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2021-07-29

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Credit Suisse Failed to Act on Archegos Risks, Report Says<blockquote>报告称，瑞士信贷未能针对Archegos风险采取行动</blockquote>

Credit Suisse GroupAG knew Archegos Capital Management was a massive risk and didn’t take actions to

Credit Suisse Failed to Act on Archegos Risks, Report Says<blockquote>报告称，瑞士信贷未能针对Archegos风险采取行动</blockquote>

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{"i18n":{"language":"zh_CN"},"data":{"magic":2,"id":808136951,"tweetId":"808136951","gmtCreate":1627563922073,"gmtModify":1633763779169,"author":{"id":4090639677996150,"idStr":"4090639677996150","authorId":4090639677996150,"authorIdStr":"4090639677996150","name":"wbino","avatar":"https://static.laohu8.com/default-avatar.jpg","vip":1,"userType":1,"introduction":"","boolIsFan":false,"boolIsHead":false,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[],"fanSize":1,"starInvestorFlag":false},"themes":[],"images":[],"coverImages":[],"extraTitle":"","html":"<html><head></head><body>Nice</body></html>","htmlText":"<html><head></head><body>Nice</body></html>","text":"Nice","highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":1,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"favoriteSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/808136951","repostId":1164040651,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1164040651","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1627563297,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1164040651?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-07-29 20:54","market":"us","language":"en","title":"Credit Suisse Failed to Act on Archegos Risks, Report Says<blockquote>报告称，瑞士信贷未能针对Archegos风险采取行动</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1164040651","media":"The Wall Street Journal","summary":"Credit Suisse GroupAG knew Archegos Capital Management was a massive risk and didn’t take actions to","content":"Credit Suisse GroupAG&nbsp;knew Archegos Capital Management was a massive risk and didn’t take actions to fix it, according to an investigation the bank commissioned into the collapse of the family investment firm.<blockquote>根据瑞士信贷集团委托对Archegos Capital Management的倒闭进行的一项调查，该银行知道Archegos Capital Management是一个巨大的风险，但没有采取行动来解决它。</blockquote> The&nbsp;report released Thursday, prepared by a law firm for Credit Suisse, detailed how the bank for years granted Archegos special dispensation to avoid rules meant to protect the bank. It also ignored staff warnings before the family investment firm’s collapse.<blockquote>周四发布的报告由瑞士信贷的一家律师事务所编写，详细介绍了该银行多年来如何授予Archegos特殊豁免，以避免旨在保护该银行的规则。它还忽视了家族投资公司倒闭前员工的警告。</blockquote> Archegos&nbsp;rocked Wall Street&nbsp;when large, concentrated positions it held in a few stocks went sour. Banks lost more than $10 billion exiting the trades. Credit Suisse fared the worst among Archegos’s lending banks, with more than $5.5 billion in losses. Archegos managed the family fortune of Bill Hwang, a former hedge-fund manager.<blockquote>当Archegos持有的几只股票的大量集中头寸出现问题时，它震惊了华尔街。银行退出交易损失超过100亿美元。瑞士信贷在Archegos的贷款银行中表现最差，损失超过55亿美元。Archegos管理着前对冲基金经理Bill Hwang的家族财富。</blockquote> Credit Suisse said Thursday it had lowered its overall risk appetite across the bank, adjusted its governance and is adding more people in risk management. It said all hedge-fund clients in the prime brokerage unit that traded with Archegos have been moved to a dynamic margining system—an upgrade of an earlier system that contributed to the losses.<blockquote>瑞士信贷周四表示，已降低全行的整体风险偏好，调整了治理，并增加了更多风险管理人员。该公司表示，大宗经纪部门中与Archegos进行交易的所有对冲基金客户都已转移到动态保证金系统，这是对导致损失的早期系统的升级。</blockquote> The Archegos losses, along with the collapse of Credit Suisse client Greensill Capital, prompted an existential rethink for the Swiss bank, which marries a giant wealth management business catering to the global rich along with a significant Wall Street presence serving corporations, hedge funds and companies. Nearly two dozen executives have left the bank.<blockquote>Archegos的损失以及瑞士信贷客户Greensill Capital的倒闭促使这家瑞士银行进行了生存反思，该银行将迎合全球富人的大型财富管理业务与为企业、对冲基金和公司提供服务的华尔街重要业务结合在一起。近24名高管已离开该银行。</blockquote> The report, produced by law firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &amp; Garrison LLP, details a dysfunctional culture around protecting the bank from risks.<blockquote>这份由Paul，Weiss，Rifkind，Wharton&amp;Garrison LLP律师事务所制作的报告详细描述了保护银行免受风险的功能失调的文化。</blockquote> “The business was focused on maximizing short-term profits and failed to rein in and, indeed, enabled Archegos’s voracious risk-taking,” the report said. “There were numerous warning signals” that Archegos’s positions posed potentially catastrophic risk” to Credit Suisse.<blockquote>报告称：“该业务专注于短期利润最大化，未能控制Archegos贪婪的冒险行为。”“有许多警告信号”表明Archegos的头寸对瑞士信贷构成了潜在的灾难性风险。</blockquote> The report doesn’t identify executives by name, but singles out for blame the bank’s then-head of equities and the risk managers involved in monitoring the Archegos trades. They “failed to heed these signs, despite evidence that some individuals did raise concerns appropriately.”<blockquote>该报告没有透露高管的姓名，但指出了该银行当时的股票主管和参与监控Archegos交易的风险经理的责任。他们“没有注意到这些迹象，尽管有证据表明一些人确实适当地提出了担忧。”</blockquote> Senior executives were late to find out about the situation, according to the report. The bank’s chief executive, Thomas Gottstein, said Thursday, “I only heard about Archegos basically when it hit the news. I wasn’t aware even about the existence of Archegos.”<blockquote>报道称，高级管理人员发现情况较晚。该银行首席执行官托马斯·戈特斯坦(Thomas Gottstein)周四表示：“我基本上是在新闻发布时才听说Archegos的。我什至不知道Archegos的存在。”</blockquote> It found many of the employees involved were more focused on using superficial fixes. This included allowing Archegos to hedge its massive positions in just a few stocks with options tied to broad stock indexes. Credit risk managers questioned if those would effectively offset risks, but didn’t sufficiently challenge the move.<blockquote>它发现许多相关员工更专注于使用表面修复。这包括允许Archegos通过与广泛股票指数挂钩的期权来对冲其在少数股票中的大量头寸。信用风险经理质疑这些措施是否能有效抵消风险，但没有对此举提出充分质疑。</blockquote> It said the bank’s prime services business, which manages trades and financing for hedge funds, had “a lackadaisical attitude towards risk and risk discipline.”<blockquote>该公司表示，该银行为对冲基金管理交易和融资的prime services业务“对风险和风险纪律态度懒散”。</blockquote> The report details Credit Suisse’s long history with Mr. Hwang, stretching back to his days running a hedge fund called Tiger Asia Management in 2003. He specialized in trading Asian stocks, taking long and short positions.<blockquote>该报告详细介绍了瑞信与黄先生的悠久历史，可以追溯到他2003年管理一家名为老虎亚洲管理的对冲基金的日子。他专门交易亚洲股票，做多做空。</blockquote> Credit Suisse stuck with Mr. Hwang even after Tiger Asia settled insider trading allegations with the Securities and Exchange Commission and&nbsp;pleaded guilty&nbsp;to federal wire fraud charges in 2012.<blockquote>即使在老虎亚洲与美国证券交易委员会就内幕交易指控达成和解并于2012年承认联邦电信欺诈指控后，瑞士信贷仍坚持与黄先生合作。</blockquote> When Tiger Asia was banned from trading in Hong Kong, Credit Suisse helped Mr. Hwang move his trading activity—rechristened under the Archegos name—to New York, where he invested in U.S.-listed Asian companies, relaunching with around $500 million.<blockquote>当老虎亚洲被禁止在香港交易时，瑞士信贷帮助黄先生将他的交易活动（更名为Archegos）转移到纽约，在那里他投资了在美国上市的亚洲公司，并以约5亿美元的资金重新启动。</blockquote> “We have seen no evidence that CS applied any additional scrutiny to Tiger Asia or Hwang in response to these matters,” the report said.<blockquote>报告称：“我们没有看到任何证据表明CS针对这些问题对Tiger Asia或Hwang进行了任何额外审查。”</blockquote> His assets swelled to $3.9 billion in 2016.<blockquote>2016年，他的资产膨胀至39亿美元。</blockquote> Credit Suisse began waiving risk protections related to Mr. Hwang well before Archegos collapsed. In 2017, changes in Mr. Hwang’s trading prompted a 10% margin call, a common request by a bank to post more cash to back up positions as they became riskier. Credit Suisse waived the requirement and created a “bespoke weekly monitoring of Archegos.”<blockquote>早在Archegos倒闭之前，瑞士信贷就开始放弃与黄先生相关的风险保护。2017年，黄先生交易的变化引发了10%的保证金看涨期权，这是银行在风险变得更大时存入更多现金以支持头寸的常见要求。瑞士信贷放弃了这一要求，并创建了“Archegos的定制每周监控”。</blockquote> Then in 2019, Archegos asked to lower its margin requirement, saying competitors were offering a better deal. The margin on the stock-linked derivatives he liked to invest in, known as total return swaps, dropped to 7.5% of the total invested from around 20%.<blockquote>然后在2019年，Archegos要求降低保证金要求，称竞争对手提供了更好的交易。他喜欢投资的股票挂钩衍生品（称为总回报掉期）的保证金占总投资的比例从20%左右降至7.5%。</blockquote> In return, Archegos agreed to give Credit Suisse more power to close out its positions with little notice. But the report says these protections were “illusory, as the business appears to have had no intention of invoking them for fear of alienating the client.”<blockquote>作为回报，Archegos同意给予瑞士信贷更多权力，让其在很少通知的情况下平仓。但报告称，这些保护措施“是虚幻的，因为企业似乎无意援引这些保护措施，因为担心疏远客户。”</blockquote> Archegos’s trading took off in the spring of 2020. As its positions swelled, Archegos repeatedly breached key limits Credit Suisse risk managers had set.<blockquote>Archegos的交易于2020年春季起飞。随着头寸的增加，Archegos一再突破瑞士信贷风险经理设定的关键限制。</blockquote> One type of limit, known as “potential exposure,” or the maximum the bank was likely to lose if markets went against Archegos, was set at $20 million. In April 2020, it was more than $200 million. By August, it swelled to $530 million. Risk managers ignored the warning, figuring a change in the bank’s methodology implemented earlier in the year had thrown off the calculation.<blockquote>一种被称为“潜在风险”的限额，即如果市场对Archegos不利，银行可能损失的最大限额，被设定为2000万美元。2020年4月，超过2亿美元。到8月份，这一数字已增至5.3亿美元。风险经理忽视了这一警告，认为该银行今年早些时候实施的方法变化打乱了计算。</blockquote> Many of the findings of the report&nbsp;echo reporting&nbsp;from a June page one article in The Wall Street Journal, which highlighted the bank’s creaky risk-management systems that left it exposed to human errors in judgment.<blockquote>该报告的许多调查结果与《华尔街日报》6月份头版一篇文章的报道相呼应，该文章强调了该银行摇摇欲坠的风险管理系统，使其容易受到人为判断错误的影响。</blockquote> The report described what it called a “juniorization” of staff as experienced personnel left and a lack of investment in risk technology. Poor governance meant some key staff had to perform multiple roles, and they described feeling overwhelmed by the data and information they had to digest.<blockquote>该报告描述了所谓的员工“初级化”，因为有经验的人员离开了，并且缺乏对风险技术的投资。糟糕的治理意味着一些关键员工不得不扮演多种角色，他们描述了被必须消化的数据和信息淹没的感觉。</blockquote> The problems were amplified by a geographic split between New York and London, with neither co-head of prime services in the different cities believing he was responsible for supervising the Archegos relationship, according to the report.<blockquote>报告称，纽约和伦敦之间的地理分裂加剧了这些问题，不同城市的prime services联席主管都不认为自己有责任监督Archegos的关系。</blockquote> Credit Suisse on Thursday said it would look to reduce its use of co-headed positions and multi-hatted roles.<blockquote>瑞士信贷周四表示，将寻求减少联席主管职位和多头职位的使用。</blockquote> The report listed repeated warning signs that the bank failed to act upon.<blockquote>该报告列出了该银行未能采取行动的反复警告信号。</blockquote> In September 2020, a credit risk manager escalated concerns about the trades to his supervisor. An oversight committee reviewed the positions at a meeting that month but planned actions weren’t taken, the report said.<blockquote>2020年9月，一位信用风险经理向其主管提出了对这些交易的担忧。报道称，一个监督委员会在当月的一次会议上审查了这些职位，但没有采取计划中的行动。</blockquote> Early in 2021, credit risk managers cut Archegos’s internal credit rating citing the firm’s “high performance volatility, concentrated portfolio, and increased use of leverage.” By Archegos’s own estimate, according to the report, it would take between two weeks and a month to liquidate its portfolio, a dangerously long time.<blockquote>2021年初，信用风险经理下调了Archegos的内部信用评级，理由是该公司“业绩波动性高、投资组合集中以及杠杆使用增加”。报告称，根据Archegos自己的估计，清算其投资组合需要两周到一个月的时间，这是一个危险的长时间。</blockquote> The credit risk managers discussed requiring more margin collateral from Archegos, estimating it needed to post around another $1 billion, but the request was never made.<blockquote>信用风险经理讨论了要求Archegos提供更多保证金抵押品，估计它还需要再提供约10亿美元，但从未提出这一请求。</blockquote> In March, the counterparty oversight committee again discussed Archegos, by then the prime brokerage unit’s largest client in terms of position size. The committee decided Archegos would be moved to a dynamic margining system within the next couple of weeks, and if not Credit Suisse would ask for additional margin.<blockquote>今年3月，交易对手监督委员会再次讨论了Archegos，就头寸规模而言，Archegos是当时大宗经纪部门最大的客户。委员会决定在未来几周内将Archegos转移到动态保证金系统，如果不这样做，瑞士信贷将要求额外的保证金。</blockquote> The dynamic margining, which incorporates more real-time data such as market volatility and position concentration into margin calculations, would have made the trades safer, according to the report. In mid-March, Credit Suisse calculated Archegos would have to put up an additional $1.4 billion margin, and told Archegos it wanted to implement the new system the next week.<blockquote>报告称，动态保证金将市场波动和头寸集中度等更多实时数据纳入保证金计算，将使交易更加安全。3月中旬，瑞士信贷计算出Archegos必须额外提供14亿美元的保证金，并告诉Archegos希望在下周实施新系统。</blockquote> Instead, Archegos canceled calls to discuss the step, and began requesting back margin it had at the bank, since the value of the shares it invested in—including&nbsp;ViacomCBS,Inc. and&nbsp;Discovery&nbsp;Inc.,had skyrocketed. In a fateful decision, Credit Suisse returned $2.4 billion in margin collateral to Archegos between March 1 and March 19.<blockquote>相反，Archegos取消了评级讨论这一步骤，并开始要求返还其在该银行的保证金，因为其投资的股票（包括ViacomCBS，Inc.）的价值。和探索公司的股价飙升。在一个决定性的决定中，瑞士信贷在3月1日至3月19日期间向Archegos返还了24亿美元的保证金抵押品。</blockquote> On March 23, Credit Suisse’s gross exposure to Archegos had grown to $27 billion.<blockquote>截至3月23日，瑞士信贷对Archegos的总敞口已增至270亿美元。</blockquote> Credit Suisse released the Archegos report alongside its second-quarter earnings, which were worse than analysts expected and stood in contrast to a strong performance at other European banks. It reported billions in outflows from clients in Asia, which the bank attributed mainly to “proactive de-risking” to cut or reduce ties to some customers.<blockquote>瑞士信贷在发布第二季度收益的同时发布了Archegos报告，该报告差于分析师预期，与其他欧洲银行的强劲表现形成鲜明对比。该银行报告称，亚洲客户资金流出数十亿美元，该银行将其主要归因于“主动去风险”，以切断或减少与一些客户的联系。</blockquote> The report was commissioned by a special committee of Credit Suisse’s board, which included former longtime bank executive Richard Meddings and former&nbsp;JPMorgan Chase&amp; Co. executive Blythe Masters. Paul Weiss’s Chairman Brad Karp oversaw the investigation.<blockquote>该报告是由瑞士信贷董事会的一个特别委员会委托编写的，该委员会包括前长期担任银行高管的理查德·梅丁斯和前摩根大通高管布莱斯·马斯特斯。保罗·韦斯的董事长布拉德·卡普监督了调查。</blockquote>","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>Credit Suisse Failed to Act on Archegos Risks, Report Says<blockquote>报告称，瑞士信贷未能针对Archegos风险采取行动</blockquote></title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nCredit Suisse Failed to Act on Archegos Risks, Report Says<blockquote>报告称，瑞士信贷未能针对Archegos风险采取行动</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n\nThe Wall Street Journal2021-07-29 20:54\n\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\nCredit Suisse GroupAG&nbsp;knew Archegos Capital Management was a massive risk and didn’t take actions to fix it, according to an investigation the bank commissioned into the collapse of the family investment firm.<blockquote>根据瑞士信贷集团委托对Archegos Capital Management的倒闭进行的一项调查，该银行知道Archegos Capital Management是一个巨大的风险，但没有采取行动来解决它。</blockquote> The&nbsp;report released Thursday, prepared by a law firm for Credit Suisse, detailed how the bank for years granted Archegos special dispensation to avoid rules meant to protect the bank. It also ignored staff warnings before the family investment firm’s collapse.<blockquote>周四发布的报告由瑞士信贷的一家律师事务所编写，详细介绍了该银行多年来如何授予Archegos特殊豁免，以避免旨在保护该银行的规则。它还忽视了家族投资公司倒闭前员工的警告。</blockquote> Archegos&nbsp;rocked Wall Street&nbsp;when large, concentrated positions it held in a few stocks went sour. Banks lost more than $10 billion exiting the trades. Credit Suisse fared the worst among Archegos’s lending banks, with more than $5.5 billion in losses. Archegos managed the family fortune of Bill Hwang, a former hedge-fund manager.<blockquote>当Archegos持有的几只股票的大量集中头寸出现问题时，它震惊了华尔街。银行退出交易损失超过100亿美元。瑞士信贷在Archegos的贷款银行中表现最差，损失超过55亿美元。Archegos管理着前对冲基金经理Bill Hwang的家族财富。</blockquote> Credit Suisse said Thursday it had lowered its overall risk appetite across the bank, adjusted its governance and is adding more people in risk management. It said all hedge-fund clients in the prime brokerage unit that traded with Archegos have been moved to a dynamic margining system—an upgrade of an earlier system that contributed to the losses.<blockquote>瑞士信贷周四表示，已降低全行的整体风险偏好，调整了治理，并增加了更多风险管理人员。该公司表示，大宗经纪部门中与Archegos进行交易的所有对冲基金客户都已转移到动态保证金系统，这是对导致损失的早期系统的升级。</blockquote> The Archegos losses, along with the collapse of Credit Suisse client Greensill Capital, prompted an existential rethink for the Swiss bank, which marries a giant wealth management business catering to the global rich along with a significant Wall Street presence serving corporations, hedge funds and companies. Nearly two dozen executives have left the bank.<blockquote>Archegos的损失以及瑞士信贷客户Greensill Capital的倒闭促使这家瑞士银行进行了生存反思，该银行将迎合全球富人的大型财富管理业务与为企业、对冲基金和公司提供服务的华尔街重要业务结合在一起。近24名高管已离开该银行。</blockquote> The report, produced by law firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &amp; Garrison LLP, details a dysfunctional culture around protecting the bank from risks.<blockquote>这份由Paul，Weiss，Rifkind，Wharton&amp;Garrison LLP律师事务所制作的报告详细描述了保护银行免受风险的功能失调的文化。</blockquote> “The business was focused on maximizing short-term profits and failed to rein in and, indeed, enabled Archegos’s voracious risk-taking,” the report said. “There were numerous warning signals” that Archegos’s positions posed potentially catastrophic risk” to Credit Suisse.<blockquote>报告称：“该业务专注于短期利润最大化，未能控制Archegos贪婪的冒险行为。”“有许多警告信号”表明Archegos的头寸对瑞士信贷构成了潜在的灾难性风险。</blockquote> The report doesn’t identify executives by name, but singles out for blame the bank’s then-head of equities and the risk managers involved in monitoring the Archegos trades. They “failed to heed these signs, despite evidence that some individuals did raise concerns appropriately.”<blockquote>该报告没有透露高管的姓名，但指出了该银行当时的股票主管和参与监控Archegos交易的风险经理的责任。他们“没有注意到这些迹象，尽管有证据表明一些人确实适当地提出了担忧。”</blockquote> Senior executives were late to find out about the situation, according to the report. The bank’s chief executive, Thomas Gottstein, said Thursday, “I only heard about Archegos basically when it hit the news. I wasn’t aware even about the existence of Archegos.”<blockquote>报道称，高级管理人员发现情况较晚。该银行首席执行官托马斯·戈特斯坦(Thomas Gottstein)周四表示：“我基本上是在新闻发布时才听说Archegos的。我什至不知道Archegos的存在。”</blockquote> It found many of the employees involved were more focused on using superficial fixes. This included allowing Archegos to hedge its massive positions in just a few stocks with options tied to broad stock indexes. Credit risk managers questioned if those would effectively offset risks, but didn’t sufficiently challenge the move.<blockquote>它发现许多相关员工更专注于使用表面修复。这包括允许Archegos通过与广泛股票指数挂钩的期权来对冲其在少数股票中的大量头寸。信用风险经理质疑这些措施是否能有效抵消风险，但没有对此举提出充分质疑。</blockquote> It said the bank’s prime services business, which manages trades and financing for hedge funds, had “a lackadaisical attitude towards risk and risk discipline.”<blockquote>该公司表示，该银行为对冲基金管理交易和融资的prime services业务“对风险和风险纪律态度懒散”。</blockquote> The report details Credit Suisse’s long history with Mr. Hwang, stretching back to his days running a hedge fund called Tiger Asia Management in 2003. He specialized in trading Asian stocks, taking long and short positions.<blockquote>该报告详细介绍了瑞信与黄先生的悠久历史，可以追溯到他2003年管理一家名为老虎亚洲管理的对冲基金的日子。他专门交易亚洲股票，做多做空。</blockquote> Credit Suisse stuck with Mr. Hwang even after Tiger Asia settled insider trading allegations with the Securities and Exchange Commission and&nbsp;pleaded guilty&nbsp;to federal wire fraud charges in 2012.<blockquote>即使在老虎亚洲与美国证券交易委员会就内幕交易指控达成和解并于2012年承认联邦电信欺诈指控后，瑞士信贷仍坚持与黄先生合作。</blockquote> When Tiger Asia was banned from trading in Hong Kong, Credit Suisse helped Mr. Hwang move his trading activity—rechristened under the Archegos name—to New York, where he invested in U.S.-listed Asian companies, relaunching with around $500 million.<blockquote>当老虎亚洲被禁止在香港交易时，瑞士信贷帮助黄先生将他的交易活动（更名为Archegos）转移到纽约，在那里他投资了在美国上市的亚洲公司，并以约5亿美元的资金重新启动。</blockquote> “We have seen no evidence that CS applied any additional scrutiny to Tiger Asia or Hwang in response to these matters,” the report said.<blockquote>报告称：“我们没有看到任何证据表明CS针对这些问题对Tiger Asia或Hwang进行了任何额外审查。”</blockquote> His assets swelled to $3.9 billion in 2016.<blockquote>2016年，他的资产膨胀至39亿美元。</blockquote> Credit Suisse began waiving risk protections related to Mr. Hwang well before Archegos collapsed. In 2017, changes in Mr. Hwang’s trading prompted a 10% margin call, a common request by a bank to post more cash to back up positions as they became riskier. Credit Suisse waived the requirement and created a “bespoke weekly monitoring of Archegos.”<blockquote>早在Archegos倒闭之前，瑞士信贷就开始放弃与黄先生相关的风险保护。2017年，黄先生交易的变化引发了10%的保证金看涨期权，这是银行在风险变得更大时存入更多现金以支持头寸的常见要求。瑞士信贷放弃了这一要求，并创建了“Archegos的定制每周监控”。</blockquote> Then in 2019, Archegos asked to lower its margin requirement, saying competitors were offering a better deal. The margin on the stock-linked derivatives he liked to invest in, known as total return swaps, dropped to 7.5% of the total invested from around 20%.<blockquote>然后在2019年，Archegos要求降低保证金要求，称竞争对手提供了更好的交易。他喜欢投资的股票挂钩衍生品（称为总回报掉期）的保证金占总投资的比例从20%左右降至7.5%。</blockquote> In return, Archegos agreed to give Credit Suisse more power to close out its positions with little notice. But the report says these protections were “illusory, as the business appears to have had no intention of invoking them for fear of alienating the client.”<blockquote>作为回报，Archegos同意给予瑞士信贷更多权力，让其在很少通知的情况下平仓。但报告称，这些保护措施“是虚幻的，因为企业似乎无意援引这些保护措施，因为担心疏远客户。”</blockquote> Archegos’s trading took off in the spring of 2020. As its positions swelled, Archegos repeatedly breached key limits Credit Suisse risk managers had set.<blockquote>Archegos的交易于2020年春季起飞。随着头寸的增加，Archegos一再突破瑞士信贷风险经理设定的关键限制。</blockquote> One type of limit, known as “potential exposure,” or the maximum the bank was likely to lose if markets went against Archegos, was set at $20 million. In April 2020, it was more than $200 million. By August, it swelled to $530 million. Risk managers ignored the warning, figuring a change in the bank’s methodology implemented earlier in the year had thrown off the calculation.<blockquote>一种被称为“潜在风险”的限额，即如果市场对Archegos不利，银行可能损失的最大限额，被设定为2000万美元。2020年4月，超过2亿美元。到8月份，这一数字已增至5.3亿美元。风险经理忽视了这一警告，认为该银行今年早些时候实施的方法变化打乱了计算。</blockquote> Many of the findings of the report&nbsp;echo reporting&nbsp;from a June page one article in The Wall Street Journal, which highlighted the bank’s creaky risk-management systems that left it exposed to human errors in judgment.<blockquote>该报告的许多调查结果与《华尔街日报》6月份头版一篇文章的报道相呼应，该文章强调了该银行摇摇欲坠的风险管理系统，使其容易受到人为判断错误的影响。</blockquote> The report described what it called a “juniorization” of staff as experienced personnel left and a lack of investment in risk technology. Poor governance meant some key staff had to perform multiple roles, and they described feeling overwhelmed by the data and information they had to digest.<blockquote>该报告描述了所谓的员工“初级化”，因为有经验的人员离开了，并且缺乏对风险技术的投资。糟糕的治理意味着一些关键员工不得不扮演多种角色，他们描述了被必须消化的数据和信息淹没的感觉。</blockquote> The problems were amplified by a geographic split between New York and London, with neither co-head of prime services in the different cities believing he was responsible for supervising the Archegos relationship, according to the report.<blockquote>报告称，纽约和伦敦之间的地理分裂加剧了这些问题，不同城市的prime services联席主管都不认为自己有责任监督Archegos的关系。</blockquote> Credit Suisse on Thursday said it would look to reduce its use of co-headed positions and multi-hatted roles.<blockquote>瑞士信贷周四表示，将寻求减少联席主管职位和多头职位的使用。</blockquote> The report listed repeated warning signs that the bank failed to act upon.<blockquote>该报告列出了该银行未能采取行动的反复警告信号。</blockquote> In September 2020, a credit risk manager escalated concerns about the trades to his supervisor. An oversight committee reviewed the positions at a meeting that month but planned actions weren’t taken, the report said.<blockquote>2020年9月，一位信用风险经理向其主管提出了对这些交易的担忧。报道称，一个监督委员会在当月的一次会议上审查了这些职位，但没有采取计划中的行动。</blockquote> Early in 2021, credit risk managers cut Archegos’s internal credit rating citing the firm’s “high performance volatility, concentrated portfolio, and increased use of leverage.” By Archegos’s own estimate, according to the report, it would take between two weeks and a month to liquidate its portfolio, a dangerously long time.<blockquote>2021年初，信用风险经理下调了Archegos的内部信用评级，理由是该公司“业绩波动性高、投资组合集中以及杠杆使用增加”。报告称，根据Archegos自己的估计，清算其投资组合需要两周到一个月的时间，这是一个危险的长时间。</blockquote> The credit risk managers discussed requiring more margin collateral from Archegos, estimating it needed to post around another $1 billion, but the request was never made.<blockquote>信用风险经理讨论了要求Archegos提供更多保证金抵押品，估计它还需要再提供约10亿美元，但从未提出这一请求。</blockquote> In March, the counterparty oversight committee again discussed Archegos, by then the prime brokerage unit’s largest client in terms of position size. The committee decided Archegos would be moved to a dynamic margining system within the next couple of weeks, and if not Credit Suisse would ask for additional margin.<blockquote>今年3月，交易对手监督委员会再次讨论了Archegos，就头寸规模而言，Archegos是当时大宗经纪部门最大的客户。委员会决定在未来几周内将Archegos转移到动态保证金系统，如果不这样做，瑞士信贷将要求额外的保证金。</blockquote> The dynamic margining, which incorporates more real-time data such as market volatility and position concentration into margin calculations, would have made the trades safer, according to the report. In mid-March, Credit Suisse calculated Archegos would have to put up an additional $1.4 billion margin, and told Archegos it wanted to implement the new system the next week.<blockquote>报告称，动态保证金将市场波动和头寸集中度等更多实时数据纳入保证金计算，将使交易更加安全。3月中旬，瑞士信贷计算出Archegos必须额外提供14亿美元的保证金，并告诉Archegos希望在下周实施新系统。</blockquote> Instead, Archegos canceled calls to discuss the step, and began requesting back margin it had at the bank, since the value of the shares it invested in—including&nbsp;ViacomCBS,Inc. and&nbsp;Discovery&nbsp;Inc.,had skyrocketed. In a fateful decision, Credit Suisse returned $2.4 billion in margin collateral to Archegos between March 1 and March 19.<blockquote>相反，Archegos取消了评级讨论这一步骤，并开始要求返还其在该银行的保证金，因为其投资的股票（包括ViacomCBS，Inc.）的价值。和探索公司的股价飙升。在一个决定性的决定中，瑞士信贷在3月1日至3月19日期间向Archegos返还了24亿美元的保证金抵押品。</blockquote> On March 23, Credit Suisse’s gross exposure to Archegos had grown to $27 billion.<blockquote>截至3月23日，瑞士信贷对Archegos的总敞口已增至270亿美元。</blockquote> Credit Suisse released the Archegos report alongside its second-quarter earnings, which were worse than analysts expected and stood in contrast to a strong performance at other European banks. It reported billions in outflows from clients in Asia, which the bank attributed mainly to “proactive de-risking” to cut or reduce ties to some customers.<blockquote>瑞士信贷在发布第二季度收益的同时发布了Archegos报告，该报告差于分析师预期，与其他欧洲银行的强劲表现形成鲜明对比。该银行报告称，亚洲客户资金流出数十亿美元，该银行将其主要归因于“主动去风险”，以切断或减少与一些客户的联系。</blockquote> The report was commissioned by a special committee of Credit Suisse’s board, which included former longtime bank executive Richard Meddings and former&nbsp;JPMorgan Chase&amp; Co. executive Blythe Masters. Paul Weiss’s Chairman Brad Karp oversaw the investigation.<blockquote>该报告是由瑞士信贷董事会的一个特别委员会委托编写的，该委员会包括前长期担任银行高管的理查德·梅丁斯和前摩根大通高管布莱斯·马斯特斯。保罗·韦斯的董事长布拉德·卡普监督了调查。</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.wsj.com/articles/credit-suisse-report-pins-archegos-disaster-on-fundamental-failure-of-management-and-controls-11627537722?mod=hp_lead_pos4\">The Wall Street Journal</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{},"source_url":"https://www.wsj.com/articles/credit-suisse-report-pins-archegos-disaster-on-fundamental-failure-of-management-and-controls-11627537722?mod=hp_lead_pos4","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1164040651","content_text":"Credit Suisse GroupAG knew Archegos Capital Management was a massive risk and didn’t take actions to fix it, according to an investigation the bank commissioned into the collapse of the family investment firm.\nThe report released Thursday, prepared by a law firm for Credit Suisse, detailed how the bank for years granted Archegos special dispensation to avoid rules meant to protect the bank. It also ignored staff warnings before the family investment firm’s collapse.\nArchegos rocked Wall Street when large, concentrated positions it held in a few stocks went sour. Banks lost more than $10 billion exiting the trades. Credit Suisse fared the worst among Archegos’s lending banks, with more than $5.5 billion in losses. Archegos managed the family fortune of Bill Hwang, a former hedge-fund manager.\nCredit Suisse said Thursday it had lowered its overall risk appetite across the bank, adjusted its governance and is adding more people in risk management. It said all hedge-fund clients in the prime brokerage unit that traded with Archegos have been moved to a dynamic margining system—an upgrade of an earlier system that contributed to the losses.\nThe Archegos losses, along with the collapse of Credit Suisse client Greensill Capital, prompted an existential rethink for the Swiss bank, which marries a giant wealth management business catering to the global rich along with a significant Wall Street presence serving corporations, hedge funds and companies. Nearly two dozen executives have left the bank.\nThe report, produced by law firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, details a dysfunctional culture around protecting the bank from risks.\n“The business was focused on maximizing short-term profits and failed to rein in and, indeed, enabled Archegos’s voracious risk-taking,” the report said. “There were numerous warning signals” that Archegos’s positions posed potentially catastrophic risk” to Credit Suisse.\nThe report doesn’t identify executives by name, but singles out for blame the bank’s then-head of equities and the risk managers involved in monitoring the Archegos trades. They “failed to heed these signs, despite evidence that some individuals did raise concerns appropriately.”\nSenior executives were late to find out about the situation, according to the report. The bank’s chief executive, Thomas Gottstein, said Thursday, “I only heard about Archegos basically when it hit the news. I wasn’t aware even about the existence of Archegos.”\nIt found many of the employees involved were more focused on using superficial fixes. This included allowing Archegos to hedge its massive positions in just a few stocks with options tied to broad stock indexes. Credit risk managers questioned if those would effectively offset risks, but didn’t sufficiently challenge the move.\nIt said the bank’s prime services business, which manages trades and financing for hedge funds, had “a lackadaisical attitude towards risk and risk discipline.”\nThe report details Credit Suisse’s long history with Mr. Hwang, stretching back to his days running a hedge fund called Tiger Asia Management in 2003. He specialized in trading Asian stocks, taking long and short positions.\nCredit Suisse stuck with Mr. Hwang even after Tiger Asia settled insider trading allegations with the Securities and Exchange Commission and pleaded guilty to federal wire fraud charges in 2012.\nWhen Tiger Asia was banned from trading in Hong Kong, Credit Suisse helped Mr. Hwang move his trading activity—rechristened under the Archegos name—to New York, where he invested in U.S.-listed Asian companies, relaunching with around $500 million.\n“We have seen no evidence that CS applied any additional scrutiny to Tiger Asia or Hwang in response to these matters,” the report said.\nHis assets swelled to $3.9 billion in 2016.\nCredit Suisse began waiving risk protections related to Mr. Hwang well before Archegos collapsed. In 2017, changes in Mr. Hwang’s trading prompted a 10% margin call, a common request by a bank to post more cash to back up positions as they became riskier. Credit Suisse waived the requirement and created a “bespoke weekly monitoring of Archegos.”\nThen in 2019, Archegos asked to lower its margin requirement, saying competitors were offering a better deal. The margin on the stock-linked derivatives he liked to invest in, known as total return swaps, dropped to 7.5% of the total invested from around 20%.\nIn return, Archegos agreed to give Credit Suisse more power to close out its positions with little notice. But the report says these protections were “illusory, as the business appears to have had no intention of invoking them for fear of alienating the client.”\nArchegos’s trading took off in the spring of 2020. As its positions swelled, Archegos repeatedly breached key limits Credit Suisse risk managers had set.\nOne type of limit, known as “potential exposure,” or the maximum the bank was likely to lose if markets went against Archegos, was set at $20 million. In April 2020, it was more than $200 million. By August, it swelled to $530 million. Risk managers ignored the warning, figuring a change in the bank’s methodology implemented earlier in the year had thrown off the calculation.\nMany of the findings of the report echo reporting from a June page one article in The Wall Street Journal, which highlighted the bank’s creaky risk-management systems that left it exposed to human errors in judgment.\nThe report described what it called a “juniorization” of staff as experienced personnel left and a lack of investment in risk technology. Poor governance meant some key staff had to perform multiple roles, and they described feeling overwhelmed by the data and information they had to digest.\nThe problems were amplified by a geographic split between New York and London, with neither co-head of prime services in the different cities believing he was responsible for supervising the Archegos relationship, according to the report.\nCredit Suisse on Thursday said it would look to reduce its use of co-headed positions and multi-hatted roles.\nThe report listed repeated warning signs that the bank failed to act upon.\nIn September 2020, a credit risk manager escalated concerns about the trades to his supervisor. An oversight committee reviewed the positions at a meeting that month but planned actions weren’t taken, the report said.\nEarly in 2021, credit risk managers cut Archegos’s internal credit rating citing the firm’s “high performance volatility, concentrated portfolio, and increased use of leverage.” By Archegos’s own estimate, according to the report, it would take between two weeks and a month to liquidate its portfolio, a dangerously long time.\nThe credit risk managers discussed requiring more margin collateral from Archegos, estimating it needed to post around another $1 billion, but the request was never made.\nIn March, the counterparty oversight committee again discussed Archegos, by then the prime brokerage unit’s largest client in terms of position size. The committee decided Archegos would be moved to a dynamic margining system within the next couple of weeks, and if not Credit Suisse would ask for additional margin.\nThe dynamic margining, which incorporates more real-time data such as market volatility and position concentration into margin calculations, would have made the trades safer, according to the report. In mid-March, Credit Suisse calculated Archegos would have to put up an additional $1.4 billion margin, and told Archegos it wanted to implement the new system the next week.\nInstead, Archegos canceled calls to discuss the step, and began requesting back margin it had at the bank, since the value of the shares it invested in—including ViacomCBS,Inc. and Discovery Inc.,had skyrocketed. In a fateful decision, Credit Suisse returned $2.4 billion in margin collateral to Archegos between March 1 and March 19.\nOn March 23, Credit Suisse’s gross exposure to Archegos had grown to $27 billion.\nCredit Suisse released the Archegos report alongside its second-quarter earnings, which were worse than analysts expected and stood in contrast to a strong performance at other European banks. It reported billions in outflows from clients in Asia, which the bank attributed mainly to “proactive de-risking” to cut or reduce ties to some customers.\nThe report was commissioned by a special committee of Credit Suisse’s board, which included former longtime bank executive Richard Meddings and former JPMorgan Chase& Co. executive Blythe Masters. Paul Weiss’s Chairman Brad Karp oversaw the investigation.","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{"CS":0.9}},"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":1233,"commentLimit":10,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"symbols":[],"verified":2,"subType":0,"readableState":1,"langContent":"EN","currentLanguage":"EN","warmUpFlag":false,"orderFlag":false,"shareable":true,"causeOfNotShareable":"","featuresForAnalytics":[],"commentAndTweetFlag":false,"andRepostAutoSelectedFlag":false,"upFlag":false,"length":4,"xxTargetLangEnum":"ORIG"},"commentList":[],"hasMoreComment":false,"orderType":2}