Nice_老虎社区_美港股上老虎

2021-08-11

Nice

Apple Inc. And Buffett: Why He Bought And Why He Holds<blockquote>苹果公司和巴菲特：他为什么买入以及为什么持有</blockquote>

免责声明：上述内容仅代表发帖人个人观点，不构成本平台的任何投资建议。

精彩评论

我们需要你的真知灼见来填补这片空白

发表看法

{"i18n":{"language":"zh_CN"},"detailType":1,"isChannel":false,"data":{"magic":2,"id":892139097,"tweetId":"892139097","gmtCreate":1628642715519,"gmtModify":1631894016226,"author":{"id":3582008717283503,"idStr":"3582008717283503","authorId":3582008717283503,"authorIdStr":"3582008717283503","name":"Dazy","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/afb15bdfd792779c336ccb3aca893815","vip":1,"userType":1,"introduction":"","boolIsFan":false,"boolIsHead":false,"crmLevel":12,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[],"wearingBadges":[],"fanSize":4,"starInvestorFlag":false},"themes":[],"images":[],"coverImages":[],"title":"","extraTitle":"","html":"<html><head></head><body>Nice</body></html>","htmlText":"<html><head></head><body>Nice</body></html>","text":"Nice","highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":1,"commentSize":1,"repostSize":0,"favoriteSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/892139097","repostId":1138697562,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1138697562","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1628642042,"share":"https://www.laohunote.com/m/news/1138697562?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-08-11 08:34","market":"us","language":"en","title":"Apple Inc. And Buffett: Why He Bought And Why He Holds<blockquote>苹果公司和巴菲特：他为什么买入以及为什么持有</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1138697562","media":"Seeking Alpha","summary":"Summary\n\nThis article analyzes Apple under the context of it being the largest holding in the Buffet","content":"Summary<blockquote>总结</blockquote> <ul> <li>This article analyzes <a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/AAPL\">Apple</a> under the context of it being the largest holding in the Buffett portfolio.</li> <li>This analysis approaches the purchase under a framework that I call the Buffett’s 10x Pretax Rule.</li> <li>And this analysis argues that Buffett holds the AAPL shares in the long term for its perpetual growth prospects, offering double-digit return even under its current expensive valuation.</li> </ul> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/24b65798f03c6f9376257bba2741e588\" tg-width=\"768\" tg-height=\"531\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\" width=\"100%\" height=\"auto\">Justin Sullivan/Getty Images News<blockquote><ul><li>本文分析<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/AAPL\">苹果</a>在它是巴菲特投资组合中最大的持股的背景下。</li><li>本分析是在我看涨期权巴菲特税前 10 倍规则的框架下进行收购的。</li><li>这一分析认为，巴菲特长期持有 AAPL 股票是为了其永久的增长前景，即使在目前昂贵的估值下，也能提供两位数的回报。</li></ul>贾斯汀·沙利文/盖蒂图片社新闻</blockquote> <h3>The investment thesis</h3> If you are reading this, chances are that you already know that AppleInc. (AAPL) is the largest position in Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway portfolio. When many people wonder if the legend has lost his magic touch, and commented on his blunders with the airline stocks, they forgot that he made more than $100B from AAPL stocks alone! With his concentrated investment style, what he lost on the relatively minor bets such as the airlines is only a footnote.<blockquote><h3>投资论文</h3>如果你正在读这篇文章，很可能你已经知道AppleInc。（AAPL）是沃伦·巴菲特伯克希尔·哈撒韦投资组合中最大的头寸。当许多人想知道这位传奇人物是否已经失去了他的魔力，并评论他在航空公司股票上的失误时，他们忘记了他仅从AAPL股票中就赚了超过1000亿美元!以他专注的投资风格，他在航空公司等相对较小的赌注上输掉的只是一个注脚。</blockquote> This article analyzes AAPL under the context of it being the largest holding in the Buffett portfolio. This analysis first approaches his entry decision under a framework that I call the Buffett’s 10x Pretax Rule. And then this analysis argues that Buffett holds the AAPL shares in the long term NOT as a technology stock – he had made it clear enough that he does not understand tech companies and will not invest in them. He must be holding AAPL for its perpetual growth prospects. From this perspective, we will see that APPL will still offer double-digit return in the longer run even under its current expensive valuation.<blockquote>本文在 AAPL 是巴菲特投资组合中最大持股的背景下对其进行分析。本分析首先在看涨期权巴菲特的 10 倍税前规则的框架下探讨了他的入场决策。然后，这项分析认为，巴菲特长期持有 AAPL 股票并不是作为科技股——他已经明确表示，他不了解科技公司，也不会投资它们。他一定是为了苹果公司的永久增长前景而持有它。从这个角度来看，我们将看到，即使在目前昂贵的估值下，APPL 从长远来看仍将提供两位数的回报。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/348a1fb56faeceb8e956ad8f6fa3b09a\" tg-width=\"640\" tg-height=\"645\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\" width=\"100%\" height=\"auto\"><blockquote></blockquote> Source:&nbsp;DataRoma<blockquote>资料来源：DataRoma</blockquote> <h3>Buffett’s 10x Pretax Rule</h3> If you’re a devout Buffett cultist like this author, you must have noticed or heard that the grand master paid ~10x pretax earnings for many of his largest and best deals. The list is a really long one, ranging from Coca-Cola, American Express, Wells Fargo, Walmart, Burlington Northern, and of course the more recent AAPL purchase and his recent $25B&nbsp;repurchases of BRK.A&nbsp;shares as analyzed in my earlier article.<blockquote><h3>巴菲特的10倍税前规则</h3>如果你和作者一样是巴菲特的虔诚崇拜者，你一定注意到或听说过这位大师为他的许多最大、最好的交易支付了约 10 倍的税前收益。名单很长，包括可口可乐、美国运通、富国银行、沃尔玛、伯灵顿北方，当然还有最近收购的 AAPL 和他最近以 25B 美元回购的 BRK.A 股票，正如我在之前的文章中分析的那样。</blockquote> The following chart shows the price history of AAPL and its 10x pretax earning since 2010. Pretax earnings are also referred to as \"EBT\", Earning Before Taxes, in this article. As seen, Buffett made his purchases during 2016-2017 when the price is below or near 10x EBT. I was lucky enough to have made the AAPL purchases at that time myself too.<blockquote>下图显示了 AAPL 的价格历史及其自 2010 年以来的 10 倍税前收益。在本文中，税前收益也称为“EBT”，即税前收益。如图所示，巴菲特在 2016-2017 年期间进行了购买，当时价格低于或接近 10 倍 EBT。当时我自己也很幸运地购买了AAPL。</blockquote> Buffet himself also mentioned and discussed the 10x pretax multiple times in his shareholder meetings and Q&amp;A sessions. An example quote is provided below (highlighting was added by me):<blockquote>巴菲特本人也在股东大会和问答环节中多次提及和讨论 10 倍税前。下面提供了一个示例报价（突出显示是我添加的）：</blockquote> Buffett: “Geico would be valued differently than Gen RE and other insurance businesses because it’s rational to assume a large underwriting profit and significant growth. You cannot say that about many insurance businesses. I would love to buy a new bunch of operating businesses with similar competitive positions to the ones we own now at nine to ten times pretax earnings.”<blockquote>巴菲特： “Geico 的估值将不同于 Gen RE 和其他保险业务，因为假设承保利润丰厚和显著增长是合理的。很多保险业务都不能这样说。我很想收购一批新的运营业务，它们的竞争地位与我们现在拥有的业务相似，税前收益是我们现在的 9 到 10 倍。”</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/9eec812a3eda60f950a1890eebc7dd34\" tg-width=\"640\" tg-height=\"359\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\" width=\"100%\" height=\"auto\"><blockquote></blockquote> Source: author based on Seeking Alpha data<blockquote>资料来源：作者基于Seeking Alpha数据</blockquote> So are there any reasons fundamental to this 10x pretax rule, or is it only a bunch of pure coincidences? I think it is the former and there are indeed many good reasons for this rule, as listed below.<blockquote>那么，这个10倍税前规则有什么根本原因吗，还是只是一堆纯粹的巧合？我认为是前者，这个规则确实有很多很好的理由，如下所列。</blockquote> <h3>First, Why pretax?</h3> Out of all the earning metrics, EPS, operation income, free cash, dividend, etc., why do we favor the pretax earning? I think there are at least two good reasons.<blockquote><h3>首先，为什么要预税？</h3>在所有盈利指标中，每股收益、营业收入、自由现金、股息等。，为什么我们青睐税前收益？我认为至少有两个很好的理由。</blockquote> <ul> <li>After tax earnings do not reflect business fundamentals. Taxes can change from time to time due to factors that have no relevance to business fundamentals, such as tax law changes and capital structure change. Plus there are plenty of ways to lower the actual tax burden of a company.</li> </ul> <ul> <li>Pretax earnings are easier to benchmark, say against bond earnings. The best equity investments are bond like, and when we speak of bond yield, that yield is pretax. So a 10x EBT would provide a 10% pretax earning yield, directly comparable to a 10% yield bond.</li> </ul> <h3>Second, why 10x?</h3> Besides being a nice and round number, it passes the/my common sense test. A 10x pretax multiple roughly translate into 12 to 15x PE depending on the tax rates, which is not far off from the long term average of stock valuation. Furthermore, if we buy average business at 10x pretax, we already get a 10% pretax return. And if we can do better than buying only average business (like Buffett), paying 10x pretax pretty much guarantees double digit pretax earning. Of course, the 10x here is only for businesses that are conservatively leveraged (say with interest coverage around 10x). The number needs to be adjusted for a highly leveraged business or a business with loads of cash.<blockquote><ul><li>税后盈利并不反映业务基本面。由于与业务基本面无关的因素，如税法变化和资本结构变化，税收可能会不时发生变化。此外，还有很多方法可以降低公司的实际税收负担。</li></ul><ul><li>与债券收益相比，税前收益更容易进行基准测试。最好的股票投资是债券，当我们谈论债券收益率时，该收益率是税前的。因此，10 倍 EBT 将提供 10% 的税前收益收益率，直接与 10% 收益率债券相当。</li></ul><h3>第二，为什么是10倍？</h3>除了是一个漂亮的整数，它还通过了/我的常识测试。根据税率的不同，10 倍税前市盈率大致转化为 12 至 15 倍市盈率，这与股票估值的长期平均水平相差不远。此外，如果我们以10倍的税前价格购买普通企业，我们已经获得了10%的税前回报。如果我们能比只收购普通企业（比如巴菲特）做得更好，那么支付 10 倍的税前收入几乎可以保证两位数的税前收入。当然，这里的 10 倍仅适用于保守杠杆率（例如利息覆盖率约为 10 倍）的企业。对于高杠杆企业或拥有大量现金的企业，这个数字需要进行调整。</blockquote> <h3>Third, warning and summary</h3> Here a strong warning is in order. I am NOT suggesting you go out and start buying every/any stock that is below 10x EBT. As investors, we face many risks. Two of the major risks are A) quality risk or value trap, i.e., paying a bargain price for something of horrible quality, and B) valuation risk, i.e., paying too much for something of superb quality. The 10x pretax rule is mainly to avoid the type B risk AFTER the type A risk has been eliminated already.<blockquote><h3>三、警示和总结</h3>这里需要一个强烈的警告。我并不是建议你出去开始购买每一只低于10倍EBT的股票。作为投资者，我们面临许多风险。两个主要风险是a）质量风险或价值陷阱，即为质量糟糕的东西支付便宜的价格，以及B）估值风险，即为质量极佳的东西支付过高的价格。10倍税前规则主要是在A类风险已经消除后规避B类风险。</blockquote> So to summarize, to apply the 10x EBT rule,<blockquote>综上所述，要应用10倍EBT规则，</blockquote> <ol> <li>the business should have not existential issue in the long run. However, at the end, this is largely a subjective judgement.</li> <li>the business should have no existential issue in the short run either. This is can be quite reliably and objectively evaluated based on the cash flow and debt coverage.</li> <li>If we paid 10x pretax and bought a business that meets requirement 1 and 2, we will be paying an average price for an average business. Not the best investment ever, but 10% pretax return is not that bad either. If we get a business that offers ANY growth, then we will be buying an above average business at an average price. And we will have a large chance of a double digit return compounding for a long time (if you hold onto to it long enough like Buffett).</li> </ol> AAPL in 2016 and 2017 obviously met all of the above requirements, and it is another textbook illustration of Buffett’s value driven investment success.<blockquote><ol><li>从长远来看，这家企业应该没有生存问题。然而，归根结底，这在很大程度上是一个主观判断。</li><li>短期内，这家企业也不应该有生存问题。这可以根据现金流和债务覆盖率进行相当可靠和客观的评估。</li><li>如果我们支付了10倍的税前费用，并购买了一家符合要求1和2的企业，我们将为一家普通企业支付平均价格。不是有史以来最好的投资，但10%的税前回报也不错。如果我们得到一个提供任何增长的企业，那么我们将以平均价格购买一个高于平均水平的企业。我们将有很大的机会在很长一段时间内获得两位数的复利（如果你像巴菲特一样持有足够长的时间）。</li></ol>2016 年和 2017 年的 AAPL 显然满足了上述所有要求，是巴菲特价值驱动投资成功的又一教科书式说明。</blockquote> <h3>AAPL: why is he still holding it?</h3> The next question now is: why is he still holding whenits valuation is not long 10x EBT? As a matter of factor, it is at ~23x EBT now, more than double 10x EBT.<blockquote><h3>AAPL：他为什么还拿着？</h3>现在的下一个问题是：当他的估值不到EBT的10倍时，他为什么还持有？作为一个因素，它现在是大约23倍EBT，是10倍EBT的两倍多。</blockquote> I am not going to pretend that I know all his considerations. There are so many aspects that needs to be considered with a position of this size - tax liabilities, alternative investment candidates, opportunity cost, et al.<blockquote>我不会假装我知道他所有的考虑。如此规模的头寸需要考虑许多方面——纳税义务、另类投资候选人、机会成本等。</blockquote> But I am pretty certain about one thing – he is NOT holding AAPL as a technology stock, wishing for the next technology breakthrough and double the earning. He had made it so clear that he does not understand tech companies and will not invest in them. He must be holding AAPL for its perpetual autonomous growth – a business that can almost “automatically” grow without the need of too much reinvestment.<blockquote>但我很确定一件事——他持有 AAPL 并不是作为科技股，而是希望下一次技术突破并将收益翻一番。他已经明确表示，他不了解科技公司，也不会投资它们。他持有 AAPL 一定是为了实现其永久的自主增长--这家企业几乎可以 “自动 ”增长，而无需过多的再投资。</blockquote> He said multiple times that there are businesses which, at the end of the day, point to a bunch of depreciated properties and equipment and tell the investors, “these are our profits.” He hates his business.<blockquote>他曾多次表示，有些企业在一天结束时，会指着一堆折旧的财产和设备告诉投资者：“这些是我们的利润”。他讨厌他的生意。</blockquote> As we will see from the next section, APPL is the exact opposite of those businesses. And due to its ultra-high ROCE and ultra-low requirement of reinvestment to fuel future growth, it will still offer double-digit return in the longer run even under its current expensive valuation.<blockquote>正如我们将在下一节中看到的，APPL与这些业务完全相反。由于其超高的 ROCE 和超低的再投资要求来推动未来增长，即使在目前昂贵的估值下，从长远来看，它仍将提供两位数的回报。</blockquote> <h3>Perpetual autonomous growth</h3> If you, like this author, are a long-term investor who subscribes to the concepts of owner's earning, perpetual growth rate, and equity bond, then the long-term return is simpler. It is \"simply\" the summation of the owner's earning yield (\"OEY\") and the perpetual growth rate (\"PGR\"), i.e.,<blockquote><h3>永久自主生长</h3>如果你和这位作者一样，是一个长期投资者，认购所有者收益、永久增长率和股票债券的概念，那么长期回报就更简单了。它“简单地”是业主盈利收益率（“OEY”）和永久增长率（“PGR”）的总和，即，</blockquote> Longer-Term ROI = OEY + PGR<blockquote>长期投资回报率 = OEY + PGR</blockquote> Because in the long term, all fluctuations in valuation are averaged out (all luck at the end even out). And it doesn't really matter how the business uses the earnings (pay out as dividend, retained in the bank account, or repurchase stocks). As long as used sensibly (as AAPL has done in the past), it will be reflected as a return to the business owner.<blockquote>因为从长远来看，估值的所有波动都是平均值的（所有运气最终都是平均值）。企业如何使用收益（作为股息支付、保留在银行账户中或回购股票）并不重要。只要明智地使用（就像AAPL过去所做的那样），它将被反映为对企业主的回报。</blockquote> OEY is the owner's earnings divided by the entry price. All the complications are in the estimation of the owner's earnings - the real economic earnings of the business, not the nominal accounting earnings. Here as a crude and conservative estimate, I will just use the free cash flow (\"FCF\") as the owner's earnings. It is conservative in the sense that rigorously speaking, the owner's earnings should be free cash flow plus the portion of CAPEx that is used to fuel the growth (i.e., the growth CAPEx). At its current price levels, the OEY is ~3.6% for AAPL (~27.4x price to FCF).<blockquote>OEY是所有者的收入除以入场价格。所有的复杂性都在于对所有者收入的估计——企业的真实经济收入，而不是名义上的会计收入。在这里，作为一个粗略而保守的估计，我将只使用自由现金流（“FCF”）作为所有者的收益。保守的是，严格来说，所有者的收益应该是自由现金流加上用于推动增长的资本支出部分（即增长资本支出）。按当前价格水平计算，AAPL 的 OEY 约为 3.6%（约为 FCF 价格的 27.4 倍）。</blockquote> Again, the valuation is quite expensive and the OEY is merely 3.6%. But do not be under impressed yet, because there is a second part to the long term return, the part is the created by the PGR, perpetual growth rate. In the long term, the growth rate is:<blockquote>同样，估值相当昂贵，OEY仅为3.6%。但还不要低估，因为长期回报还有第二部分，这部分是由PGR创造的，即永久增长率。从长期来看，增长率是：</blockquote> PGR = ROCE * Reinvestment Rate<blockquote>PGR=ROCE*再投资率</blockquote> ROCE stands for the return on capital employed. Note that ROCE is different from the return on equity (and more fundamental and important in my view). ROCE considers the return of capital ACTUALLY employed, and therefore provides insight into how much additional capital a business needs to invest in order to earn a given extra amount of income – a key to estimate the PGR. The reinvestment rate is the portion of income the business plows back to fuel further growth.<blockquote>ROCE 代表资本回报率。请注意，ROCE 不同于股本回报率（在我看来更基本、更重要）。ROCE考虑实际使用的资本回报率，因此可以深入了解企业需要投资多少额外资本才能赚取给定的额外收入——这是估算PGR的关键。再投资率是企业为推动进一步增长而回收的收入部分。</blockquote> So to estimate the PGR, we need to estimate two things: ROCE and reinvestment rate.<blockquote>因此，要估计PGR，我们需要估计两件事：ROCE和再投资率。</blockquote> To estimate the ROCE of businesses like AAPL, I consider the following items capital actually employed:<blockquote>为了估算 AAPL 等企业的 ROCE，我考虑了资本实际使用的以下项目：</blockquote> 1. Working capital, including payables, receivables, inventory. These are the capitals required for the daily operation of their businesses.<blockquote>1、流动资金，包括应付账款、应收款项、存货。这些是他们业务日常运营所需的资本。</blockquote> 2. Gross Property, Plant, and Equipment. These are the capitals required to actually conduct business and manufacture their products.<blockquote>2.财产、厂房和设备总额。这些是实际开展业务和制造产品所需的资本。</blockquote> 3. Research and development expenses (an essential expense for a business like AAPL).<blockquote>3.研发费用（对于像AAPL这样的企业来说是必不可少的费用）。</blockquote> Based on the above considerations, the ROCE of AAPL over the past decade are shown below. As seen, it was able to maintain a respectably high ROCE over the past decade: it used to be 450% early in the decade and still hovers around an average of 150% in recent years since 2016. To put things in perspective, as detailed in myprevious articleforVisa Inc., another autonomous grower that Buffett likes, Visa features a ROCE “only” around 105%.<blockquote>基于上述考虑，AAPL过去十年的ROCE如下所示。正如所看到的，它在过去十年中能够保持相当高的 ROCE：在本世纪初，它曾经是 450%，自 2016 年以来，近年来仍徘徊在平均 150% 左右。正如我在上一篇文章中详细介绍的那样，巴菲特喜欢的另一家自主种植者 Visa Inc. Visa 的 ROCE “只有 ”105% 左右。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/d21191b41d6360f09d6f6496fac499a4\" tg-width=\"640\" tg-height=\"358\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\" width=\"100%\" height=\"auto\"><blockquote></blockquote> Source: author and Seeking Alpha.<blockquote>来源：作者和寻求阿尔法。</blockquote> Now let’s see the reinvestment part. In recent years, the following is how AAPL has been allocating its operation cash (“OPC”). As seen, AAPL has been using on average ~33% of the OPC as maintenance CAPEx and dividend. So these two “mandatory” have been on average costing only 1/3 of AAPL’s operation cash in recent years. The quotation mark means even though dividend is usually considered an optional cost. But for a stock with AAPL’s status, management probably won’t cut it unless they really have to.<blockquote>现在让我们来看看再投资部分。近年来，AAPL 如何分配其运营现金（“OPC”）。如图所示，AAPL 平均使用约 33% 的 OPC 作为维护资本支出和股息。因此，近年来，这两项 “强制性 ”平均只消耗了 AAPL 运营现金的 1/3。引号意味着即使股息通常被认为是一种可选成本。但对于像苹果公司这样地位的股票来说，除非万不得已，否则管理层可能不会减持。</blockquote> For the remaining 2/3, the company does have a choice. It can use it for a variety of things: reinvest to fuel further growth, retain it to strength the balance sheet, pay an extra special dividend, pay down debt, buyback shares, et al. It obviously makes total sense to reinvest all of it to fuel further growth given its 150% ROCE. At this ROCE, $1 reinvested would be fuel $1.5 of additional earning! But the problem is that for businesses at this scale, there are just not that many opportunities to reinvest the earnings. As a result, AAPL has been allocating a part of the remaining earning, on average 70% in recently years, to buy back shares. Such repurchases, besides reflecting the confidence of the management on their own business, again also signals the lack of good reinvestment opportunities.<blockquote>对于剩下的2/3，公司确实有选择。它可以将其用于多种用途：再投资以推动进一步增长、保留其以加强资产负债表、支付额外的特别股息、偿还债务、回购股票等。鉴于其 150% 的 ROCE，将其全部再投资以推动进一步增长显然是完全有意义的。在这个ROCE中，1美元的再投资将增加1.5美元的额外收入!但问题是，对于这种规模的企业来说，将收益再投资的机会并不多。因此，AAPL 一直在将剩余收益的一部分（近年来平均为 70%）分配给回购股票。此类回购除了反映管理层对自身业务的信心外，也再次表明缺乏良好的再投资机会。</blockquote> But all things considered, with such spectacular ROCE, AAPL does not need that much reinvestment to grow, as elaborated below.<blockquote>但总的来说，有了如此惊人的 ROCE，AAPL 不需要那么多再投资来实现增长，如下所述。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/190eeaa73f40d26feb7de2b4932718a8\" tg-width=\"640\" tg-height=\"343\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\" width=\"100%\" height=\"auto\"><blockquote></blockquote> Source: author and Seeking Alpha.<blockquote>来源：作者和寻求阿尔法。</blockquote> With a 150% ROCE, it means that even if AAPL only reinvests 5% of its earning to expand the capital employed, it could maintain a 7.5% PGR (PGR = ROCE * fraction of earning reinvested = 150% * 5% = 7.5%). As aforementioned, this is a reason that AAPL can afford to use pretty much all the OPC for dividend and share repurchase after covering its maintenance CAPEx.<blockquote>ROCE 为 150%，这意味着即使 AAPL 仅将其收益的 5% 再投资以扩大所使用的资本，它也可以保持 7.5% 的 PGR（PGR = ROCE * 再投资收益的分数 = 150% * 5% = 7.5%）。如前所述，这就是 AAPL 在支付维护资本支出后几乎可以使用所有 OPC 进行股息和股票回购的原因。</blockquote> Now we have both pieces of the puzzle in place to estimate the long-term return. At its current price levels, the OEY is estimated to be ~3.6%, and the PGR is about 7.5%. So the total return in the long term at current valuation would be a double digit 11% as shown in the chart below. Also as seen, even when ROCE fluctuates somewhat, the fluctuations wouldn’t change the long-term return dramatically.<blockquote>现在，我们已经准备好了这两块拼图来估算长期回报。按目前的价格水平，OEY 估计约为 3.6%，PGR 约为 7.5%。因此，按当前估值计算，长期总回报率将是两位数的11%，如下图所示。同样可以看出，即使 ROCE 略有波动，这种波动也不会极大地改变长期回报。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/93688ad65495c50b51be46b2fcda963c\" tg-width=\"640\" tg-height=\"422\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\" width=\"100%\" height=\"auto\"><blockquote></blockquote> Source: author.<blockquote>来源：作者。</blockquote> <h3>Conclusion and final thought</h3> Many of Buffett's largest and best deals are purchased below or around 10x EBT, ranging from Coca-Cola, American Express, Wells Fargo, Walmart, Burlington Northern, and also the more recent AAPL purchase and his $25B&nbsp;repurchases of BRK.A&nbsp;shares.<blockquote><h3>结论和最后的思考</h3>巴菲特的许多最大和最好的交易都是以低于或约为 10 倍 EBT 的价格购买的，包括可口可乐、美国运通、富国银行、沃尔玛、伯灵顿北方公司，以及最近对 AAPL 的收购和他以 25B 美元回购 BRK.A 股票。</blockquote> This article analyzes AppleInc.under the context as the largest purchase and also largest holding in the Buffett portfolio. This analysis approaches the purchase under a framework that I call the Buffett’s 10x Pretax Rule. The analysis showed that When Buffett purchased AAPL in 2016 and 2017, it met all the requirements for the 10x pretax rule and represented another textbook illustration of his value driven success.<blockquote>本文分析了 AppleInc. 作为巴菲特投资组合中最大的购买和最大的持股。本分析是在我看涨期权巴菲特税前 10 倍规则的框架下进行收购的。分析显示，巴菲特在2016年和2017年收购AAPL时，符合10倍税前规则的所有要求，代表了他价值驱动成功的又一教科书式例证。</blockquote> Then this article also attempted to answer why he is holding it given the current relatively expensive valuation. He is definitely NOT holding AAPL as a technology stock, wishing for the next technology breakthrough to double the earning. He must be holding AAPL for its perpetual autonomous growth – a business that can almost “automatically” grow without the need of too much reinvestment. From this perspective, the result show that these shares still can offer double-digit return even under its current expensive valuation.<blockquote>然后本文还试图回答，鉴于目前相对昂贵的估值，他为什么持有它。他绝对不是将 AAPL 作为科技股持有，而是希望下一次技术突破能够使收益翻倍。他持有 AAPL 一定是为了实现其永久的自主增长--这家企业几乎可以 “自动 ”增长，而无需过多的再投资。从这个角度来看，结果表明，即使在目前昂贵的估值下，这些股票仍然可以提供两位数的回报。</blockquote> And as a final note before ending this section, this might be the most valuable insight that I’ve learned by studying Warren Buffett’s investment philosophy. The insight really is that I do not need a business with double-digit growth to generate double-digit returns. A reliable business that can offer a stable growth at a boring rate of a few percent (like ~5%) can already provide double-digit returns with good certainty as long as A) they are purchased at a reasonable valuation, and B) they have ROCE sufficiently high so that the growth can be driven by reinvesting a small fraction of the income. In the long run, assuming a growth rate more than 5% percent probably is a dangerous assumption to start with anyway.<blockquote>在结束本节之前，最后要说的是，这可能是我通过研究沃伦-巴菲特的投资理念学到的最有价值的见解。真正的见解是，我不需要一个两位数增长的企业来产生两位数的回报。一个可靠的企业能够以几个百分点（比如约5%）的无聊速度提供稳定增长，只要a）它们以合理的估值购买，并且B）它们的ROCE足够高，因此可以通过将收入的一小部分再投资来推动增长。从长远来看，假设增长率超过5%可能是一个危险的假设。</blockquote>","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>Apple Inc. And Buffett: Why He Bought And Why He Holds<blockquote>苹果公司和巴菲特：他为什么买入以及为什么持有</blockquote></title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nApple Inc. And Buffett: Why He Bought And Why He Holds<blockquote>苹果公司和巴菲特：他为什么买入以及为什么持有</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n\nSeeking Alpha2021-08-11 08:34\n\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\nSummary<blockquote>总结</blockquote> <ul> <li>This article analyzes <a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/AAPL\">Apple</a> under the context of it being the largest holding in the Buffett portfolio.</li> <li>This analysis approaches the purchase under a framework that I call the Buffett’s 10x Pretax Rule.</li> <li>And this analysis argues that Buffett holds the AAPL shares in the long term for its perpetual growth prospects, offering double-digit return even under its current expensive valuation.</li> </ul> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/24b65798f03c6f9376257bba2741e588\" tg-width=\"768\" tg-height=\"531\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\" width=\"100%\" height=\"auto\">Justin Sullivan/Getty Images News<blockquote><ul><li>本文分析<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/AAPL\">苹果</a>在它是巴菲特投资组合中最大的持股的背景下。</li><li>本分析是在我看涨期权巴菲特税前 10 倍规则的框架下进行收购的。</li><li>这一分析认为，巴菲特长期持有 AAPL 股票是为了其永久的增长前景，即使在目前昂贵的估值下，也能提供两位数的回报。</li></ul>贾斯汀·沙利文/盖蒂图片社新闻</blockquote> <h3>The investment thesis</h3> If you are reading this, chances are that you already know that AppleInc. (AAPL) is the largest position in Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway portfolio. When many people wonder if the legend has lost his magic touch, and commented on his blunders with the airline stocks, they forgot that he made more than $100B from AAPL stocks alone! With his concentrated investment style, what he lost on the relatively minor bets such as the airlines is only a footnote.<blockquote><h3>投资论文</h3>如果你正在读这篇文章，很可能你已经知道AppleInc。（AAPL）是沃伦·巴菲特伯克希尔·哈撒韦投资组合中最大的头寸。当许多人想知道这位传奇人物是否已经失去了他的魔力，并评论他在航空公司股票上的失误时，他们忘记了他仅从AAPL股票中就赚了超过1000亿美元!以他专注的投资风格，他在航空公司等相对较小的赌注上输掉的只是一个注脚。</blockquote> This article analyzes AAPL under the context of it being the largest holding in the Buffett portfolio. This analysis first approaches his entry decision under a framework that I call the Buffett’s 10x Pretax Rule. And then this analysis argues that Buffett holds the AAPL shares in the long term NOT as a technology stock – he had made it clear enough that he does not understand tech companies and will not invest in them. He must be holding AAPL for its perpetual growth prospects. From this perspective, we will see that APPL will still offer double-digit return in the longer run even under its current expensive valuation.<blockquote>本文在 AAPL 是巴菲特投资组合中最大持股的背景下对其进行分析。本分析首先在看涨期权巴菲特的 10 倍税前规则的框架下探讨了他的入场决策。然后，这项分析认为，巴菲特长期持有 AAPL 股票并不是作为科技股——他已经明确表示，他不了解科技公司，也不会投资它们。他一定是为了苹果公司的永久增长前景而持有它。从这个角度来看，我们将看到，即使在目前昂贵的估值下，APPL 从长远来看仍将提供两位数的回报。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/348a1fb56faeceb8e956ad8f6fa3b09a\" tg-width=\"640\" tg-height=\"645\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\" width=\"100%\" height=\"auto\"><blockquote></blockquote> Source:&nbsp;DataRoma<blockquote>资料来源：DataRoma</blockquote> <h3>Buffett’s 10x Pretax Rule</h3> If you’re a devout Buffett cultist like this author, you must have noticed or heard that the grand master paid ~10x pretax earnings for many of his largest and best deals. The list is a really long one, ranging from Coca-Cola, American Express, Wells Fargo, Walmart, Burlington Northern, and of course the more recent AAPL purchase and his recent $25B&nbsp;repurchases of BRK.A&nbsp;shares as analyzed in my earlier article.<blockquote><h3>巴菲特的10倍税前规则</h3>如果你和作者一样是巴菲特的虔诚崇拜者，你一定注意到或听说过这位大师为他的许多最大、最好的交易支付了约 10 倍的税前收益。名单很长，包括可口可乐、美国运通、富国银行、沃尔玛、伯灵顿北方，当然还有最近收购的 AAPL 和他最近以 25B 美元回购的 BRK.A 股票，正如我在之前的文章中分析的那样。</blockquote> The following chart shows the price history of AAPL and its 10x pretax earning since 2010. Pretax earnings are also referred to as \"EBT\", Earning Before Taxes, in this article. As seen, Buffett made his purchases during 2016-2017 when the price is below or near 10x EBT. I was lucky enough to have made the AAPL purchases at that time myself too.<blockquote>下图显示了 AAPL 的价格历史及其自 2010 年以来的 10 倍税前收益。在本文中，税前收益也称为“EBT”，即税前收益。如图所示，巴菲特在 2016-2017 年期间进行了购买，当时价格低于或接近 10 倍 EBT。当时我自己也很幸运地购买了AAPL。</blockquote> Buffet himself also mentioned and discussed the 10x pretax multiple times in his shareholder meetings and Q&amp;A sessions. An example quote is provided below (highlighting was added by me):<blockquote>巴菲特本人也在股东大会和问答环节中多次提及和讨论 10 倍税前。下面提供了一个示例报价（突出显示是我添加的）：</blockquote> Buffett: “Geico would be valued differently than Gen RE and other insurance businesses because it’s rational to assume a large underwriting profit and significant growth. You cannot say that about many insurance businesses. I would love to buy a new bunch of operating businesses with similar competitive positions to the ones we own now at nine to ten times pretax earnings.”<blockquote>巴菲特： “Geico 的估值将不同于 Gen RE 和其他保险业务，因为假设承保利润丰厚和显著增长是合理的。很多保险业务都不能这样说。我很想收购一批新的运营业务，它们的竞争地位与我们现在拥有的业务相似，税前收益是我们现在的 9 到 10 倍。”</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/9eec812a3eda60f950a1890eebc7dd34\" tg-width=\"640\" tg-height=\"359\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\" width=\"100%\" height=\"auto\"><blockquote></blockquote> Source: author based on Seeking Alpha data<blockquote>资料来源：作者基于Seeking Alpha数据</blockquote> So are there any reasons fundamental to this 10x pretax rule, or is it only a bunch of pure coincidences? I think it is the former and there are indeed many good reasons for this rule, as listed below.<blockquote>那么，这个10倍税前规则有什么根本原因吗，还是只是一堆纯粹的巧合？我认为是前者，这个规则确实有很多很好的理由，如下所列。</blockquote> <h3>First, Why pretax?</h3> Out of all the earning metrics, EPS, operation income, free cash, dividend, etc., why do we favor the pretax earning? I think there are at least two good reasons.<blockquote><h3>首先，为什么要预税？</h3>在所有盈利指标中，每股收益、营业收入、自由现金、股息等。，为什么我们青睐税前收益？我认为至少有两个很好的理由。</blockquote> <ul> <li>After tax earnings do not reflect business fundamentals. Taxes can change from time to time due to factors that have no relevance to business fundamentals, such as tax law changes and capital structure change. Plus there are plenty of ways to lower the actual tax burden of a company.</li> </ul> <ul> <li>Pretax earnings are easier to benchmark, say against bond earnings. The best equity investments are bond like, and when we speak of bond yield, that yield is pretax. So a 10x EBT would provide a 10% pretax earning yield, directly comparable to a 10% yield bond.</li> </ul> <h3>Second, why 10x?</h3> Besides being a nice and round number, it passes the/my common sense test. A 10x pretax multiple roughly translate into 12 to 15x PE depending on the tax rates, which is not far off from the long term average of stock valuation. Furthermore, if we buy average business at 10x pretax, we already get a 10% pretax return. And if we can do better than buying only average business (like Buffett), paying 10x pretax pretty much guarantees double digit pretax earning. Of course, the 10x here is only for businesses that are conservatively leveraged (say with interest coverage around 10x). The number needs to be adjusted for a highly leveraged business or a business with loads of cash.<blockquote><ul><li>税后盈利并不反映业务基本面。由于与业务基本面无关的因素，如税法变化和资本结构变化，税收可能会不时发生变化。此外，还有很多方法可以降低公司的实际税收负担。</li></ul><ul><li>与债券收益相比，税前收益更容易进行基准测试。最好的股票投资是债券，当我们谈论债券收益率时，该收益率是税前的。因此，10 倍 EBT 将提供 10% 的税前收益收益率，直接与 10% 收益率债券相当。</li></ul><h3>第二，为什么是10倍？</h3>除了是一个漂亮的整数，它还通过了/我的常识测试。根据税率的不同，10 倍税前市盈率大致转化为 12 至 15 倍市盈率，这与股票估值的长期平均水平相差不远。此外，如果我们以10倍的税前价格购买普通企业，我们已经获得了10%的税前回报。如果我们能比只收购普通企业（比如巴菲特）做得更好，那么支付 10 倍的税前收入几乎可以保证两位数的税前收入。当然，这里的 10 倍仅适用于保守杠杆率（例如利息覆盖率约为 10 倍）的企业。对于高杠杆企业或拥有大量现金的企业，这个数字需要进行调整。</blockquote> <h3>Third, warning and summary</h3> Here a strong warning is in order. I am NOT suggesting you go out and start buying every/any stock that is below 10x EBT. As investors, we face many risks. Two of the major risks are A) quality risk or value trap, i.e., paying a bargain price for something of horrible quality, and B) valuation risk, i.e., paying too much for something of superb quality. The 10x pretax rule is mainly to avoid the type B risk AFTER the type A risk has been eliminated already.<blockquote><h3>三、警示和总结</h3>这里需要一个强烈的警告。我并不是建议你出去开始购买每一只低于10倍EBT的股票。作为投资者，我们面临许多风险。两个主要风险是a）质量风险或价值陷阱，即为质量糟糕的东西支付便宜的价格，以及B）估值风险，即为质量极佳的东西支付过高的价格。10倍税前规则主要是在A类风险已经消除后规避B类风险。</blockquote> So to summarize, to apply the 10x EBT rule,<blockquote>综上所述，要应用10倍EBT规则，</blockquote> <ol> <li>the business should have not existential issue in the long run. However, at the end, this is largely a subjective judgement.</li> <li>the business should have no existential issue in the short run either. This is can be quite reliably and objectively evaluated based on the cash flow and debt coverage.</li> <li>If we paid 10x pretax and bought a business that meets requirement 1 and 2, we will be paying an average price for an average business. Not the best investment ever, but 10% pretax return is not that bad either. If we get a business that offers ANY growth, then we will be buying an above average business at an average price. And we will have a large chance of a double digit return compounding for a long time (if you hold onto to it long enough like Buffett).</li> </ol> AAPL in 2016 and 2017 obviously met all of the above requirements, and it is another textbook illustration of Buffett’s value driven investment success.<blockquote><ol><li>从长远来看，这家企业应该没有生存问题。然而，归根结底，这在很大程度上是一个主观判断。</li><li>短期内，这家企业也不应该有生存问题。这可以根据现金流和债务覆盖率进行相当可靠和客观的评估。</li><li>如果我们支付了10倍的税前费用，并购买了一家符合要求1和2的企业，我们将为一家普通企业支付平均价格。不是有史以来最好的投资，但10%的税前回报也不错。如果我们得到一个提供任何增长的企业，那么我们将以平均价格购买一个高于平均水平的企业。我们将有很大的机会在很长一段时间内获得两位数的复利（如果你像巴菲特一样持有足够长的时间）。</li></ol>2016 年和 2017 年的 AAPL 显然满足了上述所有要求，是巴菲特价值驱动投资成功的又一教科书式说明。</blockquote> <h3>AAPL: why is he still holding it?</h3> The next question now is: why is he still holding whenits valuation is not long 10x EBT? As a matter of factor, it is at ~23x EBT now, more than double 10x EBT.<blockquote><h3>AAPL：他为什么还拿着？</h3>现在的下一个问题是：当他的估值不到EBT的10倍时，他为什么还持有？作为一个因素，它现在是大约23倍EBT，是10倍EBT的两倍多。</blockquote> I am not going to pretend that I know all his considerations. There are so many aspects that needs to be considered with a position of this size - tax liabilities, alternative investment candidates, opportunity cost, et al.<blockquote>我不会假装我知道他所有的考虑。如此规模的头寸需要考虑许多方面——纳税义务、另类投资候选人、机会成本等。</blockquote> But I am pretty certain about one thing – he is NOT holding AAPL as a technology stock, wishing for the next technology breakthrough and double the earning. He had made it so clear that he does not understand tech companies and will not invest in them. He must be holding AAPL for its perpetual autonomous growth – a business that can almost “automatically” grow without the need of too much reinvestment.<blockquote>但我很确定一件事——他持有 AAPL 并不是作为科技股，而是希望下一次技术突破并将收益翻一番。他已经明确表示，他不了解科技公司，也不会投资它们。他持有 AAPL 一定是为了实现其永久的自主增长--这家企业几乎可以 “自动 ”增长，而无需过多的再投资。</blockquote> He said multiple times that there are businesses which, at the end of the day, point to a bunch of depreciated properties and equipment and tell the investors, “these are our profits.” He hates his business.<blockquote>他曾多次表示，有些企业在一天结束时，会指着一堆折旧的财产和设备告诉投资者：“这些是我们的利润”。他讨厌他的生意。</blockquote> As we will see from the next section, APPL is the exact opposite of those businesses. And due to its ultra-high ROCE and ultra-low requirement of reinvestment to fuel future growth, it will still offer double-digit return in the longer run even under its current expensive valuation.<blockquote>正如我们将在下一节中看到的，APPL与这些业务完全相反。由于其超高的 ROCE 和超低的再投资要求来推动未来增长，即使在目前昂贵的估值下，从长远来看，它仍将提供两位数的回报。</blockquote> <h3>Perpetual autonomous growth</h3> If you, like this author, are a long-term investor who subscribes to the concepts of owner's earning, perpetual growth rate, and equity bond, then the long-term return is simpler. It is \"simply\" the summation of the owner's earning yield (\"OEY\") and the perpetual growth rate (\"PGR\"), i.e.,<blockquote><h3>永久自主生长</h3>如果你和这位作者一样，是一个长期投资者，认购所有者收益、永久增长率和股票债券的概念，那么长期回报就更简单了。它“简单地”是业主盈利收益率（“OEY”）和永久增长率（“PGR”）的总和，即，</blockquote> Longer-Term ROI = OEY + PGR<blockquote>长期投资回报率 = OEY + PGR</blockquote> Because in the long term, all fluctuations in valuation are averaged out (all luck at the end even out). And it doesn't really matter how the business uses the earnings (pay out as dividend, retained in the bank account, or repurchase stocks). As long as used sensibly (as AAPL has done in the past), it will be reflected as a return to the business owner.<blockquote>因为从长远来看，估值的所有波动都是平均值的（所有运气最终都是平均值）。企业如何使用收益（作为股息支付、保留在银行账户中或回购股票）并不重要。只要明智地使用（就像AAPL过去所做的那样），它将被反映为对企业主的回报。</blockquote> OEY is the owner's earnings divided by the entry price. All the complications are in the estimation of the owner's earnings - the real economic earnings of the business, not the nominal accounting earnings. Here as a crude and conservative estimate, I will just use the free cash flow (\"FCF\") as the owner's earnings. It is conservative in the sense that rigorously speaking, the owner's earnings should be free cash flow plus the portion of CAPEx that is used to fuel the growth (i.e., the growth CAPEx). At its current price levels, the OEY is ~3.6% for AAPL (~27.4x price to FCF).<blockquote>OEY是所有者的收入除以入场价格。所有的复杂性都在于对所有者收入的估计——企业的真实经济收入，而不是名义上的会计收入。在这里，作为一个粗略而保守的估计，我将只使用自由现金流（“FCF”）作为所有者的收益。保守的是，严格来说，所有者的收益应该是自由现金流加上用于推动增长的资本支出部分（即增长资本支出）。按当前价格水平计算，AAPL 的 OEY 约为 3.6%（约为 FCF 价格的 27.4 倍）。</blockquote> Again, the valuation is quite expensive and the OEY is merely 3.6%. But do not be under impressed yet, because there is a second part to the long term return, the part is the created by the PGR, perpetual growth rate. In the long term, the growth rate is:<blockquote>同样，估值相当昂贵，OEY仅为3.6%。但还不要低估，因为长期回报还有第二部分，这部分是由PGR创造的，即永久增长率。从长期来看，增长率是：</blockquote> PGR = ROCE * Reinvestment Rate<blockquote>PGR=ROCE*再投资率</blockquote> ROCE stands for the return on capital employed. Note that ROCE is different from the return on equity (and more fundamental and important in my view). ROCE considers the return of capital ACTUALLY employed, and therefore provides insight into how much additional capital a business needs to invest in order to earn a given extra amount of income – a key to estimate the PGR. The reinvestment rate is the portion of income the business plows back to fuel further growth.<blockquote>ROCE 代表资本回报率。请注意，ROCE 不同于股本回报率（在我看来更基本、更重要）。ROCE考虑实际使用的资本回报率，因此可以深入了解企业需要投资多少额外资本才能赚取给定的额外收入——这是估算PGR的关键。再投资率是企业为推动进一步增长而回收的收入部分。</blockquote> So to estimate the PGR, we need to estimate two things: ROCE and reinvestment rate.<blockquote>因此，要估计PGR，我们需要估计两件事：ROCE和再投资率。</blockquote> To estimate the ROCE of businesses like AAPL, I consider the following items capital actually employed:<blockquote>为了估算 AAPL 等企业的 ROCE，我考虑了资本实际使用的以下项目：</blockquote> 1. Working capital, including payables, receivables, inventory. These are the capitals required for the daily operation of their businesses.<blockquote>1、流动资金，包括应付账款、应收款项、存货。这些是他们业务日常运营所需的资本。</blockquote> 2. Gross Property, Plant, and Equipment. These are the capitals required to actually conduct business and manufacture their products.<blockquote>2.财产、厂房和设备总额。这些是实际开展业务和制造产品所需的资本。</blockquote> 3. Research and development expenses (an essential expense for a business like AAPL).<blockquote>3.研发费用（对于像AAPL这样的企业来说是必不可少的费用）。</blockquote> Based on the above considerations, the ROCE of AAPL over the past decade are shown below. As seen, it was able to maintain a respectably high ROCE over the past decade: it used to be 450% early in the decade and still hovers around an average of 150% in recent years since 2016. To put things in perspective, as detailed in myprevious articleforVisa Inc., another autonomous grower that Buffett likes, Visa features a ROCE “only” around 105%.<blockquote>基于上述考虑，AAPL过去十年的ROCE如下所示。正如所看到的，它在过去十年中能够保持相当高的 ROCE：在本世纪初，它曾经是 450%，自 2016 年以来，近年来仍徘徊在平均 150% 左右。正如我在上一篇文章中详细介绍的那样，巴菲特喜欢的另一家自主种植者 Visa Inc. Visa 的 ROCE “只有 ”105% 左右。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/d21191b41d6360f09d6f6496fac499a4\" tg-width=\"640\" tg-height=\"358\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\" width=\"100%\" height=\"auto\"><blockquote></blockquote> Source: author and Seeking Alpha.<blockquote>来源：作者和寻求阿尔法。</blockquote> Now let’s see the reinvestment part. In recent years, the following is how AAPL has been allocating its operation cash (“OPC”). As seen, AAPL has been using on average ~33% of the OPC as maintenance CAPEx and dividend. So these two “mandatory” have been on average costing only 1/3 of AAPL’s operation cash in recent years. The quotation mark means even though dividend is usually considered an optional cost. But for a stock with AAPL’s status, management probably won’t cut it unless they really have to.<blockquote>现在让我们来看看再投资部分。近年来，AAPL 如何分配其运营现金（“OPC”）。如图所示，AAPL 平均使用约 33% 的 OPC 作为维护资本支出和股息。因此，近年来，这两项 “强制性 ”平均只消耗了 AAPL 运营现金的 1/3。引号意味着即使股息通常被认为是一种可选成本。但对于像苹果公司这样地位的股票来说，除非万不得已，否则管理层可能不会减持。</blockquote> For the remaining 2/3, the company does have a choice. It can use it for a variety of things: reinvest to fuel further growth, retain it to strength the balance sheet, pay an extra special dividend, pay down debt, buyback shares, et al. It obviously makes total sense to reinvest all of it to fuel further growth given its 150% ROCE. At this ROCE, $1 reinvested would be fuel $1.5 of additional earning! But the problem is that for businesses at this scale, there are just not that many opportunities to reinvest the earnings. As a result, AAPL has been allocating a part of the remaining earning, on average 70% in recently years, to buy back shares. Such repurchases, besides reflecting the confidence of the management on their own business, again also signals the lack of good reinvestment opportunities.<blockquote>对于剩下的2/3，公司确实有选择。它可以将其用于多种用途：再投资以推动进一步增长、保留其以加强资产负债表、支付额外的特别股息、偿还债务、回购股票等。鉴于其 150% 的 ROCE，将其全部再投资以推动进一步增长显然是完全有意义的。在这个ROCE中，1美元的再投资将增加1.5美元的额外收入!但问题是，对于这种规模的企业来说，将收益再投资的机会并不多。因此，AAPL 一直在将剩余收益的一部分（近年来平均为 70%）分配给回购股票。此类回购除了反映管理层对自身业务的信心外，也再次表明缺乏良好的再投资机会。</blockquote> But all things considered, with such spectacular ROCE, AAPL does not need that much reinvestment to grow, as elaborated below.<blockquote>但总的来说，有了如此惊人的 ROCE，AAPL 不需要那么多再投资来实现增长，如下所述。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/190eeaa73f40d26feb7de2b4932718a8\" tg-width=\"640\" tg-height=\"343\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\" width=\"100%\" height=\"auto\"><blockquote></blockquote> Source: author and Seeking Alpha.<blockquote>来源：作者和寻求阿尔法。</blockquote> With a 150% ROCE, it means that even if AAPL only reinvests 5% of its earning to expand the capital employed, it could maintain a 7.5% PGR (PGR = ROCE * fraction of earning reinvested = 150% * 5% = 7.5%). As aforementioned, this is a reason that AAPL can afford to use pretty much all the OPC for dividend and share repurchase after covering its maintenance CAPEx.<blockquote>ROCE 为 150%，这意味着即使 AAPL 仅将其收益的 5% 再投资以扩大所使用的资本，它也可以保持 7.5% 的 PGR（PGR = ROCE * 再投资收益的分数 = 150% * 5% = 7.5%）。如前所述，这就是 AAPL 在支付维护资本支出后几乎可以使用所有 OPC 进行股息和股票回购的原因。</blockquote> Now we have both pieces of the puzzle in place to estimate the long-term return. At its current price levels, the OEY is estimated to be ~3.6%, and the PGR is about 7.5%. So the total return in the long term at current valuation would be a double digit 11% as shown in the chart below. Also as seen, even when ROCE fluctuates somewhat, the fluctuations wouldn’t change the long-term return dramatically.<blockquote>现在，我们已经准备好了这两块拼图来估算长期回报。按目前的价格水平，OEY 估计约为 3.6%，PGR 约为 7.5%。因此，按当前估值计算，长期总回报率将是两位数的11%，如下图所示。同样可以看出，即使 ROCE 略有波动，这种波动也不会极大地改变长期回报。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/93688ad65495c50b51be46b2fcda963c\" tg-width=\"640\" tg-height=\"422\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\" width=\"100%\" height=\"auto\"><blockquote></blockquote> Source: author.<blockquote>来源：作者。</blockquote> <h3>Conclusion and final thought</h3> Many of Buffett's largest and best deals are purchased below or around 10x EBT, ranging from Coca-Cola, American Express, Wells Fargo, Walmart, Burlington Northern, and also the more recent AAPL purchase and his $25B&nbsp;repurchases of BRK.A&nbsp;shares.<blockquote><h3>结论和最后的思考</h3>巴菲特的许多最大和最好的交易都是以低于或约为 10 倍 EBT 的价格购买的，包括可口可乐、美国运通、富国银行、沃尔玛、伯灵顿北方公司，以及最近对 AAPL 的收购和他以 25B 美元回购 BRK.A 股票。</blockquote> This article analyzes AppleInc.under the context as the largest purchase and also largest holding in the Buffett portfolio. This analysis approaches the purchase under a framework that I call the Buffett’s 10x Pretax Rule. The analysis showed that When Buffett purchased AAPL in 2016 and 2017, it met all the requirements for the 10x pretax rule and represented another textbook illustration of his value driven success.<blockquote>本文分析了 AppleInc. 作为巴菲特投资组合中最大的购买和最大的持股。本分析是在我看涨期权巴菲特税前 10 倍规则的框架下进行收购的。分析显示，巴菲特在2016年和2017年收购AAPL时，符合10倍税前规则的所有要求，代表了他价值驱动成功的又一教科书式例证。</blockquote> Then this article also attempted to answer why he is holding it given the current relatively expensive valuation. He is definitely NOT holding AAPL as a technology stock, wishing for the next technology breakthrough to double the earning. He must be holding AAPL for its perpetual autonomous growth – a business that can almost “automatically” grow without the need of too much reinvestment. From this perspective, the result show that these shares still can offer double-digit return even under its current expensive valuation.<blockquote>然后本文还试图回答，鉴于目前相对昂贵的估值，他为什么持有它。他绝对不是将 AAPL 作为科技股持有，而是希望下一次技术突破能够使收益翻倍。他持有 AAPL 一定是为了实现其永久的自主增长--这家企业几乎可以 “自动 ”增长，而无需过多的再投资。从这个角度来看，结果表明，即使在目前昂贵的估值下，这些股票仍然可以提供两位数的回报。</blockquote> And as a final note before ending this section, this might be the most valuable insight that I’ve learned by studying Warren Buffett’s investment philosophy. The insight really is that I do not need a business with double-digit growth to generate double-digit returns. A reliable business that can offer a stable growth at a boring rate of a few percent (like ~5%) can already provide double-digit returns with good certainty as long as A) they are purchased at a reasonable valuation, and B) they have ROCE sufficiently high so that the growth can be driven by reinvesting a small fraction of the income. In the long run, assuming a growth rate more than 5% percent probably is a dangerous assumption to start with anyway.<blockquote>在结束本节之前，最后要说的是，这可能是我通过研究沃伦-巴菲特的投资理念学到的最有价值的见解。真正的见解是，我不需要一个两位数增长的企业来产生两位数的回报。一个可靠的企业能够以几个百分点（比如约5%）的无聊速度提供稳定增长，只要a）它们以合理的估值购买，并且B）它们的ROCE足够高，因此可以通过将收入的一小部分再投资来推动增长。从长远来看，假设增长率超过5%可能是一个危险的假设。</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://seekingalpha.com/article/4447893-apple-and-buffett-why-he-bought\">Seeking Alpha</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{"AAPL":"苹果"},"source_url":"https://seekingalpha.com/article/4447893-apple-and-buffett-why-he-bought","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1138697562","content_text":"Summary\n\nThis article analyzes Apple under the context of it being the largest holding in the Buffett portfolio.\nThis analysis approaches the purchase under a framework that I call the Buffett’s 10x Pretax Rule.\nAnd this analysis argues that Buffett holds the AAPL shares in the long term for its perpetual growth prospects, offering double-digit return even under its current expensive valuation.\n\nJustin Sullivan/Getty Images News\nThe investment thesis\nIf you are reading this, chances are that you already know that AppleInc. (AAPL) is the largest position in Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway portfolio. When many people wonder if the legend has lost his magic touch, and commented on his blunders with the airline stocks, they forgot that he made more than $100B from AAPL stocks alone! With his concentrated investment style, what he lost on the relatively minor bets such as the airlines is only a footnote.\nThis article analyzes AAPL under the context of it being the largest holding in the Buffett portfolio. This analysis first approaches his entry decision under a framework that I call the Buffett’s 10x Pretax Rule. And then this analysis argues that Buffett holds the AAPL shares in the long term NOT as a technology stock – he had made it clear enough that he does not understand tech companies and will not invest in them. He must be holding AAPL for its perpetual growth prospects. From this perspective, we will see that APPL will still offer double-digit return in the longer run even under its current expensive valuation.\n\nSource: DataRoma\nBuffett’s 10x Pretax Rule\nIf you’re a devout Buffett cultist like this author, you must have noticed or heard that the grand master paid ~10x pretax earnings for many of his largest and best deals. The list is a really long one, ranging from Coca-Cola, American Express, Wells Fargo, Walmart, Burlington Northern, and of course the more recent AAPL purchase and his recent $25B repurchases of BRK.A shares as analyzed in my earlier article.\nThe following chart shows the price history of AAPL and its 10x pretax earning since 2010. Pretax earnings are also referred to as \"EBT\", Earning Before Taxes, in this article. As seen, Buffett made his purchases during 2016-2017 when the price is below or near 10x EBT. I was lucky enough to have made the AAPL purchases at that time myself too.\nBuffet himself also mentioned and discussed the 10x pretax multiple times in his shareholder meetings and Q&A sessions. An example quote is provided below (highlighting was added by me):\nBuffett: “Geico would be valued differently than Gen RE and other insurance businesses because it’s rational to assume a large underwriting profit and significant growth. You cannot say that about many insurance businesses. I would love to buy a new bunch of operating businesses with similar competitive positions to the ones we own now at nine to ten times pretax earnings.”\n\nSource: author based on Seeking Alpha data\nSo are there any reasons fundamental to this 10x pretax rule, or is it only a bunch of pure coincidences? I think it is the former and there are indeed many good reasons for this rule, as listed below.\nFirst, Why pretax?\nOut of all the earning metrics, EPS, operation income, free cash, dividend, etc., why do we favor the pretax earning? I think there are at least two good reasons.\n\nAfter tax earnings do not reflect business fundamentals. Taxes can change from time to time due to factors that have no relevance to business fundamentals, such as tax law changes and capital structure change. Plus there are plenty of ways to lower the actual tax burden of a company.\n\n\nPretax earnings are easier to benchmark, say against bond earnings. The best equity investments are bond like, and when we speak of bond yield, that yield is pretax. So a 10x EBT would provide a 10% pretax earning yield, directly comparable to a 10% yield bond.\n\nSecond, why 10x?\nBesides being a nice and round number, it passes the/my common sense test. A 10x pretax multiple roughly translate into 12 to 15x PE depending on the tax rates, which is not far off from the long term average of stock valuation. Furthermore, if we buy average business at 10x pretax, we already get a 10% pretax return. And if we can do better than buying only average business (like Buffett), paying 10x pretax pretty much guarantees double digit pretax earning. Of course, the 10x here is only for businesses that are conservatively leveraged (say with interest coverage around 10x). The number needs to be adjusted for a highly leveraged business or a business with loads of cash.\nThird, warning and summary\nHere a strong warning is in order. I am NOT suggesting you go out and start buying every/any stock that is below 10x EBT. As investors, we face many risks. Two of the major risks are A) quality risk or value trap, i.e., paying a bargain price for something of horrible quality, and B) valuation risk, i.e., paying too much for something of superb quality. The 10x pretax rule is mainly to avoid the type B risk AFTER the type A risk has been eliminated already.\nSo to summarize, to apply the 10x EBT rule,\n\nthe business should have not existential issue in the long run. However, at the end, this is largely a subjective judgement.\nthe business should have no existential issue in the short run either. This is can be quite reliably and objectively evaluated based on the cash flow and debt coverage.\nIf we paid 10x pretax and bought a business that meets requirement 1 and 2, we will be paying an average price for an average business. Not the best investment ever, but 10% pretax return is not that bad either. If we get a business that offers ANY growth, then we will be buying an above average business at an average price. And we will have a large chance of a double digit return compounding for a long time (if you hold onto to it long enough like Buffett).\n\nAAPL in 2016 and 2017 obviously met all of the above requirements, and it is another textbook illustration of Buffett’s value driven investment success.\nAAPL: why is he still holding it?\nThe next question now is: why is he still holding whenits valuation is not long 10x EBT? As a matter of factor, it is at ~23x EBT now, more than double 10x EBT.\nI am not going to pretend that I know all his considerations. There are so many aspects that needs to be considered with a position of this size - tax liabilities, alternative investment candidates, opportunity cost, et al.\nBut I am pretty certain about one thing – he is NOT holding AAPL as a technology stock, wishing for the next technology breakthrough and double the earning. He had made it so clear that he does not understand tech companies and will not invest in them. He must be holding AAPL for its perpetual autonomous growth – a business that can almost “automatically” grow without the need of too much reinvestment.\nHe said multiple times that there are businesses which, at the end of the day, point to a bunch of depreciated properties and equipment and tell the investors, “these are our profits.” He hates his business.\nAs we will see from the next section, APPL is the exact opposite of those businesses. And due to its ultra-high ROCE and ultra-low requirement of reinvestment to fuel future growth, it will still offer double-digit return in the longer run even under its current expensive valuation.\nPerpetual autonomous growth\nIf you, like this author, are a long-term investor who subscribes to the concepts of owner's earning, perpetual growth rate, and equity bond, then the long-term return is simpler. It is \"simply\" the summation of the owner's earning yield (\"OEY\") and the perpetual growth rate (\"PGR\"), i.e.,\nLonger-Term ROI = OEY + PGR\nBecause in the long term, all fluctuations in valuation are averaged out (all luck at the end even out). And it doesn't really matter how the business uses the earnings (pay out as dividend, retained in the bank account, or repurchase stocks). As long as used sensibly (as AAPL has done in the past), it will be reflected as a return to the business owner.\nOEY is the owner's earnings divided by the entry price. All the complications are in the estimation of the owner's earnings - the real economic earnings of the business, not the nominal accounting earnings. Here as a crude and conservative estimate, I will just use the free cash flow (\"FCF\") as the owner's earnings. It is conservative in the sense that rigorously speaking, the owner's earnings should be free cash flow plus the portion of CAPEx that is used to fuel the growth (i.e., the growth CAPEx). At its current price levels, the OEY is ~3.6% for AAPL (~27.4x price to FCF).\nAgain, the valuation is quite expensive and the OEY is merely 3.6%. But do not be under impressed yet, because there is a second part to the long term return, the part is the created by the PGR, perpetual growth rate. In the long term, the growth rate is:\nPGR = ROCE * Reinvestment Rate\nROCE stands for the return on capital employed. Note that ROCE is different from the return on equity (and more fundamental and important in my view). ROCE considers the return of capital ACTUALLY employed, and therefore provides insight into how much additional capital a business needs to invest in order to earn a given extra amount of income – a key to estimate the PGR. The reinvestment rate is the portion of income the business plows back to fuel further growth.\nSo to estimate the PGR, we need to estimate two things: ROCE and reinvestment rate.\nTo estimate the ROCE of businesses like AAPL, I consider the following items capital actually employed:\n1. Working capital, including payables, receivables, inventory. These are the capitals required for the daily operation of their businesses.\n2. Gross Property, Plant, and Equipment. These are the capitals required to actually conduct business and manufacture their products.\n3. Research and development expenses (an essential expense for a business like AAPL).\nBased on the above considerations, the ROCE of AAPL over the past decade are shown below. As seen, it was able to maintain a respectably high ROCE over the past decade: it used to be 450% early in the decade and still hovers around an average of 150% in recent years since 2016. To put things in perspective, as detailed in myprevious articleforVisa Inc., another autonomous grower that Buffett likes, Visa features a ROCE “only” around 105%.\n\nSource: author and Seeking Alpha.\nNow let’s see the reinvestment part. In recent years, the following is how AAPL has been allocating its operation cash (“OPC”). As seen, AAPL has been using on average ~33% of the OPC as maintenance CAPEx and dividend. So these two “mandatory” have been on average costing only 1/3 of AAPL’s operation cash in recent years. The quotation mark means even though dividend is usually considered an optional cost. But for a stock with AAPL’s status, management probably won’t cut it unless they really have to.\nFor the remaining 2/3, the company does have a choice. It can use it for a variety of things: reinvest to fuel further growth, retain it to strength the balance sheet, pay an extra special dividend, pay down debt, buyback shares, et al. It obviously makes total sense to reinvest all of it to fuel further growth given its 150% ROCE. At this ROCE, $1 reinvested would be fuel $1.5 of additional earning! But the problem is that for businesses at this scale, there are just not that many opportunities to reinvest the earnings. As a result, AAPL has been allocating a part of the remaining earning, on average 70% in recently years, to buy back shares. Such repurchases, besides reflecting the confidence of the management on their own business, again also signals the lack of good reinvestment opportunities.\nBut all things considered, with such spectacular ROCE, AAPL does not need that much reinvestment to grow, as elaborated below.\n\nSource: author and Seeking Alpha.\nWith a 150% ROCE, it means that even if AAPL only reinvests 5% of its earning to expand the capital employed, it could maintain a 7.5% PGR (PGR = ROCE * fraction of earning reinvested = 150% * 5% = 7.5%). As aforementioned, this is a reason that AAPL can afford to use pretty much all the OPC for dividend and share repurchase after covering its maintenance CAPEx.\nNow we have both pieces of the puzzle in place to estimate the long-term return. At its current price levels, the OEY is estimated to be ~3.6%, and the PGR is about 7.5%. So the total return in the long term at current valuation would be a double digit 11% as shown in the chart below. Also as seen, even when ROCE fluctuates somewhat, the fluctuations wouldn’t change the long-term return dramatically.\n\nSource: author.\nConclusion and final thought\nMany of Buffett's largest and best deals are purchased below or around 10x EBT, ranging from Coca-Cola, American Express, Wells Fargo, Walmart, Burlington Northern, and also the more recent AAPL purchase and his $25B repurchases of BRK.A shares.\nThis article analyzes AppleInc.under the context as the largest purchase and also largest holding in the Buffett portfolio. This analysis approaches the purchase under a framework that I call the Buffett’s 10x Pretax Rule. The analysis showed that When Buffett purchased AAPL in 2016 and 2017, it met all the requirements for the 10x pretax rule and represented another textbook illustration of his value driven success.\nThen this article also attempted to answer why he is holding it given the current relatively expensive valuation. He is definitely NOT holding AAPL as a technology stock, wishing for the next technology breakthrough to double the earning. He must be holding AAPL for its perpetual autonomous growth – a business that can almost “automatically” grow without the need of too much reinvestment. From this perspective, the result show that these shares still can offer double-digit return even under its current expensive valuation.\nAnd as a final note before ending this section, this might be the most valuable insight that I’ve learned by studying Warren Buffett’s investment philosophy. The insight really is that I do not need a business with double-digit growth to generate double-digit returns. A reliable business that can offer a stable growth at a boring rate of a few percent (like ~5%) can already provide double-digit returns with good certainty as long as A) they are purchased at a reasonable valuation, and B) they have ROCE sufficiently high so that the growth can be driven by reinvesting a small fraction of the income. In the long run, assuming a growth rate more than 5% percent probably is a dangerous assumption to start with anyway.","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{"AAPL":0.9}},"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":1208,"commentLimit":10,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"symbols":[],"verified":2,"subType":0,"readableState":1,"langContent":"EN","currentLanguage":"EN","warmUpFlag":false,"orderFlag":false,"shareable":true,"causeOfNotShareable":"","featuresForAnalytics":[],"commentAndTweetFlag":false,"andRepostAutoSelectedFlag":false,"upFlag":false,"length":4,"subscribersOnly":false,"subscribersOnlyAccessible":false,"xxTargetLangEnum":"ORIG"},"commentList":[],"isCommentEnd":true,"isTiger":false,"isWeiXinMini":false,"url":"/m/post/892139097"}