like Rivian, it attracted investment from large tech players like Amazon. IPET’s 1998 IPO raised $82.5 million, its stock debuting at $11. At the height of its power, it had a balloon fly in the Macy’s Day Parade. But thanks to an unprofitable business model, the company lost money at a rapid pace. It eventually went bankrupt and, by late 2000, was trading for $0.06 per share.\nWhile the NASDAQ is nowhere near 2000 levels of overvaluation, some individual stocks are getting there. We can find semi stocks,social media stocks, and even blue chip SaaS stocks above 20 times sales. EVs are the most inflated of them all, with even the most mature player in the space sporting a 23.5 price/sales ratio. There are some pricey names in this market, and some don’t even have sales -- let alone earnings!\nRivian is a perfect case-in-point. Much like Pets.com, it has a lot of market cap but no profit. The company claimed in its prospectus that it had 48,390 pre-orders and had collected $1,000 on each one. If that’s the case then it brought in has $48.3 million in cash from those orders. The company won’t be able to recognize any of this as revenue until the vehicles are delivered. If we take the $48.3 million in cash as a kind of “sale” then Rivian has an astonishing 2,270 price/sales ratio. That’s mighty high, but these aren’t considered “sales” under U.S. GAAP. Instead, they represent a liability until the vehicles start being delivered. That is, until the revenue is “earned.”\nPut simply: Rivian has a stratospheric valuation, even if we’re being generous with it. Like Pets.com before it, it trades at a valuation not based on real world performance. Hype, comparisons to Telsa(TSLA) and general optimism toward EVs have driven the price -- not fundamentals. All the telltale signs of a bubble are there. Given this, it would be wise for investors to tread carefully with the stock, as it is beginning to look like the NASDAQ Bubble stocks that rose in the late 90s only to crash painfully in 2000.\nPets.com: Anatomy of a Bubble\nIt’s impossible to talk about the 2000 crash without mentioning Pets.com. The most infamous of the stocks that crashed in the dotcom bust, it was in many ways a microcosm of the NASDAQ in that period.\nEarly on, things looked bright for Pets.com. Amazon bought a large stake in the company in its first venture funding around. Later, a consortium of investors injected $10.5 million. The company ran a $1.2 million super bowl ad. Eventually, it became a household name. In February 2000, it went public for $11 per share, raising $82.5 million.\nThings were going well.\nBut people started asking hard questions about IPET’s business model. It had trouble generating positive gross margins mailing out large bags of dog food. It sold below cost, attempting to gain market share. It spent $400 to acquire each new customer. Finally, it faced stiff competition from a number of companies, all of them offering the same basic thing. In November 2000, it went bankrupt and was delisted.\nIPET’s final annual report contained the following metrics:\n\nCash: $4.6 million, down 52% from the prior year.\nTotal assets: $4.7 million, down 62%\nTotal liabilities: $4.18 million, down 56%.\nCash raised in liquidation: $438,000.\nCash spent in liquidation: $6.3 million.\n\nNo revenue or earnings were reported, because the company was not doing business by the time the report was released. Instead, it was a liquidation company, focused on paying off investors.\nIt’s hard not to see the similarities to Rivian here. We’ve got the early investment by Amazon, the sensational IPO, the lack of profits, and the post-IPO selloff. One factor that’s missing in Rivian’s case is a truly broken business model. There doesn’t appear to be anything RIVN is doing that will make profits impossible. But the company has a long road to drive before it has any real value. In the meantime, investors are left reading vague tea leaves about pre-orders and van range.\nCompetitive Landscape\nOne way to approach Rivian’s value is to look at the marketplace it’s operating in. The electric vehicle industry is a competitive one with a clear market leader:\nTesla.\nTSLA dominates the EV industry on both market cap and revenue, although its market cap dominance is much stronger than its sales lead. Other companies are catching up to Tesla on deliveries. One of those is Volkswagen(OTCPK:VWAGY). In the third quarter, it delivered 122,100 all-electric vehicles. According to Statista, it has a 12.5% market share in EVs globally -- right behind Tesla. It’s a steep drop-off after Volkswagen, though. And there’s more than a dozen players in the space.\nRivian’s market share in EVs is impossible to calculate because we don’t know how many vehicles it will sell. If the 48,000 pre-orders plus the 100,000 cars ordered by Amazon eventually materialize, then that’s 148,000 future deliveries. However, these deliveries can’t be counted to a specific quarter or year. The Amazon vans are going to be delivered over four years and the pre-orders may fall through. So we can’t compare Rivian’s 148,000 in potential sales to Tesla’s 237,000 in Q3, or Volkswagen’s 122,000. The timeframes don’t line up.\nNevertheless, we know that Rivian’s share is likely to be fairly small. If the Amazon deal runs to the end of 2024 then that’s 25,000 deliveries per year, or 6,250 per quarter. That’s assuming deliveries begin in 2021, which TechCrunch says is the case. The 48,000 pre-orders will presumably be delivered over the course of a single year, since most car buyers order the current year’s model. So let’s say 25,000 per year to Amazon and some year -- perhaps 2022 -- when 48,000 get sent out to customers within 12 months. That gets us to 73,000 in a year, or 24,333 per quarter. Nowhere near where Tesla and VW are. And we don’t even know whether the 48,000 pre-orders will come through!\nValuation\nAnother set of items we can look at to gauge Rivian’s value is its multiples. Broadly, it doesn’t have any. But we can come up with a kind of hypothetical price/sales ratio based on a future scenario.\nIf you treat Rivian’s $1,000 pre-order deposits as “sales” then you get to about $48 million in sales. That would produce a price/sales ratio of 2,270, although these deposits aren’t considered revenue based on U.S. GAAP. We could also throw in some indeterminate amount there for the Amazon order, but there is no confirmation that has begun generating revenue.\nPerhaps a better multiple would be using future revenue. Rivian trucks start at $69,000. We know there are 48,000 consumer pre-orders, and 100,000 Amazon orders over four years (25,000 per year on average). That could give us a future year with 73,000 sales. If they average to $69,000 per vehicle, then we get to $5.037 billion in revenue. That, with Friday’s market cap of $109 billion, gives us a 22 forward price/sales ratio. That’s not completely insane, but keep in mind we have assumed here that:\n\nThe 48,000 pre-orders will come through.\nThey’ll all be delivered in 2022.\nAmazon won’t back out of its order even after the scandalous range report.\n\nThat’s a lot of assumptions to make. Quite likely, at least one of the moving pieces in this puzzle won’t fit. So what we have got here is a “best case scenario” price/sales ratio where all of the sales Rivian has announced, actually close. And in 2022 no less! I’m attempting to be as charitable with my projection as possible, yet the multiple still ends up being very high.\nThe Bottom Line\nThe bottom line on Rivian is this:\nIf any company in 2021 could be another Pets.com, Rivian is it.\nIt has no GAAP-recognizable sales. Its IPO went bust after reaching an unbelievable valuation. It is surrounded by hype but has little to back it up.\nPut simply, it is a product of its time, a hyped up stock in an era where hype has become the norm.\nDoes that mean that Rivian stock is guaranteed to go down? Hardly. Just like there are risks to RIVN longs, there are risks to its shorts as well. Continued social media hype, an unexpected jump in deliveries, or Amazon coming through with its order, are all scenarios that make RIVN a very risky play for shorts.\nBut just like Pets.com before it, RIVN looks unlikely to live up to the promise of its IPO. For that reason, I will pass on the stock.","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{"RIVN":0.9}},"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":3999,"commentLimit":10,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"symbols":[],"verified":2,"subType":0,"readableState":1,"langContent":"CN","currentLanguage":"CN","warmUpFlag":false,"orderFlag":false,"shareable":true,"causeOfNotShareable":"","featuresForAnalytics":[],"commentAndTweetFlag":false,"andRepostAutoSelectedFlag":false,"upFlag":false,"length":2,"subscribersOnly":false,"subscribersOnlyAccessible":false,"xxTargetLangEnum":"ZH_CN"},"commentList":[],"isCommentEnd":true,"isTiger":false,"isWeiXinMini":false,"url":"/m/post/875606148"}
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